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ABSTRACT 
The societal challenge how to deal with offenders deemed habitually dangerous, requires to 
balance needs for security of the general public with the human rights of the potential extreme 
dangerous offender. The prediction of future heavy crimes can never be precise. Hence, all 
measures infringing the rights of individuals deemed dangerous are very problematic from a 
human rights perspective.  
Germany uses “Sicherungsverwahrung” (preventive detention) to handle this 
challenge. The concept basically meant that after their prison-sentence, offenders deemed 
dangerous were kept in prison like conditions until they were not deemed dangerous anymore. 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) interfered after such measures were 
prolonged and ordered retrospectively. The thesis shows that also the non-retrospective forms 
of preventive detention were problematic under the European Convention on Human Rights, 
because preventive detention did hardly differentiate from a penalty albeit classified as purely 
preventive in Germany. The ECtHR triggered reforms of preventive detention that started a 
development to more human rights conformity, but, as argued in the thesis, the ECtHR 
accepted new forms of preventive detention that still violate the Convention. Consequently, 
Germany still needs to solve the challenge of dealing with offenders deemed dangerous in 
accordance with human rights. 
 
  
SUMMARY 
 “Sicherungsverwahrung” (preventive detention) is a measure in Germany to prevent 
allegedly dangerous offenders from committing heavy crimes by maintaining them in 
detention after their prison-sentence ends. In the German law tradition, it is seen as purely 
preventive, but it was executed very similar to prison-sentences. Preventive detention as a 
concept was developed at the end of the nineteenth century, introduced to law 1934 and 
reformed in the sixties and seventies of the twenties century. Since 1998, the possibilities to 
order it were expanded, including forms of preventive detention with retrospective effect. 
Such an effect had the form of preventive detention that could be retrospectively ordered at 
the end of a prison-sentence and the abolition of the former 10-years maximum duration for 
preventive detention that also included offenders who were already convicted, imprisoned or 
confined in preventive detention. 
Starting with its leading judgement in M. v. Germany at the end of 2009, the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled that the forms of preventive detention, that meant a 
retrospective worsening for the offenders concerned, infringed Art. 5 § 1 European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) because none of the exceptions allowing a deprivation 
of liberty in Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 ECHR applied to those forms of preventive detention. The ECtHR 
especially criticized that there was no causal connection between preventive detention and the 
offender’s “conviction” in the terms of Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2. lit. a) ECHR, if the form of preventive 
detention was not foreseen by law at the time of the conviction. Additionally, the ECtHR 
ruled that preventive detention was executed in a way that it had to be qualified as penalty in 
the terms of Art. 7 § 1. ECHR. Consequently, the forms of preventive detention, that were not 
existent at the time of the offence that lead to their ordering, resulted in a violation of nulla 
poena sine lege. 
These rulings by the ECtHR triggered a reform process in Germany that aimed at 
altering the execution of preventive detention to make its character also under the ECHR 
preventive, instead of punitive. Since these reforms the execution of preventive detention is 
not just confinement in prison conditions anymore, but a comprehensive legal framework tries 
to facilitate treatment and therapy during the detention with the aim to make offenders less 
dangerous and to reintegrate them into society as fast as possible. The legal framework also 
tries to make the burden of the confinement for the detainees as small as possible to 
emphasise the non-penal character of preventive detention. The new legal framework getting 
gradually implemented, can be seen as making the execution of preventive detention not in 
general violating the Convention anymore. 
Most forms of preventive detention with retrospective effect were abolished for the 
future, but Germany also searched ways not to release offenders deemed as extremely 
dangerous, although the forms of preventive detention confining them violated the ECHR. 
The German legislator and the Constitutional Court tried to base the preventive detention for 
those extremely dangerous offenders on Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 lit. e) ECHR, namely the detention “of 
persons of unsound mind”. For this goal Germany implemented a new necessary statutory 
criterion for forms of preventive detention violating the prohibition of retrospective 
worsening. The ECtHR accepted these new forms of preventive detention in individual cases 
as deprivation of liberty justified under Art. 5 § 1 cl.2 lit. e) ECHR and ruled that the new 
 forms of preventive detention are not to be qualified as penalty in the terms of Art. 7 § 1 cl. 2 
ECHR anymore.  
Contrary to the ECtHR, the thesis argues that the new statutory criterion regarding the 
mental condition of the preventive detainees, that was intended to justify forms of preventive 
detention with retrospective effect, was not sufficient to change the assessment under the 
Convention. Not only is the new statutory criterion too loose to alter a measure from 
infringing basic human rights to being consistent with the ECHR, but also the entire German 
conduct to subsequently try to alter a measure to circumvent the Convention is not in line with 
a narrow interpretation of this Convention.  
How human rights apply to the parts of society with the weakest public representation 
of interests, for example, offenders deemed as abnormal and dangerous, is a good indicator 
how civilised a society has become. Every society needs to meet the challenge how to deal 
with offenders deemed as extremely dangerous. The common European human rights 
minimum standards can allow that an answer to this question takes into account the legitimate 
security concerns of the general public. Such an answer might still include that offenders, who 
are predicted to commit the gravest offences if released, are kept in confinement even after 
their ordinary and guilt adequate prison-sentence ended. 
But any confinement, that gets ordered independently from guilt, is very problematic 
from a human rights perspective. It can only be seen as not violating the ECHR if it is shaped 
in itself as human rights friendly as possible. Offenders who are to be confined independently 
of their guilt, need to be treated as good as the circumstances allow. From the beginning of 
their prison-sentence, they have to be treated optimally with the aim to reintegrate them into 
society as fast as possible. Only if a fast reintegration is facilitated with all modern methods, 
such a confinement really serves predominantly a preventive cause. If the offenders have a 
longer detainment than necessary because not everything was done to reintegrate them 
quickly, the confinement is not predominately preventive, but punitive. This is especially 
problematic when prevention is the only justification under national law or the ECHR. In 
addition to state-of-the-art efforts for fast releases, it is also important that the execution of the 
confinement coming after the guilt adequate punishment is as close to life in freedom as 
possible. This later confinement must be shaped as non-punitive as possible to honour that the 
offenders are forced to sacrifice their freedom for the security of the general public. A 
confinement fulfilling the criteria described above, could be an answer complying with 
European minimum human rights standards to the question how to handle allegedly extremely 
dangerous individuals. 
Despite therapeutic treatment, good conditions and sophisticated theoretical 
justifications, for the offenders detained such a measure would still feel like a penalty. Hence, 
it is important not to retrospectively order or enhance it in order to avoid the impression of 
conflicting with the basic human right nulla poena sine lege, as protected by Art. 7 § 1 cl. 2 
ECHR from which is no derogation permitted even in public emergency threatening the life of 
the nation. 
The interactions between Germany and the ECtHR could have been instructive to 
envisage a possible modern answer to the societal challenge of dealing with extremely 
dangerous offenders, but this goal was not reached. It is very positive that the ECtHR 
triggered the development to a more modern, human rights orientated handling of assumed 
danger posed by individuals, but it is regrettable that the ECtHR stopped to push Germany to 
 a system of preventive detention that is fully in line with basic human rights as protected by 
the ECHR.  
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 1 
“Sicherungsverwahrung” (preventive detention) in Germany under the 
scrutiny of the ECHR 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In Germany the term “Sicherungsverwahrung” (preventive detention) describes a measure 
according to which individuals having served their prison sentence are kept in custody with 
the goal to protect the general public.
1 
In contrast to ordinary penalties, preventive detention is 
not limited by the offender’s guilt.2 It ends when it is found with sufficient certainty that the 
offender is not dangerous anymore, making its duration unforeseeable and potentially 
lifelong.
3
 This makes preventive detention arguably the most severe measure in Germany.
4
 
Preventive detention has normally been ordered in the same judgement in which an 
offender has been convicted and sentenced to a prison-term (preventive detention ordered in 
the judgement).
5
 But since 1998 the possibilities to order it and to maintain offenders in 
preventive detention were gradually expanded.
6
 Inter alia, Germany abolished the former 10-
years maximum duration for offenders confined for the first time in preventive detention.
7
 
The abolition also explicitly affected offenders who had already been sentenced 
(retrospectively prolonged preventive detention).
8
 Also, the possibility to order preventive 
detention shortly before the release from prison was introduced (retrospective preventive 
detention).
9
 
This expansion of preventive detention was scrutinised by the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) and starting in 2009, with its leading judgement M. v. Germany
10
, the 
Court declared the aforementioned forms of preventive detention with retrospective effects as 
incompatible with the European Convention on Human rights (ECHR)
11
.
12
 The compatibility 
of various forms of preventive detention with the Convention will be the subject of this thesis.  
                                                 
1
 Thomas Ullenbruch, Kirstin Drenkhahn and Christine Morgenstern, “§ 66 StGB” (Art. 66 Criminal Code) in 
Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch (Munich Commentary on the Criminal Code), 2th volume, 3th 
edition, ed. Wolfgang Joecks and Klaus Miebach (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2016), recital 4. 
2
 Ibid., recital 3. 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Reichsregierung (Government of the Third Reich), Art. 1 nr. 1 §§ 20a and 40e Gesetz gegen gefährliche 
Gewohnheitsverbrecher und über Maßregeln der Sicherung und Besserung (Act against dangerous habitual 
offenders and on measures of prevention and betterment) passed: 24.11.1933 (RGBl I (1933), p. 995. Available 
on: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20180120000042/http://www.servat.unibe.ch/dns/RGBl_1933_I_995_G_Gewohnhe
itsverbrecher.pdf [hereinafter: Habitual Offenders Act]. Preventive detention that was ordered after the 
convicting judgement was only possible for acts that were committed before 1.1.1934 according to a transitional 
provision (Cf. Ibid., Art. 5 nr. 1). 
6
 Michael Alex, Nachträgliche Sicherungsverwahrung ein rechtsstaatliches und kriminalpolitisches Debakel 
(Retrospective preventive detention – a rule of law and criminal policy debacle), 2nd edition (Holzkirchen: Felix-
Verlag, 2013), p. 9-20 [hereinafter: Alex, Debacle]. 
7
 BVerfGE 128, 326, § 8. 
8
 Ibid., § 10. 
9
 Ibid., § 15. 
10
 M. v. Germany (Application nr. 19359/04, judgement of 17 December 2009). 
11
 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
ECHR (last amended by Protocols nr. 11 and 14, published 4 November 1950). Available on: 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. 
 2 
The ECtHR’s judgements triggered a general reform of the execution of preventive 
detention in Germany and changes in the prerequisites of particular forms of preventive 
detention. In this thesis, not only the new system of preventive detention will be assessed, but 
also old forms of preventive detention will be evaluated more rigorously than in the ECtHR’s 
judgements. For this, the insights will help that became more apparent in the subsequent 
reform process.  
This evaluation of preventive detention in Germany under the scrutiny of the ECHR 
tries also to be a small contribution to a question all societies face, namely how to deal with 
offenders deemed notoriously dangerous. Including the historic perspective in which 
individuals deemed dangerous, for instance, were deported or executed,
13
 the approach a 
society chooses might be a good indicator how civilized it has become. The interactions 
between the ECtHR, on the on hand, and the German legislator and Constitutional Court, on 
the other hand show illustrative the struggle to implement a system of prevention that honours 
human rights as guaranteed by the ECHR. Whether such a system was finally established in 
Germany shall be partly answered in the following chapters. 
The next chapter (2.) contains a description of the theoretical conception of preventive 
detention also with the aim to provide a knowledge base for argumentation in subsequent 
parts. Afterwards, in chapter 3., I will outline the developments of preventive detention prior 
to the ECtHR’s leading judgement M. v. Germany in late 2009 and try to answer the first 
research question whether the different forms of preventive detention were compatible with 
the ECHR before 2010. Chapter 4. will briefly outline the reform process in Germany that 
was triggered by the ECtHR’s judgements. These reforms took mainly effect on the 1.6.2013. 
Hence, Chapter 5. will evaluate the second research question, whether these reforms in 
Germany brought the system of preventive detention in line with the Convention after this 
date. This will also provide a basis to answer the underlying question whether the changes are 
an example for a successful cooperation between the ECtHR and a State Party to the 
Convention that improved the human rights situation in Germany or if the German legislator 
together with the Federal Constitutional Court searched a way to circumvent the requirements 
of the Convention. Lastly, the conclusions (chapter 6.) will attempt to set out what can be 
learned from the interaction between the ECtHR and the German constitutional institutions 
with regard to the question of how a society could deal with allegedly dangerous offenders in 
accordance with human rights 
Due to the word limit of this master thesis, only the key dates of preventive detention 
for juveniles and young adults will be mentioned, but the specifics will not be discussed. 
2. THEORETICAL CONCEPTION OF PREVENTIVE DETENTION 
The societal challenge, how to handle offenders deemed dangerous, was answered partly with 
preventive detention as part of the twin-track system in Germany.
14
 This twin-track system in 
                                                                                                                                                        
12
 Axel Dessecker, “§ 66 StGB” (Art. 66 criminal code), in Strafgesetzbuch (criminal code), 1st volume, 5th 
edition, ed. by Urs Kindhäuser, Ulfired Neumann and Hans-Ulrich Pfaeffgen, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2017) 
recital 6. 
13
 BVerfGE 109, 133, § 2. 
14
 Ibid., §§ 2 f. 
 3 
the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch [hereinafter: StGB])
15
 distinguishes between 
Strafen (penalties)
16
 and Maßregeln der Besserung und Sicherung (measures of betterment 
and prevention)
17
.
18
 Penalties can only be imposed in connection with guilt which is the basis 
for the sentencing.
19
 Contrary to that, the dangerousness of the offender is the basis for the 
measures of betterment and prevention, whereas the guilt or absence thereof is not a 
condition.
20
 Their goal is to protect the general public.
21
 Correction of the offender’s 
behaviour and hindering him to damage the general public are the means to reach this goal. 
The betterment of the offender in itself is not the purpose of the measures of betterment and 
prevention, as it is not allowed to impose the measures against an individual who is unlikely 
to commit further offences.
22
 On the other hand, it is possible to detain an offender, who is not 
capable of betterment, to secure the general public.
23
 Precondition for all measures of 
betterment and prevention are Anlasstat (triggering offence), danger of future crimes and 
proportionality.
24
 Preventive detention additionally in its concept requires a guilty verdict.
25
 
That means that preventive detention only gets ordered if the offender was convicted and 
sentenced to a prison-term by a court. Such a conviction requires that the offender is fully or 
diminished criminally liable.
26
  
The background of the twin-track system was significantly shaped by Franz von 
Liszt’s penal theory of the idea of purpose (to prevent future crimes) in criminal law (punitur 
ne peccetur), as expounded in his inaugural speech 1882, called “Marburger Programm”.27 
                                                 
15
 Strafgesetzbuch, StGB (Criminal Code), (last amended by Article 62 of the Act of 20.11.2019 [BGBl. I 
(2019), p. 1626]), in the version of the publication of 13.11.1998. Available on: https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/stgb/BJNR001270871.html. 
16
 Penalties in the German Criminal Code are prison sentence (Art. 38 StGB), fines (Art. 40 StGB) and 
subordinated the driving ban for a maximum duration of six months (Art. 44 StGB). 
17
 The measures of betterment and prevention are enlisted in Art. 61 StGB: (1.) placement in a psychiatric 
hospital, (2.) placement in an addiction treatment facility, (3.) placement in preventive detention, (4.) supervision 
of conduct, (5.) disqualification from driving, (6.) disqualification from exercising a profession. 
18
 Gerhard van Gemmern, “§ 61 StGB” (Art. 61 criminal code) in Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch 
(Munich Commentary on the Criminal Code), 2nd volume, 3th edition, ed. Wolfgang Joecks and Klaus Miebach 
(Munich: C.H. Beck, 2016), recital 1. 
19
 See Art. 46 StGB, stating that guilt is the base on which the penalty is fixed; BVerfGE, 91, 1, § 78; Van 
Gemmern, “§ 61 StGB”, supra note 18. 
20
 BVerfGE 109, 133, § 149; Van Gemmern, “§ 61 StGB”, supra note 18; Dominik Brodowski, 
“Diskussionsbeiträge der 36. Tagung der deutschsprachigen Strafrechtslehrerinnen und Strafrechtslehrer 2015 in 
Augsburg” (Contributions to the discussion at the 36th Conference of German-speaking Criminal Law Teachers 
2015 in Augsburg), ZSTW (issue 127[3], 2015): 691 (722) [hereinafter: Brodowski, “Criminal Law Conference 
2015”], citing Stuckenberg. 
21
 Van Gemmern, “§ 61 StGB”, supra note 18. 
22
 Ibid.; Gerhard, van Gemmern, “§ 63 StGB“ (Art. 63 criminal code) in Münchener Kommentar zum 
Strafgesetzbuch (Munich Commentary on the Criminal Code), 2nd volume, 3th edition, ed. Wolfgang Joecks and 
Klaus Miebach (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2016), recital 1; Gerhard, van Gemmern, “§ 64 StGB“ (Art. 64 criminal 
code) in Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch (Munich Commentary on the Criminal Code), 2nd volume, 
3th edition, ed. Wolfgang Joecks and Klaus Miebach (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2016), recital 1. 
23
 Van Gemmern, “§ 61 StGB”, supra note 18. 
24
 Art. 62-66b, 68, 69, 70 StGB; Van Gemmern, “§ 61 StGB”, supra note 18, recital 3. 
25
 Art. 66 § 1 nr. 1, Art. 66a § 1 nr. 1 StGB. An exception is regulated in Art. 66b § 1 (former § 3) StGB (see 
infra chapters 3.2.3.2. and 5.3.2.).  
26
 Art. 20 f. StGB; Georg Freund, “Vorbemerkung zu § 13” (Preliminary remark on Art. 13), in Münchener 
Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch (Munich Commentary on the Criminal Code), 1st Volume, 3th edition, edited 
by Wolfgang Joecks and Klaus Miebach (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2017), recitals 237 f. 
27
 Cf. for von Liszt’s theory in written form: Franz von Liszt, “Der Zweckgedanke im Strafrecht.” (The purpose-
idea in criminal law.) ZSTW, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft (1883): pp. 1-47 [hereinafter: 
von Liszt, “purpose-idea“]; Kristin Drenkhahn and Christine Morgenstern, “Dabei soll es auf den Namen nicht 
ankommen – der Streit um die Sicherungsverwahrung“ (It should not depend on the name - the dispute over 
 4 
His theory was a counter-draft to the then predominant idea of retribution as main reason for 
punishment (punitur quia peccatum est).
28 According to Liszt’s theory, the reason for a penal 
system should be purpose-directed special prevention.
29 
Punishment should serve deterrence, 
rehabilitation and societal protection.
30 Therefore, “occasional offenders” should receive a 
suspended sentence as warning, "reformable offenders" should receive (longish) custodial 
sentences, which should be accompanied by measures of resocialisation, and “incorrigible 
offenders” should be given very long custodial sentences (or with indefinite duration) to 
protect the general public.
31 
To achieve actual reform that also implements the last mentioned 
very long custodial sentences for incorrigible offenders, von Liszt saw its naming as a 
compromise-tool to win over the legal scientists who wanted the amount of guilt to form the 
punishment’s limit.32 Hence, in 1893 he suggested to call the very long custodial measures for 
incorrigible offenders “Sicherheitsmaßregeln” (measures of prevention/securing-measures), 
instead of naming them punishments.
33
 Von Liszt even mocked his opponents in this dispute 
over schools of thought with declaring:  
It should not depend on the name one wants to give the child. This is the loveable 
side... of our opponents, that they are satisfied if the time-honoured labels [meant is 
the punishing because of retribution] are spared.
34
 
 
In the same article he also called the idea to combine a short penalty with a long and severe 
subsequent custody, but to name it differently than penalty, a “ridiculous absurdity”35. 
                                                                                                                                                        
preventive detention), ZSTW, (issue 124 [1], 2012): 132 (133 f., 201) [hereinafter: Drenkhahn and Morgenstern, 
“It should not depend on the name“]. 
A reform-movement carried by von Liszt’s “Marburger Programm” and Gustav Radbruch leaded to the 
introduction of the twin-track system in draft reforms for the German criminal code. The reform-movement was 
based in turn on the Italian school of positive criminology by Enrico Ferri and Raffaele Garofalo as well as Carl 
Stooss’s idea of securing the society against criminals. (Cf. Helmut Pollähne, “§ 61 StGB” [Art. 61 criminal 
code], in Strafgesetzbuch [Criminal code], 1st volume, 5th edition, ed. Urs Kindhäuser, Ulfried Neumann and 
Hans-Ulrich Pfaeffgen. [Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2017], recital 2.). 
28
 Von Liszt, “purpose-idea”, supra note 27, pp. 1 f., 33-36; Drenkhahn and Morgenstern, “It should not depend 
on the name“, supra note 27, pp. 133 f., 168. 
Although it was a counter-draft, Liszt described his approach as “Vereinigungstheorie” (unification theory), 
demanded that new scientific findings be taken into account and explained that the penalty for a purpose would 
be the evolution of the primitive penalty as in the criminal theories of Immanuel Kant and Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel. (Cf. von Liszt, “purpose-idea”, supra note 27, pp. 9-33, 43 f., 46 f.; Katrin Höffler, “Tätertypen 
im Strafrecht und in der Kriminologie” (Types of offenders in criminal law and criminology), ZSTW (issue 
127[4], 2015): 1018 (1020). 
29
 Von Liszt, “purpose-idea”, supra note 27, pp. 33 f.; Wolfgang Joecks, “Einleitung” (Introduction) in 
Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch (Munich Commentary on the Criminal Code), 1st volume, 3th 
edition, ed. Wolfgang Joecks and Klaus Miebach, (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2017), recitals 62 f. 
30
 Von Liszt, “purpose-idea”, supra note 27, pp. 33 f. 
31
 Ibid., pp. 35-42. 
32
 Franz von Liszt, “Die Deterministischen Gegner der Zweckstrafe.” (The Deterministic Opponents of the 
Purpose-driven Penalty.) ZSTW (1893): 325 (367 f.) [hereinafter: von Liszt, “Deterministic Opponents”]. 
33
 Ibid. Von Liszt opposed the idea of dividing the administration of the penitentiary system in two tracks, but 
was ready to accept a nominal division to achieve his goal of a purpose driven penalty. (Cf. Franz von Liszt, 
Ibid., pp. 368 f.; Drenkhahn and Morgenstern, “It should not depend on the name“, supra note 27, pp. 133 f.). 
34
 (Translation) The original quote is: “Dabei soll es uns auf den Namen nicht ankommen, den man dem Kinde 
geben will. Das ist ja die liebenswürdige Seite… unserer Gegner, daß sie zufirenden sind, wenn die 
altehrwürdigen Etiketten [meant is the punishing because of retribution] geschont werden.” (Von Liszt, 
“Deterministic Opponents”, supra note 32, pp. 367 f.). 
35
 (Translation) The original quote is: “lächerlicher Widersinn” (Von Liszt, “Deterministic Opponents”, supra 
note 32, p 368). 
 5 
Despite this public mocking, the twin-track system including a securing measure, like 
suggested by von Liszt, became part of all draft reforms for the criminal code since 1906.
36
 
According to von Liszt, his three types of purposes of penalties (deterrence[1], 
rehabilitation[2] and societal protection[3]), are simultaneously the three ways of protecting 
“Rechtsgüter” (legal protected goods37); from this, in turn, he draws the conclusion that his 
three corresponding categories of punishment (suspended sentence as warning[1], longish 
custodial sentences accompanied by resocialisation measures[2] and long custodial 
sentence[3] match three “Tätertypen” (types of offenders): the not in need of correction[1], 
the corrigible and in need of correction[2], and the incorrigible criminal[3].
38
 
The idea of “Tätertypen”, in turn, fitted well in the Nazi-ideology. The Nazis, finally 
on 24.11.1933, introduced the twin-track system including preventive detention as a custodial 
measure of prevention and betterment
39
.
40
 The criteria for ordering preventive detention was 
the “Hang” (propensity) to commit crimes and the necessity for public security.41 The Nazis 
interpreted preventive detention according to their ideology and described the detainees as 
“unworthy life”, as “parasites on the German’s people’s body” and handed them to 
extermination by work.
42
 This shows the inherent danger of extreme utilitarian interpretations 
in von Liszt’s, humanitarian-intended, special prevention.43 
In the Federal Republic the law stayed almost unchanged, until reforms in 1969 and 
1975 mainly limited the possibilities to order preventive detention.
44
 The background was 
inter alia the idea to end preventive detention of non-dangerous offenders, to facilitate 
preventive detention of dangerous criminals and to emphasise its character as measure of last 
resort, as well as concerns regarding prognoses-accuracy.
45
 
                                                 
36
 Ullenbruch, Drenkhahn and Morgenstern, “§ 66 StGB”, supra note 1, recital 17; BVerfGE 109, 133, § 3. 
37
 “Rechtsgüter” is roughly translated. Other translations include “legal interests” or “protected rights”, but are 
not precise either. 
38
 Von Liszt, “purpose-idea”, supra note 27, pp. 35, 44 f.; Höffler, supra note 28, p. 1021. As von Liszt explains, 
the reasons for three different categories of offenders correspond to his three different reasons to punish: The 
retribution can only be vis-à-vis a concrete offence and this offence is inseparable from the offender. There is no 
crime that not the criminal committed. The penalty is directed against the criminal not against the notions of 
crimes. (Cf. Von Liszt, “purpose-idea”, supra note 27, pp. 35, 44). 
39
 The order of the words “prevention” and “betterment” was changed to betterment and prevention in 1975. (Cf. 
Bundestagsdrucksache 7/550 [Bundestag printed paper 7/550], p. 191). 
40
 Habitual Offenders Act, supra note 5; BVerfGE 109, 133, § 3 f; Ullenbruch, Drenkhahn and Morgenstern, “§ 
66 StGB”, supra note 1, recital 17; Ilnseher v. Germany [GC] (Applications nr. 10211/12 and 27505/14, 
judgement of 4 December 2018), dissenting opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque joined by Judge Dedov, § 3 
[hereinafter: Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], dissenting opinion Judge Pinto de Albuquerque joined by Judge Dedov]. 
41
Art. 1, 2 Habitual Offenders Act, supra note 5, (Art. 1 introduced Art. 20a in the StGB), Art. 2 introduced Art. 
42e in the StGB; today, after major changes: Art. 66 StGB); Ullenbruch, Drenkhahn and Morgenstern, “§ 66 
StGB”, supra note 1, recital 18; Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], dissenting opinion Judge Pinto de Albuquerque 
joined by Judge Dedov, supra note 40.  
42
 Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], dissenting opinion Judge Pinto de Albuquerque joined by Judge Dedov, supra note 
40, § 4; Pollähne, “§ 61 StGB“, supra note 27, recital 2; Ullenbruch, Drenkhahn and Morgenstern, “§ 66 StGB”, 
supra note 1, recital 18. 
43
 Pollähne, “§ 61 StGB“, supra note 27, recital 2. 
44
 BVerfGE 109, 133, §§ 5 f; In the German Democratic Republic, on the other hand, the highest court in 1952 
abolished preventive detention, because it was based on the doctrine of “Tätertypen” (types of offenders) and 
therefore was considered contentual fascistic. (Cf. Tobias Mushoff, Strafe – Maßregel – Sicherungsverwahrung. 
Eine kritsche Untersuchung über das Verhältnis von Schuld und Prävention [Punishment – measure of 
correction and prevention - preventive detention. A critical examination of the relationship between guilt and 
prevention], [Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften, 2008], p. 28). 
45
 Bundestagsdrucksache V/4094 (Bundestag printed paper V/4094), pp. 21. f; BVerfGE 109, 133, § 14.  
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The modern analysis of the twin-track system abandoned a general claim to truth.
46
 
The methodological approach is critical reflection of different disciplines, schools of thought 
and theories also of neighbouring sciences with the goal to analyse interdisciplinary and 
holistically complex societal realties.
47
 This means to search in the state of tension between 
legitimate societal security interests on the one hand and human rights and the rule of law on 
the other hand for norms based on theory-driven empiricism.
48
 The goal of preventive 
detention is to prevent grave crimes.
49
 The prognosis of such crimes is the most important 
scientific challenge for the field of preventive detention.
50
 In that field, the frequency with 
which grave crimes are committed after release is called base-rate.
51
 Because of the small 
base-rate of such past-release offences the probability for false-positives (offenders that are 
forecasted to commit heavy offences, but would in fact not if released) is very high.
52
 The 
prognosis is hard to verify as offenders diagnosed dangerous are normally not released.
53
 
False-positives make the justification of preventive detention in general a scientific 
challenge.
54
  
The reforms from 1998 until 2008 expanding the possibilities to order preventive 
detention and its maximum duration were not scientifically driven.
55
 For instance, the 
professional public just learned about the abolition of the 10-years maximum duration for 
preventive detention after it got into force in 1998.
56
 Instead these reforms were either 
motivated by the view in politics that the public demanded for a recollection in the broader 
                                                 
46
 Pollähne, “§ 61 StGB“, supra note 27 recital 2. 
47
 Ibid. 
48
 Ibid. 
49
 Jörg Kinzig, “Die Praxis der Sicherungsverwahrung. Ergebnisse eines empirischen Forschungsvorhabens” 
(The practice of preventive detention. Results of an empirical research project), ZSTW (issue 109[1], 1997): 122 
(125 f.) [hereinafter: Kinzig, “results of a research project”]. In psychology in general, base-rate describes the 
distribution of characteristics in a group of the population. (Cf. “Lexikon der Psychologie: Basisraten” [Lexica of 
psychologie: base-rates], Spektrum.de. Available on: 
https://www.spektrum.de/lexikon/psychologie/basisraten/1937). 
50
 Kinzig, “results of a research project”, supra note 49, pp. 124-126. 
51
 Ibid., pp. 125 f., footnote 17); Norbert Nedopil, “Prognosebegutachtungen bei zeitlich begrenzten 
Freiheitsstrafen - Eine sinnvolle Lösung für problematische Fragestellungen?“ (Forecast assessments regarding 
prison sentences of limited duration - A sensible solution for problematic issues?), NStZ, Neue Zeitschrift für 
Strafrecht (issue 7, 2002): 344 (347 f.). 
52
 Kinzig, “results of a research project”, supra note 49, pp. 125 f; Nedopil, supra note 51, pp. 347 f. 
Only a small number of people is in preventive detention, only a smaller number is released and only an even 
smaller number commits serious crimes afterwards. (Cf. Alex, Debacle, supra note 6, pp. 80, 102 f.) 
Eisenberg and Schlüter state that a prognosis for young people is almost impossible because of engraved 
difficulties in predicting their personal and social development. (Cf. Ulrich Eisnberg and Susanne Schlüter, 
“Extensive Gesetzesauslegung bei Anordnung von Sicherungsverwahrung“ [Extensive interpretation of the law 
when ordering preventive detention], NJW, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [issue 3, 2001]: 188 [190]). 
Brodowski cites Johannes Kaspar who stated that it is not proven that without preventive detention the level of 
crime would rise. (Cf. Brodowski, “Criminal Law Conference 2015”, supra note 20, pp. 722 f.). 
53
 Nedopil, supra note 51, pp. 346 f. 
54
 Kinzig, “results of a research project”, supra note 49, pp. 125 f. 
55
 Alex, Debacle, supra note 6, pp. 20-23; Drenkhahn and Morgenstern, “It should not depend on the name”, 
supra note 27, pp. 136 f. 
Albrecht explains with regard to the entire reform of the sexual criminal law that it was not driven by scientific 
insights, but by public demands for harsher penalties. (Cf. Hans-Jörg Albrecht, “Die Determinanten der 
Sexualstrafrechtsreform” [determinants of the criminal law reform], ZSTW [issue 111(4), 1999]: 863 [869-874]). 
Arthur Kreuzer is cited by Heger saying that the introduction of retrospective preventive detention was not based 
on verification of a real increase in crime, but on populistic considerations. (Cf. Martin Heger, 
“Diskussionsbeiträge der Strafrechtslehrertagung 2005 in Frankfurt/Oder” [Contributions to the discussion at the 
2005 criminal law teachers' conference in Frankfurt/Oder], ZSTW, [issue 117(4), 2005]: 865 [881]). 
56
 Drenkhahn and Morgenstern, “It should not depend on the name”, supra note 27, pp. 136 f. 
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criminal law to harsh punishments actually carried out
57
 or, as others describe it, by a reaction 
to extensive media coverage about individual sexually motivated child murders (by released 
offenders), although the total case numbers were declining.
58
 Hence, they can be interpreted 
as a decision for enhanced public security in its tension-state with human rights and the rule 
of law.
59
 Attempts to classify the motivation behind this shift towards the emphasis on 
security are the wish to prevent certain forms of criminality fully,
60
 the demonization of 
certain offenders,
61
 the idea to sanction also the threat to legally protected rights, instead of 
just their violation
62
 or the effort to better the security-feeling of the population
63
.  
                                                 
57
 Albrecht, supra note 55, pp. 865, 876-880. 
58
 Alex, Debacle, supra note 6, p. 8-10; Katharina Ebner, Die Vereinbarkeit der Sicherungsverwahrung mit 
deutschem Verfassungsrecht und der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention (The compatibility of preventive 
detention with German constitutional law and the European Convention on Human Rights), (Hamburg: Verlag 
Dr. Kovač, 2015), pp. 27 f. Alex and Ebner name as examples the discovery of the case Dutroux in 1996 and one 
month later the sexual abuse and murdering of the seven-year-old Nathalie S. by an offenders released from 
prison early and in January 1997; the sexual abuse and murdering of a ten-year-old by an offender sentenced to 
six years before under juvenile criminal law for the murder of another child. 
The in 1997 proposed legislation to alter the sexual criminal law and to extend the possibilities to order 
preventive detention begins with the explanation that the coming to light of sexual offences committed against 
children would show that protection of the general public would need to be improved. (Cf. 
Bundestagsdrucksache 13/7163 [Bundestag printed paper 13/7163], p. 1). 
The expansion of the possibilities for preventive detention was also contrary to the development of child-
murders connected to sexual-delicts: Graphic of sexual murders against children (Source: Albrecht, supra note 
55, p. 872):
 
From 1987 until 1991 24 cases were registered in Germany, from 1997 until 2001 the number was 12. (Cf. Alex, 
Debacle, supra note 6, p. 181). 
59
 Albrecht, supra note 55, p. 865. 
60
 The idea to prevent some forms of criminality fully is deemed illusionary in criminology. (Cf. Albrecht, supra 
note 55, p. 876; Alex, Debacle, supra note 6, p. 102). 
61
 Albrecht, supra note 55, pp. 876 f. Indicative is the quotation of Gerhard Schröder in the newspaper “Bild am 
Sonntag” on the 8.7.2001: “Wegschließen – und zwar für immer” (lock up - and forever), referring to adult men 
who abuse little girls, because he came more and more to the opinion that it is not possible to treat them and the 
only commandment would be to protect the children. (Cf. Der Spiegel “Gerhard Schröder ‘Sexualstraftäter 
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The theoretical background for the reforms after M. v. Germany will be examined in 
chapter 5. 
3. PREVENTIVE DETENTION IN GERMANY AND ITS COMPATIBILITY 
WITH THE ECHR BEFORE M. V. GERMANY 
3.1. Overview of developments prior to M. v. Germany 
After the Second World War, West Germany maintained the laws governing preventive 
detention, but preventive detention for juveniles was not reintroduced in the Juvenile Courts 
Act when it was newly promulgated in 1953.
64
 The reforms in 1969 and 1975 tightened the 
thresholds for ordering preventive detention, ruled that the detention needs to be reviewed 
every two, instead of three years and introduced a 10-year maximum duration for preventive 
detention ordered for the first time.
65
 Furthermore, preventive detention for young adults 
under 25 was abolished.
66
 At this time, the bodies guarding the ECHR generally did not view 
preventive detention in Germany as incompatible with the Convention.
67
 
After a low in the numbers of preventive detentions and its ordering in the nineties,
68
 
the expansion of the possibilities to order it started with Gesetz zur Bekämpfung von 
Sexualdelikten und anderen gefährlichen Straftaten (The Combat of Sexual Offences and 
Other Dangerous Offences Act)
69
. With effect from 31.1.1998 it abolished the former 10-
years maximum duration for the first preventive detention also with retrospective effect.
70
 
                                                                                                                                                        
lebenslang wegsperren‘” [Gerhad Schröder ‘“lock up sexual offenders for lifetime“], 08.07.2001. Available on: 
https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/gerhard-schroeder-sexualstraftaeter-lebenslang-wegsperren-a-
144052.html). 
62
 Bernd Heinrich, “Die Grenzen des Strafrechts bei der Gefahrprävention. Brauchen oder haben wir ein 
‚Feindstrafrecht‛?” (The limits of criminal law in the prevention of danger. Do we need or have an “enemy 
criminal law"?), ZSTW (issue 121[1], 2009): 94 (95 f., 99). 
63
 Albrecht, supra note 55, p. 871. Kinzig, “results of a research project”, supra note 49, pp. 163 f.; Klaus 
Laubenthal, “Die Renaissance der Sicherungsverwahrung“ (The renaissance of preventive detention), ZSTW 
(issue 116[3], 2004): 703 (747). 
64
 Alex, Debacle, supra note 6, p. 6. 
65
 BVerfGE 109, 133, § 5; Art. 67d § 1 cl. 1 StGB old version of 1.1.1975. Old version available on: 
https://lexetius.com/StGB/67d,12. 
66
 Art. 1 § 66 section 1 Zweites Gesetz zur Reform des Strafrechts (Second Criminal Justice Reform Act), 
passed: 4.7.1969, BGBl I (1969), p. 717. Available on: 
https://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav#__bgbl__%2F%2F*%5B%40attr_id%3D%27bgbl169s0717.pdf%27%
5D__1585209752091; Alex, Debacle, supra note 6, p. 6. 
67
 In 1971 the European Commission of Human Rights examined preventive detention ordered in the judgement 
(Art. 20a and 42 e StGB at that time) and came to the conclusion that it did not violate the Convention. (Cf. X. v. 
Germany, [Application nr. 4324/69, Commission decision of 4 February 1971, published in Collection 37, pp. 
98-100], see also Dax v. Germany, [application nr. 19969/92, Commission decision of 7 July 1992]); Dessecker, 
“§ 66 StGB”, supra note 12, recital 6; Kristina Schuster, Die Sicherungsverwahrung im Nationalsozialismus und 
ihre Fortentwicklung bis heute (Preventive Detention under National Socialism and its further development until 
today), (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2019), p. 204. 
68
 Alex, Debacle, supra note 6, pp. 7, 9: Between 1975 and 1996 the number of preventive detainees went down 
from 337 to 176, and the numbers for new orderings of preventive detention were just 31 in 1991, compared to 
230 orderings in 1959 and 219 orderings in 1969. 
69
 Gesetz zur Bekämpfung von Sexualdelikten und anderen gefährlichen Straftaten (The Combat of Sexual 
Offences and Other Dangerous Offences Act), passed: 26.1.1998, BGBl. I (1998), p. 160. Available on: 
https://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav#__bgbl__%2F%2F*%5B%40attr_id%3D%27bgbl198s0160.pdf%27%
5D__1583683826107. 
70
 Art. 1 nr. 4 in conjunction wit Art. 2 nr. 3 The Combat of Sexual Offences and Other Dangerous Offences Act; 
Ebner, supra note 58, p. 28. 
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This means that the preventive detention could last till death, even if it was limited to 
10 years at the time of the offence, at the time of the judgement ordering preventive detention, 
at the start of the detention or some days before its original end. 
 At the 28.8.2002, a law introduced the reservation of preventive detention in the 
judgement, while the preventive detention could be ordered before the release from prison.
71
 
On 1.4.2004 this possibility was introduced in the Juvenile Courts Act
72
.
73
 This constituted 
the first possibility since 1969 to order preventive detention for young adults.
74
 
Retrospective preventive detention gets ordered before a prison-release without this 
possibility being mentioned in the convicting judgement.
75
 On the 10.2.2004, the Federal 
Constitutional Court declared the laws in five Ländern76 allowing retrospective preventive 
detention as contravention against the constitution because the federal legislator had the 
competence for criminal law.
77
 It declared the unconstitutional laws temporary applicable 
until 30.9.2004.
78
 Afterwards retrospective preventive detention was introduced very fast on 
                                                                                                                                                        
With the law a new paragraph (3) in Art. 66 StGB, introduced catalogued crimes (against sexual self-
determination, qualified forms of battery and the crime of intoxicating oneself and committing offences without 
criminal liability because of this intoxication), for that the ordering of preventive detention was possible under 
simpler conditions. A comparison between this version and the previous version of the law is available on: 
https://lexetius.com/StGB/66,9. 
71
 Gesetz zur Einführung der vorbehaltenen Sicherungsverwahrung (Act on the introduction of reserved 
preventive detention), passed: 21.8.2002, BGBl I (2002), p. 3344. Available on: 
https://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?start=%2F%2F*%5B%40attr_id%3D%27bgbl102s3344.pdf%27%5D
#__bgbl__%2F%2F*%5B%40attr_id%3D%27bgbl102s3344.pdf%27%5D__1583742737990. 
72
 Jugendgerichtsgesetz, JGG (Juvenile Courts Act), (last amended by Article 1 of the 9.12.2019 [BGBl I (2019), 
p. 2146]), in ther version of the publication of 11.12.1974. Available on: https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/jgg/.  
73
 Art. 6 nr. 3 Gesetz zur Änderung der Vorschriften über die Straftaten gegen die sexuelle Selbstbestimmung 
und zur Änderung anderer Vorschriften (Reform of the Provisions on Offences against Sexual Self-
determination and of Other Provisions Act), passed 27.9.2003, BGBl. I (2003) p. 3007. Available on: 
https://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?start=%2F%2F*%5B%40attr_id%3D%27bgbl103s3007.pdf%27%5D
#__bgbl__%2F%2F*%5B%40attr_id%3D%27bgbl103s3007.pdf%27%5D__1583683620153; Alex, Debacle, 
supra note 6, pp. 14 f.  
74
 Nina Nestler and Christian Wolf, “Sicherungsverwahrung gem. § 7 Abs. 2 JGG und der Präventionsgedanke 
im Strafrecht – kritische Betrachtung eines legislativen Kunstgriffs“ (preventive detention according to Art 7 § 2 
Juvenil Court Act and the idea of prevention in criminal law – critical examination of a legislative artifice), Neue 
Kriminalpolitik (issue 20 [4], 2008): 153 (154). 
75
 Art. 1 nr. 2 Gesetz zur Einführung der nachträglichen Sicherungsverwahrung (The Retrospective Preventive 
Detention Act), passed: 23.7.2004, (BGBl. I (2004), p. 1838. Available on: 
https://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?start=//*%5B@attr_id=%27bgbl104s1838.pdf%27%5D#__bgbl__%2
F%2F*%5B%40attr_id%3D%27bgbl104s1838.pdf%27%5D__1583741964647. 
76
 Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Lower Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia. (Cf. old version prior to the 1.1.2011 
of Art. 1a Einführungsgesetz zum Strafgesetzbuch, EGStGB [Introductory Act to the Criminal Code], [last 
amended by Art. 2 Act of 4 November 2016 (BGBl. I [2016] pp. 2460, 2462), passed 2.3.974, BGBl. I [1974] p. 
469. Available on: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgbeg/, [Old version available on: 
https://www.buzer.de/gesetz/5387/al26916-0.htm]). 
77
 BVerfGE 109, 190, “Tenor” (operative part of the ruling) nr. 2 a), b), § 81; Alex, Debacle, supra note 6, pp. 
15-18. 
78
 BVerfGE 109, 190, “Tenor” (operative part of the ruling) nr. 2 c), § 81. Because of this temporary continued 
application, the Federal Constitutional Court’s judgement could be interpreted as a barely mantled instruction to 
the federal legislator to adopt similar measures on the federal level. (Cf. Thomas Ullenbruch and Kirstin 
Drenkhahn, “§ 66b StGB” [Art. 66b criminal code] in Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch [Munich 
Commentary on the Criminal Code], 2nd volume, 3th edition, ed. Wolfgang Joecks and Klaus Miebach [Munich: 
C.H. Beck, 2016], recital 13). 
Indications, that the federal legislator understood the temporary continued application as invitation to adopt 
retrospective preventive detention, can be found in Bundestagsdrucksache 15/2887 (Bundestag printed paper 
15/2887), p. 10. It states that the Constitutional Court imposed the tasked on the legislator to check whether it 
wants to introduce similar measures. 
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federal level.
79
 In 2008, the climax of the expansion of preventive detention was reached with 
the introduction of retrospective preventive detention for minors who committed crimes at the 
age of criminal responsibility (14 years).
80
 In its leading judgement M. v. Germany
81
 the 
ECtHR halted this trend of expanding the preventive detention regime.
82
 Starting with this 
judgment, the Court declared in individual cases the retrospective abolition of the 10-year 
maximum duration and the retrospective ordering of preventive detention as violation of the 
Convention.
83
 
The expansion of the possibilities to order preventive detention was accompanied by 
an increase of the orderings of preventive detention and of the detainees, as the following 
table shows.
84
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Bundestagsdrucksache 15/3346 (Bundestag printed paper 15/3346), p. 3 translated reads: By ordering the 
continued application of the laws of the Länder for a transitional time period until 30.9.2004, the Court 
underlined the need for such provisions). 
In line with that, the federal retrospective preventive detention, that was introduced before the Constitutional 
Court’s transitional time period ended, entailed the possibility to keep individuals, who were detained under the 
Länder’s unconstitutional retrospective preventive detention laws, in preventive detention. (Cf. the old version 
prior to the 1.1.2011 of Art. 1a Introductory Act to the Criminal Code, supra note 76. Old version available on: 
https://www.buzer.de/gesetz/5387/al26916-0.htm). 
79
 The Retrospective Preventive Detention Act, supra note 75; Alex, Debacle, supra note 6, pp. 18-20; Ebner, 
supra note 58, pp. 35 f. The Constitutional Court’s judgement was on the 10.2.2004 and already on the 2.3.2004 
the first draft law regarding federal retrospective preventive detention entered the federal parliament 
(Bundestagsdrucksache 15/2576 [Bundestag printed paper 15/2576]). 
80
 Gesetz zur Einführung der nachträglichen Sicherungsverwahrung bei Verurteilung nach Jugendstrafrecht (Act 
on the introduction of subsequent preventive detention for convictions under the criminal law relating to young 
offenders), passed: 8.7.2008, BGBl. I (2008) p. 1212. Available on: 
https://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?startbk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&bk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&start=//*
[@attr_id=%27bgbl108s1212.pdf%27]#__bgbl__%2F%2F*%5B%40attr_id%3D%27bgbl108s1212.pdf%27%5
D__1583742225326; Nestler, and Wolf, supra note 74, p. 154. 
81
 M. v. Germany, supra note 10. 
82
 Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], dissenting opinion Judge Pinto de Albuquerque joined by Judge Dedov, supra note 
40, § 21. 
83
 Dessecker, “§ 66 StGB”, supra note 12 recital 6. (For examples, see infra chapter 3.2.3.). 
84
 Source: Erstes Deutsches Fernsehen (First German TV Channel), Zahlen zur Sicherungsverwahrung in 
Deutschland (Numbers regarding preventive detention in Germany). Available on: 
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Noteworthy is that the trend of ordering more and more preventive detention and the 
total numbers declined after M. v. Germany in late 2009. This indicates that the ECtHR’s 
assessment of the conformity with the ECHR had an important effect on the system of 
preventive detention in Germany.  
3.2. Conformability with the ECHR  
This subchapter will examine the system of preventive detention before 2010 under the 
scrutiny of the ECHR.
85
 Later, the legal changes after M. v. Germany, that finally took effect 
on the 1.6.2013 will be outlined (chapter 4.) and the conformity of the resulting new rules 
with the Convention will be analysed (chapter 5.). 
3.2.1. Ordered in the judgement 
Until 2002, the only possibility to order preventive detention was regulated in Art. 66 StGB.
86
 
Art. 66 StGB provides that the convicting court orders preventive detention in addition to 
ordinary imprisonment in the same judgement, provided certain requirements are met. 
Normally, a court responsible for the execution of sentences decides at the end of the prison-
term whether the preventive detention is executed.
87
 It also periodically reviews whether all 
conditions for perpetuation of the detention are still present.
88
 
Firstly, I will examine preventive detention ordered in the judgement under the same 
criteria the ECtHR applied, secondly I will argue why it is necessary to assess preventive 
detention more thoroughly and thirdly I will apply a broader scope than the Court to assess 
the compatibility with the Convention. 
                                                                                                                                                        
https://www.daserste.de/unterhaltung/film/ein-offener-kaefig/specials/diagramm-zahlen-sicherungsverwahrung-
deutschland100.html. Numbers might be higher. According to Kinzig, preventive detention was ordered 79 times 
in 2007 and 111 times in 2008. (Cf. Jörg Kinzig, “Das Recht der Sicherungsverwahrung nach dem Urteil des 
EGMR in Sachen M. gegen Deutschland,” (the law governing preventive detention after the judgement of the 
ECtHR in M. v. Germany), NStZ (issue 5, 2010): 233 (234) [hereinafter: Kinzig, “Preventive detention after M. 
v. Germany“]. 
Because the number of female preventive detainees is so low, there are special rules on the execution of 
preventive detention for females and most scientific studies disregard female detainees. Therefore, I will not 
assess specially the particularities of preventive detention for females and I will use the grammatical masculine 
when referring to preventive detainees in general. 
85
 The system of laws governing preventive detention was quite chaotic. (Cf. Jörg Kinzig, “Die Neuordnung des 
Rechts der Sicherungsverwahrung” [The reorganisation of the law on preventive detention], NJW [issue 4, 
2011]: 177 [177]) [hereinafter: Kinzig, “The reorganisation“]. Therefore, and because of the word limit only the 
parts of the system of preventive detention that are relevant for the compatibility with the ECHR will be 
examined. 
Sources might be also cited, that refer to a newer legal situation, where it does not make a difference for 
preventive detention’s compatibility with the ECHR. (For an overview of the changes see infra chapter 4.). 
86
 Ullenbruch, Drenkhahn and Morgenstern, “§ 66 StGB”, supra note 1, recitals 20 f. 
87
 Art. 67 c § 1 StGB, Art. 463 § 3, 454, 462a § 1 Strafprozessordnung, StPO (Code of Criminal Procedure), (last 
amended by Art. 2 of the Act of 3.3.2020 [BGBl. I (2020), p. 431], in the version of the publication of 7.4.1987. 
Available on: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stpo/, Art 78b § 1 nr. 1 Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, GVG 
(Court Constitution Act), (last amended by Art. 3 of the Act of 12.12.20019 [BGBl. I (2019), p. 2633]), in the 
version of the publication of 9.1975. Available on: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gvg/GVG.pdf. Old 
version of Art. 67c StGB available on: https://lexetius.com/StGB/67c,2; Mushoff, supra note 44, p. 89; M. v. 
Germany, supra note 10, §§ 36, 96. 
88
 Art. 67e § 1, 2 StGB. Apart from exceptions this applies also for preventive detention that was ordered 
differently. Old version of Art. 67e § 2 StGB available on: https://lexetius.com/StGB/67e,2). 
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3.2.1.1. Criteria applied by the ECtHR 
The ECHR only allows the deprivation of liberty for one of the reasons enlisted in 
Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 lit. a)-f).89 All exceptions in this exhaustive list are to interpret narrowly, to 
fulfil the Articles aim, namely prevention from arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
90
 
Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 lit. c) ECHR is not qualified in the ECtHR’s established jurisprudence 
as a justification for preventive detention because the wording “necessary to prevent his 
committing an offence” demands a concrete and specific offence, instead of general 
dangerousness.
91
 
According to the ECtHR it might be possible to base preventive detention on lit. e), 
the detention “of persons of unsound mind”.92 Apart from the fact that German courts did not 
base preventive detention on “unsound mind”, the legal framework before the reform process 
after M. v. Germany indicated that preventive detention disregarded mental health: Art. 66-
66b StGB
93
 enabled preventive detention of offenders with full or diminished criminal 
liability, whereas Art. 63 StGB allowed the placement in a psychiatric hospital only in case of 
diminished or no liability originating from different mental conditions. Thus preventive 
detention could not be justified by lit. e). Additionally, the ECtHR pointed out that lit. e) only 
justifies the placement in a hospital or comparable institution that is appropriate to treat 
mental health conditions.
94
 The conditions in preventive detention facilities did not achieve 
this standard.
95
 
The only possible justification for preventive detention left is lit. a), the detention 
“after conviction by a competent court”. The ECtHR’s judgements concerning preventive 
detention’s conformity with Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 lit. a) ECHR are mainly based on its interpretation 
of “after” in lit. a). It interprets “after” as “causal connection”96 between the conviction and 
the deprivation of liberty. This mandatory causal connection gets weaker over time and might 
break, when the deprivation of liberty does not relay on the same grounds and does not follow 
                                                 
89
 M. v. Germany, supra note 10, § 86. 
90
 Winterwerp v. the Netherlands (Application nr. 6301/73, judgement of 24 October 1979, published in Series A 
nr. 33), § 37; Haidn v. Germany (Application nr. 6587/04, judgement of 13 January 2011), § 88; Glien v. 
Germany (Application nr. 7345/12, judgement of 28 November 2013), § 71 with further references. 
91
 M. v. Germany, supra note 10, §§ 89, 102, that is cited e.g. in O.H. v. Germany (Application nr. 4646/08, 
judgement of 24 November 2011), § 76; Kristin Drenkhahn and Christine Morgenstern, “Sicherungsverwahrung 
in Deutschland und Europa” (preventive detention in Germany and Europe), in Strafrecht Wirtschaftsstrafrecht 
Steuerrecht. Gedächtnisschrift für Wolfgang Joecks (Criminal law Commercial criminal law Tax law. Memorial 
publication for Wolfgang Joecks), edited by Friede Dünkel et al. (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2018), 25 (39). 
92
 M. v. Germany, supra note 10, § 103.  
93
 Also Art. 66b § 3 StGB in the version before the 1.1.2011 only allowed preventive detention for criminally 
liable offenders, although the offenders were placed before in a psychiatric hospital for the time they had a 
mental condition infringing their criminal liability. Old versions available on: https://lexetius.com/StGB/66b,4, 
https://lexetius.com/StGB/66b,3. 
94
 Kallweit v. Germany (Application nr. 17792/07, judgement of 13 January 2011), §§ 55, 57; S. v. Germany 
(Application nr. 3300/10, judgement of 28 June 2012), §§ 82, 96. 
95
 The ECtHR always decides individual cases and therefore only accesses the respective institution in that the 
offender was detained. Nevertheless, before the reform process after M. v. Germany resulted in the changes 
governing the conditions of preventive detention with effect from 1.6.2013, the Court did not hold that any 
facility for preventive detention fulfilled the required standard. For instance, in S. v. Germany, supra note 94, § 
99, concerning the Straubing prison the therapy possibilities were not hold sufficient. (Cf. furthermore, Kallweit 
v. Germany, supra note 94, §§ 55). 
96
 M. v. Germany supra note 10, § 88. In Weeks v. the United Kingdom, (Application nr. 9787/82, judgement of 2 
March 1987, published in Series A nr. 114), § 42, the ECtHR for the first time spoke of a “causal connection”. 
Before in Van Droogenbroeck v. Belgium (Application nr. 7906/77, judgement of 24 June 1982, published in 
Series A nr. 50), § 39, the Court demanded a “sufficient connection”. 
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the same objectives that the conviction does.
97
 For preventive detention, a causal connection 
persists as long as the periodical decisions to continue it are based on the same grounds as its 
ordering in the conviction.
98 
This can regularly be the case when both are based on the 
likelihood that the offender will commit a certain type of crime.
99
 
For “conviction” in the terms of Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 lit. a) ECHR, the assessment of guilt is 
a necessary precondition.
100
 Hence, the periodic decisions themselves are no convictions in 
the sense of, because they do not entail the assessment of guilt.
101
 
The deprivation of liberty also needs to be lawful.
102
 The law needs to be of certain 
“quality [making it] compatible with the rule of law”103. This enables the ECtHR to examine 
national law.
104
 In the ECtHR’s judgements concerning preventive detention, foreseeability is 
the main-criterion to assess the lawfulness of the deprivation of liberty.
105
 The ECtHR regards 
                                                 
97
 Grosskopf v. Germany (Application nr. 24478/03, judgement of 21 October 2010), §§ 44, 48, 50, 52 f.; M. v. 
Germany, supra note 10, §§ 88, 97; Van Droogenbroeck v. Belgium, supra note 96, § 40; Del Río Prada v. Spain 
[GC] (Application nr. 42750/09, judgement of 21 October 2013), § 124; H.W. v. Germany (Application nr. 
17167/11, judgement of 19 September 2013), § 102. 
98
 Grosskopf v. Germany, supra note 97, §§ 47 f. The preventive detention against Mr. Grosskopf was ordered in 
1996, before the reforms expanding the possibilities to order preventive detention started. (Cf. Ibid, §§ 6 f.); 
Already in 1971 the Commission examined less thoroughly preventive detention that was ordered in the 
judgement (Art. 20a and 42 e StGB at that time) with focus on the confirmation of the Nazi-legislation governing 
preventive detention by the Federal Republic’s legislator and did not deal with the problematic of the causal 
connection between judgement and deprivation of liberty. (Cf. X. v. Germany, [Application nr. 4324/69, 
Commission decision of 4 February 1971, published in Collection 37, pp. 98-100], see also Dax v. Germany, 
[application nr. 19969/92, Commission decision of 7 July 1992]).; Jens Meyer-Ladewig, Stefan Harrendorf and 
Stefan König, “Art. 5” in Europäische Menschenrechts Konvention Handkommentar, (European Convention on 
Human Rights Hand Comment), 4th edition, ed. by Jens Meyer-Ladeswig, Martin Nettesheim and Stefan 
Raumer. (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2017), recital 29. 
99
 For instance, a high likelihood of property offences at the time of ordering preventive detention and at the 
times, when its continuation was decided, was seen as sufficient in Grosskopf v. Germany, supra 
note 97, §§ 49 f. 
100
 Müller v. Germany (Application nr. 264/13, decision of 5 March 2015), §§ 45, 50; Guzzardi v. Italy 
(Application nr. 7367/76, judgement of 6 November 1980, published in Series A nr. 39), § 100; Van 
Droogenbroeck v. Belgium, supra note 96, § 35; M. v. Germany, supra note 10, § 87. 
101
 M. v. Germany, supra note 10, §§ 95 f; Meyer-Ladewig, Harrendorf and König, “Art. 5”, supra note 98, 
recital 29. 
102
 Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 states that the depravation of liberty must be: “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by 
law” and the different possibilities in Art. 5 have the condition “lawful”; M. v. Germany, supra note 10, § 90. 
103
 Ibid., § 90. 
104
 That Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 states that the depravation of liberty must be: “in accordance with a procedure prescribed  
by law” and the condition “lawful” in Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 lit a)-f), make it for the ECtHR in principle possible to 
control the observance of national laws, in particular procedural and constitutional law. (Cf. Ibid., § 104; 
Christine Morgenstern, Die Untersuchungshaft. Eine Untersuchung unter rechtsdogmatischen, 
kriminologischen, rechtsvergleichenden und europarechtlichen Aspekten [The Detention Awaiting Trial. An 
investigation among legal-dogmatic, criminological, comparative and European law aspects], [Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 2018], p. 269; Veith Mehde “Art. 104”, in Grundgesetz. Kommentar [Basic Law. Commentary], 7 
volumes, ed. Theodor Maunz and Günter Dürig, [Munich: C.H. Beck, years 1962 ff. (status: 88th supplementary 
delivery August 2019)], recital 14). 
105
 Müller v. Germany, supra note 100, § 48: “Any deprivation of liberty must, in addition to falling within one 
of the exceptions set out in sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) of Article 5 § 1, be 'lawful'. […] In order to comply with the 
rule of law, domestic law authorising deprivation of liberty must further be sufficiently accessible, precise and 
foreseeable in its application, in order to avoid all risk of arbitrariness”; 
M. v. Germany, supra note 10, § 104: “The Court further observes that the present application raises an issue in 
terms of the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention. It reiterates that national law must be of a certain quality 
and, in particular, must be foreseeable in its application, in order to avoid all risk of arbitrariness”; 
Haidn v. Germany, supra note 90, § 79: “The standard of “lawfulness” set by the Convention thus requires that 
all law be sufficiently precise to allow the person – if need be, with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree 
that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail”; 
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the foreseeability of preventive detention ordered in the judgement, that is regulated by law 
since 1934, as unproblematic.
106
  
Therefore, and because of the found causal link, the ECtHR does not see preventive 
detention that is ordered in the judgement as problematic.
107
 
3.2.1.2. Reasons to assess preventive detention with a broader scope 
It is confusing that the ECtHR solely examined a causal link and foreseeability, but at the 
same time stressed that all exceptions in Art. 5 § 1 ECHR need to be interpreted narrowly in 
order to fulfil the aim of Art. 5 ECHR to avoid all forms of arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
108
 
There were several reasons to examine preventive detention more critically than just 
examining a causal link and foreseeability. For instance, issues indicating that preventive 
detention violated the ECHR might be that the prediction of heavy crimes produces many 
false positives or that the conditions of the execution of preventive detention seemed very 
similar to the execution of prison-sentences. 
Since the ECtHR did not explain why it solely assessed the causal link and 
foreseeability for preventive detention, I need to speculate. The reason might be that the 
ECtHR tries not to examine details too specifically because it is too remote from the 
individual cases and their decisive details in the Convention States.
109
 This may lead the Court 
to be generally reluctant to assess the adequacy of criminal provisions and criminal sentences 
too precisely. The Court just carries out a supervision of the national systems on a European 
level, while it leaves the Member States a margin of appreciation.
110
 It reviews only common 
European standards, but not all details to which the national courts are much closer.
111
 As the 
Grand Chamber explained in Vinter and others v. the United Kingdom: 
issues relating to just and proportionate punishment are the subject of rational debate 
and civilised disagreement. Accordingly, Contracting States must be allowed a margin 
of appreciation in deciding on the appropriate length of prison sentences for particular 
crimes. As the Court has stated, it is not its role to decide what is the appropriate term 
                                                                                                                                                        
Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], dissenting opinion Judge Pinto de Albuquerque joined by Judge Dedov, supra note 
40, § 127. 
106
 It is foreseeable in which cases the application of Art. 66, 67d and 67e StGB leads to preventive detention 
according to Grosskopf v. Germany, supra note 97, § 53. Nevertheless, one could discuss, whether the different 
laws that formed the system of preventive detention were too complicated and incoherent to really foresee the 
consequences. (Cf. Kinzig, “The reorganisation“, supra note 85, p.177) One could also argue that the 
methodology and outcome of prognosis for heavy recidivism mainly based on prison behaviour are too unclear 
to reach the extreme high threshold for releases in Art. 67d § 2 StGB between 31.1.1998 and 31.7.2016: “as soon 
as it is to be expected that the person concerned will not commit any further unlawful acts on his or her release”. 
(Different versions Art. 67d § 2 StGB available on: https://lexetius.com/StGB/67d,10, 
https://lexetius.com/StGB/67d,2, regarding the prognosis-problematic cf. e.g. Kinzig, “The reorganisation“, 
supra note 85, p. 179). 
107
 Grosskopf v. Germany, supra note 97, §§ 42-54. 
108
 See supra note 90. 
109
 William A., Schabas, The Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2015), pp. 75 f., 78 f., 81. 
110
 Vinter and others v. the United Kingdom [GC] (Applications nr. 66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10, judgement of 
9 July 2013), § 104; Yutaka Arai-Takahash, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of 
Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Antwerpen et al: Intersentia, 2002), pp. 2-4. 
111
 Art. 53 ECHR; Alexander Somek, The Cosmopolitan Constitution, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 
pp. 187 f.; Jörg Polakiewicz, “Europe’s multi-layered human rights protection system: challenges, opportunities 
and risks.” Transcript of lecture at Waseda University Tokyo, 14.2016, under the heading “European Court of 
Human Rights”. Available on: https://www.coe.int/en/web/dlapil/speeches-of-the-director/-
/asset_publisher/ja71RsfCQTP7/content/europe-s-multi-layered-human-rights-protection-system-challenges-
opportunities-and-risks?inheritRedirect=false. 
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of detention applicable to a particular offence or to pronounce on the appropriate 
length of detention or other sentence which should be served by a person after 
conviction by a competent court [.]
112
 
It is possible that this is an underlying principle, namely that the ECtHR does not control the 
length of prison-sentences for particular crimes. This possible underlying principle might 
have led the Court to the conclusion that for Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 lit. a) ECHR the scope of the 
examination of arbitrariness is reduced to the assessment of a causal link. At least the Court 
indicated so in Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC]: 
The Court applies a different approach towards the principle that there should be no 
arbitrariness in cases of detention under Article 5 § 1 (a), where, in the absence of bad 
faith or one of the other grounds set out in paragraph 69 above, as long as the 
detention follows and has a sufficient causal connection with a lawful conviction, the 
decision to impose a sentence of detention and the length of that sentence are matters 
for the national authorities rather than for the Court under Article 5 § 1 [.]113 
One could interpret this quotation to mean that the ECtHR just assesses a causal link, if the 
process of the judgement was without arbitrariness, and that the Court does not examine 
whether the outcome of the judgement is arbitrary. For instance, the outcome of a lawful 
judgement could be arbitrary when it led to an arbitrary form of confinement suggested by 
domestic law. 
In the following I will show an argument speaking against the existence of such a 
possible principle stating that only a causal link in Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 lit. a) ECHR is examined. 
Then a reason why such a principle should not exist will be named. Finally, I will argue that if 
such a principle existed, the German preventive detention would not fit in it. Also, I will show 
why such a possible principle should not be applied on German preventive detention.  
Against the existence of such a principle argues the following older quotation 
indicating that the requirement of a causal connection is an additional one, instead of a 
replacement for the other requirements of Art. 5 § 1 ECHR: 
The "lawfulness" required by the Convention presupposes not only conformity with 
domestic law but also, as confirmed by Article 18…, conformity with the purposes of 
the deprivation of liberty permitted by sub-paragraph (a) of Article 5 para. 1… 
Furthermore, the word "after" in sub-paragraph (a) does not simply mean that the 
detention must follow the "conviction" in point of time: in addition, the "detention" 
must result from… the "conviction" [.] [emphasis added]114 
Independently from the actual existence of a principle reducing the scope of the arbitrariness 
assessment to a causal link, in my opinion such a principle should not be in place. The 
following “fundamental principle”115 is too important to allow such a broad exception: 
no detention which is arbitrary can be compatible with Article 5 § 1 and the notion of 
“arbitrariness” in Article 5 § 1 extends beyond lack of conformity with national law, 
so that a deprivation of liberty may be lawful in terms of domestic law but still 
arbitrary and thus contrary to the Convention.
116
 
If the arbitrariness of a deprivation of liberty was not controlled, because a conviction was 
involved, then “the fundamental purpose of Article 5 § 1… to protect the individual from 
                                                 
112
 Vinter and others v. the United Kingdom [GC], supra note 110, § 105 with further references. 
113
 Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], (Application nr. 13229/03, judgement 29 January 2008), § 71. 
114
 Weeks v. the United Kingdom, supra note 96, § 42. 
115
 Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], supra note 113, § 67. 
116
 Ibid. 
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arbitrariness”117, could not be fulfilled. Then Member States could just implement convictions 
to enable arbitrary deprivations of liberty. 
Independently from the existence of a general principle narrowing the scope for 
Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 lit. a) ECHR to the assessment of a causal link, there are the following reasons 
not to apply such a principle on German preventive detention, but to assess the possible 
arbitrariness of it thoroughly.  
The previous cited paragraph in Vinter and others v. the United Kingdom, that might 
explain the underlying principle limiting the scope of arbitrariness assessments, indicates 
many reasons why not to apply such a limited scope to German preventive detention:  
Contracting States must be allowed a margin of appreciation in deciding on the 
appropriate length of prison sentences for particular crimes.
118
 
Firstly, “margin of appreciation” indicates that there are absolute limits regarding the 
appropriateness of confinements. “Margin” does not equal absolute freedom for the states to 
punish.  
Secondly, preventive detention does not get inflicted “for particular crimes” 
[emphasis added], instead Art. 66 StGB does not require specific crimes so that many and 
various crimes can be an occasion to decide whether offenders are deemed too dangerous to 
live in freedom.  
Furthermore, preventive detention also does not fully fit in the description above as it 
is not a “prison sentence” in the German law tradition and in the governments explanations 
before the Court.
119
 Instead it is seen as a purely preventive measure that is precisely no 
penalty, but gets imposed because of dangerousness.
120
 Later the ECtHR accepted that 
preventive detention can be the detention “of persons of unsound mind” as permitted by Art. 5 
§ 1 lit e) ECHR and no penalty in the terms of Art. 7 § 1 cl. 2 ECHR if another justification is 
retrospectively added (treatment of mental disorder) and it is executed with more therapy.
121
 
Therefore, preventive detention has an ambiguous character. When applying a human rights 
treaty, this ambivalence of the measure cannot be interpreted to the disadvantages of the 
individual victims of the measure, here the preventive detainees. 
In general, it might be unnecessary for the ECtHR to examine whether six or seven 
years would be more “appropriate… for particular crimes”, but the question whether 
preventive detention is arbitrary or not has much more consequences. The minimum 
requirement for imposing preventive detention is a conviction to two years imprisonment.
122
 
If preventive detention was not imposed because it was arbitrary, then it can make the 
difference between two years of imprisonment and lifelong confinement. When the difference 
can be so extreme, it seems necessary that the ECtHR assesses the arbitrariness thoroughly. In 
Vinter and others v. the United Kingdom, the Grand Chamber examined thoroughly the 
                                                 
117
 Hassan v. the United Kingdom (Application nr. 29750/09, judgement of 16 September 2014), 
Vinter and others v. the United Kingdom [GC], supra note 110, § 105. 
119
 Kristin Drenkhahn, “Secure Preventive Detention in Germany: Incapacitation or Treatment Intervention?”, 
Behavioral Sciences and the Law (issue 31, 2013): 312 (314) [hereinafter: Drenkhahn, “Incapacitation or 
Treatment Intervention?”; BVerfGE 109, 133, §§ 127-144; M. v. Germany, supra note 10, §§ 113-116. 
120
 Drenkhahn, “Incapacitation or Treatment Intervention?”, supra note 119; BVerfGE 109, 133, §§ 127-144; M. 
v. Germany, supra note 10, §§ 113-116. 
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 Bergmann v. Germany (Application nr. 23279/14, judgement of 7 January 2016), §§ 118-133, 153-182; W.P. 
v. Germany (Application nr. 55594/13, judgement of 6 October 2016), §§ 50-68, 75-79; Ilnseher v. Germany 
[GC] (Applications nr. 10211/12 and 27505/14, judgement of 4 December 2018), §§ 146-170, 210-236. 
122
 Art. 66 § 1 StGB. 
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possible gross disproportionality of life-sentences, albeit under Art. 3 ECHR.
123
 Preventive 
detention can have the same effect as life-sentences and is arguably worse because it can also 
be imposed for non-major crimes and is not limited by the offenders guilt.
124
 Hence, it seems 
adequate to assess its proportionality as well. The ECHR also knows a proportionality 
assessment for Art. 5 § 1.125 But the ECtHR did not assess the proportionality of German 
preventive detention. Since proportionality tests like arbitrariness assessments entail a 
thoroughly examination, also proportionality considerations argue for assessing preventive 
detention more rigorously than just establishing a causal link.
126
  
To conclude, preventive detention does not fit to the benchmarks of a possible 
principle regarding Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 lit. a) ECHR that narrows the scope of arbitrariness 
assessments.  
In addition to the foregoing considerations about preventive detention fitting in such a 
principle, such a principle should not be applied on preventive detention because preventive 
detention is conflicting in many ways with the ECHR. Since the following arguments 
interpreted too strictly could already lead to the conclusion that German preventive detention 
is incompatible with the ECHR, at least a rigours arbitrariness assessment seems appropriate. 
Firstly, the German Constitutional Court declared the execution of the entire system of 
preventive detention in Germany as unconstitutional in 2011 because it did not differ enough 
from prison-sentences to have a clear prevention-character and was unproportional.
127
 Due to 
the limits of this thesis, I will not assess constitutional details. But an extremely strict 
interpretation of the fact that the Constitutional Court discovered that preventive detention 
had been executed unconstitutional before, could lead to the conclusion that preventive 
detention was not “lawful” in terms of a narrowly interpreted Art. 5 § 1 ECHR. 
Secondly, the ECtHR made statements in other judgements on Art. 5 § 1 ECHR that 
interpreted literally would lead to the conclusion that preventive detention always violates 
Art. 5 § 1 ECR. In Hassan v. the United Kingdom, the ECtHR stated: 
It can only be in cases of international armed conflict, where… the detention of 
civilians who pose a threat to security are accepted features of international 
humanitarian law, that Article 5 could be interpreted as permitting the exercise of such 
broad powers.
128
 
A simple argumentum e contrario would lead to the conclusion that Art. 5 ECHR does not 
allow to preventively detain civilians in peace times. But preventive detention differs from 
detaining dangerous civilians according to humanitarian law in so far as additionally the 
                                                 
123
 Vinter and others v. the United Kingdom [GC], supra note 110, §§ 59-75, 83-88, 102-130. 
124
 Ullenbruch, Drenkhahn and Morgenstern, “§ 66 StGB”, supra note 1, recital 3; M. v. Germany, supra note 10, 
§ 132. 
125
 Carine Simons contre la Belgique (Application nr. 71407/10, decision of 28 August 2012), § 32; Jean-
François Renucci, Introduction to the European Convention on Human Rights. The rights guaranteed and the 
protection mechanism (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2005), pp. 7, 57 f. 
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 In the case of possible objections arguing that such a proportionality-test would only fit under Art. 3 ECHR, I 
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arbitrariness of preventive detention more carefully. It would infringe the clarity of this thesis’ structure to 
examine proportionality under Art. 3 ECHR. 
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 BVerfGE 128, 326, “Leitsatz” (headnote/guiding principle) nr. 3 a), b), “Tenor” (operative part of the 
ruling) II, §§ 96-109, 128. 
128
 Hassan v. the United Kingdom, supra note 117, § 104. 
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conviction for several or grave crimes is demanded.
129
 Also the following quotation from 
Hassan v. the United Kingdom interpreted literally would rule out preventive detention: 
the list of grounds of permissible detention in Article 5 § 1 does not include 
internment or preventive detention where there is no intention to bring criminal 
charges within a reasonable time
130
  
When the German preventive detention is conducted there is no intention to bring criminal 
charges at all, but in case of the German version, criminal charges have already been brought 
prior to the convictions. 
Furthermore, Art. 18 ECHR states:  
The restrictions permitted under this Convention to the said rights and freedoms shall 
not be applied for any purpose other than those for which they have been prescribed. 
One could argue that this forbids to use Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 lit. a) ECHR that uses convictions, that 
are “signifie[d]”131 by a determination of guilt, to impose preventive measures that are based 
on dangerousness. Lit. c) already regulates the detention to prevent offences, but does not 
allow to detain someone because of abstract dangerousness.
132
 One could argue that the 
Convention – by regulating detention to prevent offences this way in Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 lit. c) 
ECHR – excluded in connection with Art. 18 ECHR all similar circumstances as reason for 
the deprivation of liberty. On the other hand, prevention is a typical part of penalties
133
 and 
penalties get inflicted “after conviction” as in lit. a). 
To conclude, German preventive detention does not fit in a possible principle that 
narrows the scope of arbitrariness assessment to the question whether a causal link between 
the deprivation of liberty and a conviction persists. Additionally, there are reasons to question 
whether German preventive detention could have been in line with the ECHR at all. Hence, it 
seems adequate to assess possible arbitrariness of preventive detention ordered in the 
judgement much more rigorously than just to establish a causal link like the ECtHR did it.  
Thus, I will assess in the next subchapter with a broad scope whether preventive 
detention is arbitrary in the sense of a narrowly interpreted Art. 5 § 1 ECHR. 
3.2.1.3. Assessment of preventive detention with a broader scope 
For arbitrariness of preventive detention argues that it is potentially lifelong and that it is not 
possible to predict the future dangerousness precisely.
134
 The ECHR is a human rights 
instrument. When applying it one should also take into account scientific developments and 
“present-day conditions”135 in order to secure a standard of human rights protection that is 
adequate for the time concerned.
136 
Modern criminology and psychology show that the 
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prediction of future grave crimes leads to a very high number of false positives.
137
 For 
preventive detention, this means that a high percentages of offenders is detained although they 
would not commit grave crimes if released. This can also not change significantly with better 
prediction methods.
138
 The main new scientific insight from the field of predicting future 
heavy crimes is that it is not precisely possible, independent of prediction methods.
139
 
For preventive detention this is easy to explain with modern concepts regarding the 
execution of penalties. The offenders have been long in prison before their preventive 
detention starts.
140
 The judgement, that ordered it, is therefore from long ago. But modern 
penal laws and penal-execution laws strives to enable offenders to live in the society again, as 
the Grand Chamber explained and substantiated thoroughly with international law in Vinter 
and others v. the United Kingdom.
141
 The judge ordering preventive detention cannot reliably 
foresee, whether this betterment approach will work. That those modern approaches to the 
execution of penalties might not be the standard in Germany,
142
 cannot be an argument. It is 
not compatible with the ECHR as human rights treaty to allow a low standard of human rights 
protection in one field to serve as a reason for a low standard in another field. 
Also, mathematically, the high rate of false positives for preventive detention is 
explainable. False positives are always especially numerous if the base-rate is small and most 
probably no future prognosis technique can change that.
143
 The base-rate for preventive 
detention is the frequency of heavy crimes after prison-release.
144
 Preventive detention gets 
only imposed on very few offenders, who normally stay detained for a long time after their 
prison-sentence.
145
 Of those released once only a very small number commits heavy 
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offences.
146
 Hence, the base-rate, that is an important factor for the accuracy of the prognosis, 
whether to preventively detain an individual will prevent heavy crimes, is very small.
147
 
Therefore, predictions especially at the time of the judgement will produce many false 
positives. For assessing the necessity to preventively detain, typically very sensitive 
prediction methods are used to keep the number of offenders wrongly assessed as not 
dangerous (false negatives) very small.
148
 If the sensitivity is big, mathematically the 
specificity declines resulting in a high number of false negatives, especially in combination 
with a small base-rate.
149
 Furthermore, prediction of future crimes gets more imprecise the 
longer the prediction timeframe is, but usually prediction on very distance future is demanded 
from experts opinions regarding preventive detention.
150
 
All attempts to assess the actual number of false positives in preventive detention are 
confronted with the obstacle that normally allegedly dangerous offenders will not be 
released.
151
 Therefore, one cannot be sure how many offenders sit in preventive detention, 
although they would not commit heavy crimes if released. For instance, Alex found a way to 
cope with this obstacle.
152
 He investigated how many heavy crimes were committed by 77 
offenders whom prison authorities, prosecutors or first instance courts and, in 53 out of 56 
conducted experts’ opinions, at least one expert, assessed as dangerous, but against whom no 
retrospective preventive detention was ordered due to other reasons.
153
 Because of the small 
case numbers, short observation periods and different premises such as that the released 
offenders are as dangerous as the continuously detained ones,
154
 Alex’s study cannot be very 
precise either. Nevertheless, it indicates that the number of false positives in preventive 
detention is very high. In the first 1,5-5 years after release only 10 out of 77 offenders deemed 
as very dangerous were sentenced to more than one year prison of whom only 6 committed 
crimes against physical integrity or sexual self-determination and only 4 were sentenced to 
preventive detention.
155
 Taking into account other studies, Alex came to the conclusion that 
about 85% of preventive detainees would not commit heavy crimes if released.
156
 For the 
reasons explained above such conclusions can never be safe, but at least a rough idea is given 
how high the number of false positives could be. However, when Alex later expanded the 
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research to 121 cases and the observation periods became longer, the result was that 15,7% of 
offenders deemed dangerous committed heavy sexual or violent crimes.
157
 
Hence, the future dangerousness cannot be precisely predicted in the convicting 
judgement. 
The periodic reviews of the preventive detention are only based on the offender’s 
conduct in prison, besides on the offences of long ago. But this conduct is usually not the 
heavy criminality, against which preventive detention should protect.
158
 Additionally, the 
circumstances in prisons are very different from the reality in freedom. Hence, the conduct in 
prison circumstances is inappropriate to predict behaviour outside.
159
  
Also, the realities in the German preventive detention, at least before M. v. Germany, 
facilitated a high number of false positives in the periodic reviews. There were very limited 
adequate therapy possibilities.
160
 If a detainee would not accept them, he was in danger, that 
from this fact his dangerousness would be concluded.
161
 If he engaged with psychologists he 
would be in danger that his words will be used to establish his dangerousness or mental 
disorder on which more preventive detention could be based. This happened at least to Mr. 
Ilnseher.
162
 
Detainees had also another obstacle to show that they are not dangerous. To prove a 
low level of dangerousness especially the conduct during detention relaxations, like leaving 
the prison for a certain period of time, was very important, but the prison authorities decided 
about relaxations with their own discretion.
163 
It is very likely that prison authorities exercise 
their discretion under big influence of presumed danger of bad publicity and civil or criminal 
liability.
164
 In general, relaxations were granted extremely restrictively.
165
 For instance, in 
8 out of 14 facilities no preventive detainee left the prison, 1 did not answer and the others 
granted maximal 2 detainees relaxations, in the course of one year, at the reporting date 
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31.8.2006.
166
 Hence, detainees that were deemed dangerous by the prison authorities had very 
small chances to get relaxations and to be finally released. Prisoners against whom preventive 
detention was ordered even could not get any confinement relaxations during their prison-
sentence due to administrative regulations.
167
 
To aggravate, the legislation only foresaw the release from detention, if it is to be 
expected that the person detained will not commit any further unlawful acts outside the 
detention.
168
 This threshold was reduced by German courts, for instance, only unlawful acts, 
that would allow to order preventive detention, count.
169
 However, also the reduced threshold 
is very hard to reach.
170
 As explained above, such a high sensitivity mathematically leads to a 
low specificity and therefore a high number of false positives. Since 1998, Art. 67d § 4 StGB 
eased the conditions for releases, after the detention lasted 10 years.
171
 But this does not alter 
the overall result, that the preventive detention’s reviews maintain many false positives. 
Consequently, also the periodic reviews are not sufficient to predict the future 
dangerousness precisely. 
One could conclude that an as imprecise as described, hard to end, possible lifelong 
detention, that is not proportional to the offender’s guilt, is in fact arbitrary. But one needs to 
see the matter holistically. The German approach is to limit prison-sentences by the offender’s 
guilt.
172
 This leads to much fewer prisoners and shorter sentences compared to other European 
states: 
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(Detailed numbers substantiating the claims about German incarceration and 
preventive detention as well as a statistical comparison of long prison-sentences between 
Germany and Great Britain are provided in Appendix 1.) 
In other states (for instance Great Britain) the potential dangerousness is traditionally 
factored into the prison-sentences.
174
 This then can lead to many long sentences. In Germany, 
not only the number of long-time prisoners is low, but also the number of preventive 
detainees was only 500 shortly before the judgement M. v. Germany on 31.8.2009.
175
  
The question what to do with potential dangerous offenders is very delicate. But the 
tension between legitimate societal security interests on one hand and individual human rights 
and the rule of law, on the other hand, needs to be resolved somehow. Surely, preventive 
detention is very problematic. Nevertheless, it is arguably better to use it in a targeted way 
than incorporating potential dangerousness into sentences on a large scale. Also, the ECHR 
cannot demand that all potentially dangerous offenders are just released after a prison-
sentence that is proportionate to their guilt. Some fraction of offenders would commit heavy 
crimes with irreparable damage for the legal rights of others. Prevention is an accepted part of 
penalties.
176
 
The modern criminology indicates that the best way to proceed with potential 
dangerous offenders is to carefully and gradually reintegrate them into society with a close-
meshed net of therapy, social work and monitoring.
177
 This way, the rights of the offenders 
get protected and also the likelihood of recidivism can be held low. It is logical that a gradual 
release into freedom comes to better results than to lock offenders up longer and then just 
release them without securing their abilities to live law-abidingly in freedom. On the contrary, 
the idea to erase certain types of crimes is populistic, but not achievable. Even if one would 
lock up certain types of offenders forever, as ex-chancellor Schröder once suggested,178 the 
offence would still be committed by the offenders not caught. Hence, a state, that takes human 
rights seriously, must balance the rights of the potential victims of crimes or rather the general 
public with the rights of the potential dangerous offender. Such a proportionality-assessment 
is also known to the ECHR and also in the course of Art. 5 § 1 ECHR.179 The crimes that the 
potentially dangerous, once-caught offender might commit, can never be fully erased. 
Consequently, to fully side with the potential victims and to lock up all offenders forever can 
only bring a small gain in security compared to state-of-the-art reintegration measures, but it 
infringes the offenders’ rights maximally. Therefore, such conduct can never be proportional. 
But does the ECHR force the Contracting States to always obey to the highest 
scientific standards at the time concerned when restricting the rights of offenders? Is only the 
objectively best solution non-arbitrary and proportional? I would argue that some margin of 
appreciation remains for the states. Scientific standards change. Also populistic demands of 
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the general population can be legitimate to a certain extent.
180
 It is hard to demand from the 
citizens to accept the most recent criminological findings telling them that, directly after his 
guilt-adequate prison-sentence, regardless of dangerousness a convicted, repeat-child-rapist 
and murderer
181
 will move next to them, for human rights reasons and to calm them with 
statistics about false positive offenders sitting wrongfully in preventive detention. The general 
public might not be fully rational. However, if there was not at least the possibility to confine 
convicted criminals perceived as extremely dangerous for a very long time, the state’s 
monopoly of violence would be hard to explain to the this public.
182
 Therefore, the security-
feeling of the population has at least some value when balancing different rights. 
The ECHR just constitutes a common minimum standard for human rights in 
Europe.
183
 The raising of the human rights standard in the very diverse Member States of the 
Council of Europe can only progress gradually.
184
 At the same time, the “State’s choice of a 
specific criminal justice system… is in principle outside the scope of the supervision the 
Court”185. As long as this aforementioned common standard allows very long prison-sentences 
not limited by guilt on a broad scale for prevention purposes, it does not necessarily help the 
cause of human rights protection to forbid the combination of short guilt-adequate sentences 
with a few long detentions for the convicted offenders deemed most dangerous to ensure 
prevention. It is desirable that societal realities are altered towards more understanding of 
criminological findings. But as long as the societal realities include strong fears of some 
perceived types of offenders, these realities need to be regarded. It is desirable that the 
common minimum standard evolves to allow only preventive measures which do not require 
deprivation of liberty. However, before such a minimum standard is established, the 
Convention, taking also into account legitimate security-feelings of the general public, does 
not forbid preventive measures against grave crimes that include confinement. 
Hence, I conclude, that preventive detention is not per se against the Convention. But 
it stays a very problematic measure from a human rights perspective. Therefore, in order not 
to violate Art. 5 § 1 ECHR, it must be executed itself in the least arbitrary and most 
proportional manner. 
The German Constitutional Court rightly stated that a special sacrifice is inflicted on 
the preventive detainees with the aim to increase the security in the society.
186
 A small 
number of detainees pays the price, that Germany can normally limit prison-sentences 
proportionally to the guilt. An honest interpretation of the concept of guilt must come to the 
conclusion that it is not the preventive detainees’ fault, that they are in detention. But they 
have to endure all negative effects, while the general population enjoys a higher security or at 
least a higher security-feeling. In M. v. Germany the Court concluded that preventive 
detention gets a penal character if not everything is done to reduce the dangerousness of the 
detainees and consequently to shorten their detention.
187
 Against the background of the 
explanations above, I would go further and conclude that preventive detention can only be 
classified as non-arbitrary and proportional, if the state does everything in its power to keep 
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preventive detention as short as possible. Otherwise it would be arbitrary in the sense, that the 
likelihood of releases from detention is lower just because the state does not try everything to 
lower the dangerousness of the offenders. A truly narrow interpretation of Art. 5 § 1 ECHR, 
that precludes all forms of arbitrary deprivation of liberty, cannot allow that individuals are 
kept in detention, because the state did not decide to help them, although it inflicted on them a 
special sacrifice for benefit of the general public. That means that the state must start from the 
beginning of the guilt-adequate prison-sentence to reintegrate the offender and lower his 
dangerousness so that a subsequent preventive detention can become superfluous.
188
 
The German Constitutional Court applied a proportionality test and rightly argued that 
the preventive detention also needs to be executed as close to life in freedom as possible in 
order to mitigate the burden of this special sacrifice.
189
 Proportionality is also necessary when 
applying the ECHR.
190
 To detain someone because of abstract dangerousness, is a severe 
interference of the right to liberty. That this interference is inflicted “after conviction” as per 
Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 lit. a) ECHR, cannot release from the requirement of proportionality. Hence, 
also the ECHR demands for an execution of preventive detention that mitigates its burden as 
much as possible. 
Additionally, one could question whether it can be proportional to preventively detain 
someone because he could cause serious economic damage, as Art 66 § 1 nr. 3 StGB named 
as one reason for preventive detention.
191
 Economic damage of victims can easily be 
compensated with money, but this is not possible for the deprivation of liberty. It seems to be 
sufficient to preserve resources if a habitual thief or fraudster gets convicted and imprisoned 
after every new crime, instead of preventively detained. If the state has to use all its available 
resources to make preventive detention non-arbitrary, as deduced above, it is hard to explain 
why the state should be allowed to preventively detain with resource preservation as a goal. 
It can be deemed as sufficiently established that Germany had not done everything in 
its power to facilitate releases and mitigate the burden, before reforms in Germany changed 
the whole system of preventive detention with effect from 1.6.2013.
192
 The ECtHR 
established thoroughly in M. v. Germany that preventive detention did not differ substantially 
from ordinary prison sentences and that the possibilities for adequate therapy to reintegrate 
the offenders were insufficient.
193
 Also the German Constitutional Court, taking the ECtHR’s 
reasoning into account, declared on 4.5.2011 all forms of preventive detention as 
unconstitutional because there was no sufficient difference between preventive detention and 
ordinary prison-sentences to compensate the special sacrifice.
194
 The following examples shall 
outline the conditions in preventive detention. 
The legal framework foresaw that offenders are firstly detained to protect the general 
public, while the help for reintegration was secondary.
195
 In principle, the same provisions as 
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for prisoners applied mutatis mutandis.
196
 This led, for instance, to a work obligation for 
detainees.
197
 Special regulations for preventive detention were, for example, that equipment 
and measures should protect detainees from damages caused by long custody.
198
 Detainees 
were allowed subordinate amenities like the right to own clothes and to get more pocket 
money than prisoners.
199
 But regarding the central aspects of preventive detention, the 
legislation did not prescribe details for care, motivation and treatment and therefore did not 
effectively press prison authorities to focus on therapeutic measure that serve release.
200
 Also 
the equipment and staffing was not described precisely. No rules facilitated that measures 
already during the prison-term try to reduce the dangerousness.
201
 The detention just had to 
get reviewed every two years.
202
  
These normative deficits were reflected in the actual situation. Preventive detention 
was normally executed in the same prisons as prison-sentences, but in different wings.
203
 In 
2006, 85% of detainees were placed in such competent entities, but against the law, 5 out of 
14 prisons did not have special sections for preventive detainees.
204
  
Mostly preventive detainees had more comfortable prison cells and more possibilities 
to equip them.
205
 Nothing more was done to alleviate the preventive detainees’ dangerousness 
with the goal of shorter detention than for long-time prisoners.
206
  
In M. v. Germany the Court rightly agreed with the Council of Europe’s 
Commissioner for Human Rights and the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture 
and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) that preventive detainees are in 
an especially problematic situation because their detention is possibly indefinite.
207
 Thus, they 
need a distinctively high level of psychological care to cope with this possible hopeless 
seeming situation.
208
 But while visiting one preventive detention unit, the CPT observed that 
contacts between inmates and staff were minimal, because the staff with special qualifications 
for therapy or social work was absent.
209
 The therapy possibilities were described as 
inadequate.
210
 The CPT argued that immediate therapy plans were necessary together with a 
system targeting release as well as multi-disciplinary staff providing a high level of care.
211
 
These results were predominantly confirmed by a comprehensive study by Bartch fully 
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published after M. v. Germany.
212
 He questioned all institutions in the Länder and conducted 
interviews with 35 overseers and 40 detainees in 2006 and 2007 for the study.
213
 Bartsch 
observed, that the execution of preventive detention was problematic. He described a big 
discrepancy between the laws governing preventive detention and the reality of its execution 
regarding the relaxation of the execution, the offering of therapy, the number of staff and 
financial benefits like payment for work in prison.
214
 As showed above, the confinement 
relaxations were minimal, although they are very important for reintegration.
215
 Dessecker 
and Leuschner describe preventive detention as executed before the reforms as traditionally 
little-therapy-orientated.
216
 
One could summarise aggressively that Sicherungsverwahrung was its literal 
translation “securing storage” – of humans, deemed dangerous. Due to the limitations of this 
thesis, I will not discuss potential conflicts with the human dignity, but just conclude that 
requirements deduced above regarding facilitating the release and mitigating the burden of 
preventive detention were not met. 
As the ECtHR only decides individual cases, it is possible that some individuals were 
placed in therapeutic institutions
217
 so easily distinguishable from prisons and got so sufficient 
therapy that their preventive detention cannot be classified as arbitrary and unproportional in 
the sense of Art. 5 § 1 ECHR. Therefore, the precise conclusion should be that preventive 
detention and its execution were normally against the Convention. Being very critical, one 
could ask, whether it is “lawful” in the sense of Art. 5 § 1 ECHR when a court orders 
preventive detention, that is usually executed against the Convention as well as against the 
constitution, and just per coincidence the detainee ends up in good conditions. 
To summarise, only Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 lit. a) ECHR was a possible justification for 
preventive detention. The main criteria the ECtHR used to assess it, namely causal link and 
foreseeability were met. But it would have been also necessary to assess the issue of 
arbitrariness carefully. Because preventive detention is not in line with the most modern 
criminological findings and inflicts a severe special sacrifice on the detainees, it can only be 
non-arbitrary and proportional if the state does everything to shorten and mitigate. As 
Germany did not do that, preventive detention before M. v. Germany must be classified as 
arbitrary and unproportional. Hence, it constituted a violation of Art. 5 § 1 ECHR. 
3.2.2. Reserved in the judgment 
In 2002, Art. 66a StGB introduced preventive detention, that is reserved in the judgment, 
whereas normally the same court
218
 decided at least six months before release from ordinary 
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prison on the base of the offender’s dangerousness.219 For reserved preventive detention a 
lower probability of dangerousness is sufficient than for preventive detention ordered in the 
judgement.
220
 
As argued above, preventive detention violated Art. 5 § 1 ECHR, before the reforms 
that took effect on 1.6.2013. The reason is that it is arbitrary and unproportional to keep 
offenders potentially forever in detention on the grounds of imprecise prediction of 
dangerousness without doing everything to lower their dangerousness and to mitigate the 
negative effects on them. The arbitrariness and unproportionality of reserved preventive 
detention are comparable to those of preventive detention ordered in the judgement. The 
threshold to finally order detention in Art. 66a StGB demanded an overall assessment 
showing that the offender can be expected to commit serious offences that cause serious harm, 
whereas Art. 66 StGB required that an overall assessment shows that he is dangerous for the 
general public.
221
 Art. 66a StGB, contrary to Art. 66 StGB, named only danger of severe 
mental or physical harm as reason for detention, but not danger of serious economic 
damage.
222
 Regarding these conditions, Art. 66a StGB could even be seen as less 
unproportional than preventive detention ordered in the judgement. However, it stays arbitrary 
and unproportional to preventively detain without serious steps to reintegrate the offenders 
and to mitigate their burden. 
Nevertheless, a thorough analysis demands to apply the principles and the main test-
criterion the ECtHR uses to assess preventive detention’s compatibility with 
Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2. lit. a) ECHR, namely the “causal link” between conviction and deprivation of 
liberty. 
According to the ECtHR’s established jurisprudence “conviction” in lit. a) must 
contain a finding of guilt.
223
 The subsequent decision about ordering the previous reserved 
preventive detention does not contain an assessment of guilt.
224
 Hence, it cannot serve as a 
conviction in the sense of lit. a). 
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However, this later ordering, compared to preventive detention ordered directly in the 
judgement, might dissolve the demanded causal connection
 225
. The principles established by 
the ECtHR state that the causal connection gets weaker over time and might break 
if a position were reached in which a decision not to release or to re-detain was based 
on grounds that were inconsistent with the objectives of the initial decision [.]
226
  
The time span between the first judgement reserving preventive detention and its order can be 
very long, for instance, the detention can theoretically be ordered six months before a life-
imprisonment ends.
227 
This might make the causal connection in individual cases considerably 
weak. Also, the grounds for reserving preventive detention in the convicting judgement differ 
from the grounds of ordering it. For the reservation, only an overall assessment of the 
offender and his offences committed at the time of the judgement
228
 determine his 
dangerousness; for the subsequent ordering, equally the offender’s development in prison is 
taken into account.
229
 Merkel argues that courts deciding about the reservation and the 
ordering of preventive detention can be different ones.
230
 Also because the assessment of 
dangerousness is not completely determined by the guilty verdict, but also by later potential 
non-criminal behaviour in custody, there would be no sufficient causal link.
231
 Since Merkel 
neither shows a principle requiring exclusively the same grounds for a deprivation of liberty 
to be applied as in the connected conviction, his argumentation is not convincing for reserved 
preventive detention in which already the dangerousness is assessed for the reservation. Also, 
essentially the same prognosis is made for the decision about the execution of preventive 
detention ordered in the judgement as per Art. 67c § 1 StGB and the decision to order 
reserved preventive detention as per Art. 66a § 3 StGB.232 For both, the dangerousness is 
assessed shortly before the end of the prison-term and for both, the conduct in prison is taken 
into account.
233
 This execution order of preventive detention ordered in the judgement has 
essentially the same effect as the decision to order preventive detention that was reserved in 
the judgement. For instance, regarding these execution orders by the courts responsible for the 
execution of sentences or in Van Droogenbroeck v. Belgium, the ECtHR accepted that 
different bodies decide over the execution of a measure than the courts that originally ordered 
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it.
234
 Hence, Merkel’s argument, that the same court must decide over the reservation and the 
subsequent order, has no basis in the ECtHR’s case-law. 
To argue against Art. 66a StGB providing a causal connection between conviction and 
deprivation of liberty, one can also refer to Van Droogenbroeck v. Belgium.
235
 In this case, a 
detention after the prison sentence of the offender was “placed at the Government’s 
disposal”236 by the Belgian court’s judgement. The ECtHR saw the causal link as given.237 
Critics of Art. 66a StGB emphasise that in the Belgian case the detention was already ordered 
in the judgement, contrary to Art. 66a StGB.
238
 But one can also argue in favour of Art. 66a 
StGB as, although Mr. Droogenbroeck was detained several times on the base of this measure 
and the link dissolved, the ECtHR still saw the causal connection as sufficient.
239
 
The above cited principle
240
 about the gradual weakening of the causal connection was 
already similarly formulated in Droogenbroeck v. Belgium: 
The link might eventually be broken if a position were reached in which those 
decisions were based on grounds that had no connection with the objectives of the 
legislature and the court [.]
241
 
Applying this principle to Art. 66a StGB one must note that the reservation of the preventive 
detention is based on the dangerousness as well as the later ordering and both have the goal to 
secure the general public, but only if proportionate, as Art. 62 StGB demands. The difference 
just lies in the way the dangerousness is assessed, in particular for the latter the conduct in 
prison is equally taken into account. This cannot be classified as having “no connection” 
between the grounds of the judgement and the later ordering as formulated in Droogenbroeck 
v. Belgium or as “inconsistent”242 as formulated in Müller v. Germany.  
In the latter case, the Court after mentioning the aforementioned principle
243
 without 
deploying it, concluded that its previous case-law denouncing retrospectively abolished 
maximum duration for preventive detention
244
 and retrospectively ordered preventive 
detention
245
 results in the following principle: a causal connection is given  
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if, and as long as that detention occurs within the framework established by the 
judgment of the sentencing court, read in the light of the law applicable at the relevant 
time [.]
246
 
I do not estimate this to be a compulsory conclusion
247
 and would summarise it as 
foreseeability that is already the main-testing-criterion for “lawfulness”248 also demanded for 
Art. 5 § 1 ECHR. Nevertheless, it is not contradictory to the ECtHR’s established principles 
used to determine causal connections. Applying the cited conclusion, the ECtHR rightly states 
that in connection with Art. 66a StGB the order of preventive detention was clearly 
foreseeable at the time of the conviction.
249
 Hence, also doubts about the “lawfulness” are 
alleviated.
250
 
Furthermore, the Court argued that the later ordering of preventive detention is not an 
additional penalty for the offenders conduct in prison, although this behaviour is taken into 
account, because it is just one part of the assessment of dangerousness and comparable to the 
assessment regarding the execution of preventive detention ordered in the judgement.
251
 
Hence, reserved preventive detention was in line with the established principles used 
by the ECtHR to assess preventive detention’s conformity with Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 lit. a) ECHR. 
Nonetheless, as explained above, these established principles are not sufficient to 
assess Art. 5 § 1 ECHR.252 Regarding the issue of arbitrariness of preventive detention. 
Droogenbroeck v. Belgium also shows that it is possible to test the danger of releasing an 
offender, instead of continually, preventively detaining him. After being placed under the 
government’s disposal, Mr. Van Droogenbroeck was released five times and was only 
detained again after disappearing or committing crimes.
253
 On the other hand, he committed 
only offences against property.
254
 Art. 66a StGB can only be applied to protect against severe 
mental or physical harm. Contrary to property infringements, such harm cannot easily be 
undone. Therefore, it is not mandatory to conclude from the example of the Belgian practice, 
that reserved preventive detention is especially arbitrary due to a lack of provisional releases. 
However, reserved preventive detention was already arbitrary and unproportional 
because not everything was done to reintegrate the offenders and to mitigate their burden. 
Provisional releases can be an important part of reintegration, but Germany did not even use 
adequately therapy options that are applicable in full custody. 
Hence, the conclusion deduced before remains, namely that reserved preventive 
detention was shaped arbitrary and unproportional, resulting in a violation of 
Art. 5 § 1 ECHR. 
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3.2.3. Retrospectively ordered/prolonged 
In 1998, the 10-years maximum duration of the first preventive detention was abolished also 
affecting offenders already in preventive detention. Since 2004, Art. 66b StGB allowed 
retrospectively ordered preventive detention.
255
 The ECtHR ruled both incompatible with 
Art. 5 and 7 ECHR.
256
 On 4.5.2011, the German Constitutional Court, taking into account the 
ECtHR’s decisions, declared this forms of preventive detention under the conditions at that 
time as unconstitutional.
257
 Starting in 2014, the German government admitted in individual 
cases for strike-outs as per Art. 37 § 1 lit. c) ECHR that retrospectively prolonged or 
retrospectively ordered preventive detention had previously violated the Convention.
258
 For 
these reasons and because, as deduced above, the execution of preventive detention in 
Germany was arbitrary and unproportional and consequently violated Art. 5 § 1 ECHR, I will 
focus on the ECtHR’s line of reasoning, instead of counter-arguments. 
3.2.3.1. Retrospective prolongation of preventive detention 
As stated above, the exhaustive list of possibilities to deprive liberty in Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 ECHR 
must be interpreted narrowly and for lit. a) a causal connection is demanded.
259
 This 
connection between conviction and deprivation of liberty gets weaker over time and can 
vanish.
260
 The causal connection gets interrupted as soon as the continuation of detention is 
based on reasons that do not arise from the conviction.
261
 
The German convictions in conjunction with the legal framework before 1998 did not 
entail the possibility to order the first preventive detention for more than 10 years.
262
 This was 
only possible due to a law change and therefore due to reasons that did not arise from the 
conviction.
263
 Hence, the detention for longer than 10 years lacked a causal connection.
264
 
Consequently, lit. a) could not justify the deprivation of liberty. 
As explained above, the other possibilities in Art. 5 § 1 ECHR did not permit 
preventive detention either.
265
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Additionally, the foreseeability as main criterion to assess the lawfulness of 
deprivation of liberty is problematic for the retrospective extension of preventive detention.
266
 
Since the ECtHR had already established that the causal link was missing, it did not decide on 
foreseeability.
267
 Although, according to German law, preventive detention is not a penalty 
resulting in no application of the prohibition of worsening penalties,
268
 the retrospective 
prolongation was very hard to foresee. The 10-years maximum duration was introduced inter 
alia to make judges, who deemed preventive detention as equivalent to life-sentences, less 
reluctant to order it.
269
 Against this background, it is demanded too much for a potential 
offender to foresee, that preventive detention might become indefinite after a change in law 
by a state claiming to honour the rule of law, before he commits his offence. Hence no 
sufficient foreseeability was given resulting in lack of lawfulness. 
Consequently, detention for longer than the former maximum duration violated 
Art. 5 § 1 ECHR.270 
For the retrospective prolongation of preventive detention, the ECtHR also assessed 
Art. 7 § 1 cl. 2 ECHR. This provision prohibits that “a heavier penalty [is] imposed than the 
one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed.” The notion of 
“penalty” is interpreted autonomously.271 First, the ECtHR examines whether the measure “is 
imposed following conviction for a ‘criminal offence’”272, then it assesses the nature and 
purpose, the characterisation in the national law, the foreseen procedure of the 
implementation and the sanction’s severity (so-called “Welch-criteria”).273  
Assessing these criteria, preventive detention generally follows a conviction.
274
 
Although Germany does not qualify preventive detention as a penalty,
275
 predominantly the 
same laws applied mutatis mutandis as for ordinary prison-sentences and it was executed very 
similarly to prison-sentences, as described above.
276 
Preventive detention is also easily to 
understand as entailing a deterrent element.
277
 It is ordered by criminal courts.
278
 Also, a 
detention with indefinitely ending only under the hard to prove condition of no danger of 
further heavy crimes is very severe.
279
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Hence, preventive detention before 2010 had to be qualified as a penalty in the terms 
of Art. 7 ECHR.
280
 
The law before 1998 clearly forbid the first preventive detention to last longer than 
10 years.
281
 Thus more than 10 years for the first preventive detention for crimes committed 
before 1998 is “a heavier penalty” in the terms of Art. 7 § 1 cl. 2 ECHR and consequently, it 
constitutes a violation thereof.
282
 
Although retrospectively prolonged preventive detention could be seen as conflicting 
with the basic rule of law principle ne bis in idem, this will not be examined in this thesis 
because Germany did not ratify protocol nr. 7 ECHR that includes this principle in its Art. 
4.
283
 
To conclude, retrospectively prolonged preventive detention violated 
Art. 5 § 1 and Art. 7 § 1 cl. 2 ECHR. 
3.2.3.2. Retrospectively ordered 
In 2004, Art. 66b StGB introduced preventive detention that is ordered retrospectively when 
the offender already is serving a prison-term, without the detention or its reservation being 
part of the convicting judgement.
284
 Former Art. 66b §§ 1, 2 StGB entailed two possibilities to 
retrospectively order preventive detention.
285
 The following conditions needed to be present: 
certain facts emerging after the trial (nova),
286
 sentences for catalogued crimes, certain 
durations and count of sentences as well as dangerousness.
287
 
Former Art. 66b § 3 StGB allowed under similar conditions preventive detention.288 It 
concerned offenders who were previously placed in a psychiatric hospital according to 
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Art. 63 StGB. Art. 63 StGB allows to place offenders in a psychiatric hospital if they 
committed an offence in the state of diminished or removed criminal liability as regulated in 
Art. 20 f. StGB and are dangerous because of the mental condition diminishing or removing 
their criminal liability.
289
 Art. 67d § 6 StGB rules that such offenders need to be released from 
psychiatric hospitals as soon as their condition, that influenced their criminal liability, ceases 
to exist or it is established that the offender did not suffer from this mental condition from the 
beginning. In those cases, Art. 66b § 3 StGB allowed to order retrospectively preventive 
detention against the offenders who had to be released from psychiatric hospitals. The 
previous offences and the current dangerousness must also meet certain criteria.  
Already after the ECtHR had ruled in M. v. Germany that the retrospective extension 
of preventive detention infringed Art. 5 § 1 and Art. 7 ECHR, some German courts, classified 
retrospective preventive detention as violation of the Convention.
290
 On 13.1.2011, the 
ECtHR firstly ruled accordingly in Haidn v. Germany.
291
 
The “causal connection” between the conviction and the detention, as 
Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 lit. a) ECHR demands,292 does not exist, if in convicting judgements neither 
preventive detention was ordered nor even its possibility was mentioned.
293
 That a prison-
sentence is the precondition for preventive detention does not suffice to establish a causal 
connection.
294
 Hence, retrospectively ordered preventive detention could not be justified by 
lit. a). 
This also applies for former Art. 66b § 3 StGB. There is no causal connection between 
the judgement ordering the placement in a psychiatric hospital and the preventive detention 
after the release from this hospital on the grounds that there is no mental condition 
anymore.
295
 For all orders of placement in a psychiatric hospital as per Art. 63 StGB, this was 
not even foreseen in the law before 2004. If an offender is placed in a psychiatric hospital on 
the grounds that he is not criminal liable, there is not even a conviction entailing the 
establishment of guilt. Hence lit. a) could not justify Art. 66b § 3 StGB either. 
As explained above, also Art. 5 § 1 ECHR’s other alternatives could not justify 
preventive detention.
296
 
This is not different for Art. 66 § 3 StGB in combination with 
Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 lit. e) ECHR, namely the detention of persons of unsound mind.297 In the 
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application area of Art. 66b § 3 StGB, the offender was precisely released from psychiatric 
hospital, because he stopped to have a sufficient severe condition to detain him in such 
hospitals. Before 2010, also no German court based this form of preventive detention on any 
mental condition. For Art. 66b § 3 StGB, such a mental condition would need to be severe 
enough for “unsound mind” in the sense of Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 lit. e) ECHR, on the one hand, but 
constitute full criminal liability in the sense of Art. 66b § 3 StGB, read in connection with Art. 
20 f. StGB, on the other hand. In the here examined period before 2010, the courts and the 
law did not even know such a category of mental conditions. 
Therefore, no alternative in Art. 5 § 1 ECHR allowed any form of retrospective 
preventive detention as governed by Art. 66b StGB. 
Later, the ECtHR declared retrospective preventive detention also as incompatible 
with Art. 7 § 1 cl. 2 ECHR.298 The Court rightly explained that there is no reason to depart 
from the assessment in M. v. Germany that preventive detention is a penalty in the terms of 
the Convention.
299
 As it was not possible before 29.7.2004 to retrospectively order preventive 
detention, those penalties are also “heavier” in the terms of Art. 7 § 1 cl. 2 ECHR.300 Hence, 
retrospective preventive detention violated the Convention. Offences, that were committed 
after the possibility of retrospective preventive detention was introduced, are negligible as 
probably, ordinary preventive detention or the 2002 introduced reserved preventive detention 
would have been typically used.
301
 However, they would at least violate Art. 5 § 1 ECHR. 
4. CHANGES IN THE GERMAN SYSTEM OF PREVENTIVE DETENTION  
Before the judgement in M. v. Germany, the government’s coalition agreement already 
announced a future reform of the system of preventive detention.
302
 After the ECtHR’s 
decision, a debate emerged in Germany whether the consequences of the judgement entailed 
that all approximately 70 offenders with retrospectively prolonged detention and about 30 
with retrospectively ordered detention needed to be released, resulting in about 40 releases 
ordered by courts.
303
 At the end of 2010, the Reform of Preventive Detention Act changed the 
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pre-requisites to order preventive detention, abolished the possibility to order retrospective 
preventive detention for the future, except for Art. 66b § 3 StGB, and introduced the Therapy 
Detention Act.
304
 The aim of the Therapy Detention Act is to keep preventive detainees in 
custody who would have had to be released because of the ECtHR judgement M. v. 
Germany.
305
 Art. 1 Therapy Detention Act states until today that in case a person cannot be 
placed in preventive detention any longer because of a prohibition of retrospective worsening, 
then the competent court can order detention in an appropriate facility. Complementary to a 
high dangerousness
306
 the act introduced the new requirement of a “psychische Störung”307 
(mental disorder).
308
 This criterion, “mental disorder”, aims at the justification for deprivation 
of liberty in Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 lit. e) ECHR, the detention “of persons of unsound mind”.309 
Whether this attempt succeeded will be analysed in the next chapter. However, on 4.5.2011 
the Constitutional Court issued a transitional provision stating that all individuals, who were 
still detained against the judgements of the ECtHR, namely because of retrospective ordered 
or retrospective prolonged preventive detention, needed to be released, if they did not suffer 
from “mental disorder” as defined in the Therapy Detention Act and had not an especially 
high level of dangerousness
310
.
311
  
At the end of the Constitutional Court’s transitional provision in effect from 1.6.2013, 
the German legislator, in turn, adopted in Art. 316f Introductory Act to the Criminal Code a 
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transitional provision with the same content.
312
 This way, it has been continuously possible 
until today to keep allegedly heavily dangerous offenders in preventive detention, although 
the German Constitutional Court declared their preventive detention as unconstitutional
313
 and 
these forms of detention violated the ECHR. Additionally, both transitional provisions allow 
the ordering of new retrospective detention or prolongation over the 10-years maximum 
duration for all triggering offences committed before the 1.6.2013.
314
 
Whether this German course of action to add stricter requirements to previous 
Convention-violating forms of preventive detention, changed the confirmability with the 
Convention, will be assessed in the next chapter. 
The Constitutional Court is of the view, that it is engaged in a dialogue with the 
ECtHR, in which it does not schematically copy the ECtHR’s reasoning, but regards the 
ECtHR’s assessments while interpreting the law within the German constitutional 
framework.
315
 The consideration of the ECtHR’s views will be typically done in the 
constitutional criteria of proportionality.
316
 This explains why the Constitutional Court ruled 
that forms of preventive detention violating the Convention can become constitutional when 
stricter requirements are added. 
The Constitutional Court in general took into account that the ECtHR classified 
preventive detention as “penalty” in terms of Art. 7 ECHR and declared the entire preventive 
detention system as unconstitutional because of insufficient distinction between punishing 
prison-sentences and preventive detention.
317
 For preventive detention to become 
constitutional, the legislator had to implement the so-called Abstandsgebot (distinction 
requirement
318
) to sufficiently differentiate between both measures.
319
 It was concretised with 
seven supplementary minimum-requirements
320
 to ensure that the – always maintained in the 
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German law tradition
321
 – preventive character of the detention prevails. The federal legislator 
did that with the Preventive Detention Distinction Act.
322
 Its most important part is 
Art. 66c StGB in which, for the first time in Germany, preventive detention was legally 
defined differently than just separating dangerous offenders from the general public.
323
 
Art. 66c § 1 StGB states that preventive detention is executed in facilities that provide a 
certain level of therapy with the aim to make the detainees ready to be released and which 
have conditions that burden the detainees as little as possible. If no adequate therapy is 
offered to the detainee fast enough, he has to be released.
324
 
Now only the danger of serious physical or psychological damage justifies preventive 
detention, but not danger of heavy economic damage anymore.
325
 
Because of the federal competence division, the individual Länder enacted laws to 
implement the distinction requirement into the laws governing the execution of the 
detention.
326
 The Länder invested more than 200 million euro to build and equip preventive 
detention facilities according to the new requirements.
327
 
In the next chapter, I will examine whether the reforms and their execution were 
sufficient to make all forms of preventive detention consistent with the ECHR. 
5. COMPATIBILITY OF PREVENTIVE DETENTION WITH THE ECHR 
AFTER THE CHANGES 
The aforementioned reforms in Germany, that should bring preventive detention in line with 
the constitution and the Convention, took effect on 1.6.2013 and the German government 
indirectly admitted that preventive detention violated the Convention prior to that date, in 
order to achieve strike-out decisions in ECtHR proceedings.
328
 Therefore, I will examine 
hereafter, whether the system of preventive detention has been compatible with the ECHR 
since 1.6.2013. 
5.1. Ordered in judgement 
The legal changes in Germany since 2010 did not result in any differences for the causal 
connection between the conviction and deprivation of liberty as demanded for 
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Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 lit. a) ECHR. This causal link persists for preventive detention ordered in the 
judgement. 
The big question is whether the changes were in fact sufficient to make preventive 
detention non-arbitrary and proportional. Nowadays, does the German state do everything in 
its power to keep preventive detention as short as possible so that nobody gets deprived of his 
liberty unnecessarily and hence arbitrarily in the sense of a restrictively interpreted Art. 5 § 1 
ECHR? Does Germany arrange the execution of preventive detention in the most beneficial 
way for the detainees in order to make the special sacrifice inflicted on them proportional? 
There are two different possibilities to examine these questions. 
Firstly, one could assess whether the new legal framework is appropriate to secure 
these requirements and whether the execution of preventive detention in fact meets those 
standards. 
The second option would be to define the “gold standard” of detention and to assess 
whether this standard is reached by preventive detention. Concretely for Germany, this could 
mean that one defines the placement in a psychiatric hospital as per Art. 63 StGB as highest 
standard possible and assess whether preventive detention is executed similarly and whether 
differences are justified by the needs of detainees not mentally ill. In Bergmann v. Germany, 
the ECtHR stated, that the preventive detention facility was similar to psychiatric hospitals 
regarding the staffing.
329
 But according to the most comprehensive study of all preventive 
detention facilities in Germany by Dessecker and Leuschner the difference is a total lack of 
care staff in preventive detention.
330
 Consequently, Dessecker states that the ECtHR is wrong 
because no preventive detention facility is equipped and staffed like a psychiatric hospital.
331
 
Upon request, he explained that the staff composition in psychiatric hospitals is totally 
different from that in preventive detention and that there is no detailed empiric research on 
that issue.
332
 Further he explained that it is not useful to compare the performance of 
psychiatric hospitals to preventive detention facilities because the types of treatment and the 
preconditions vary.
333
 Since I do not have the means to conduct such an empirical study, I will 
not further investigate on the second option. However, I conclude that the ECtHR’s 
unsubstantiated claim, that a preventive detention facility is staffed like a psychiatric hospital, 
is wrong and therefore cannot be an argument for the compatibility of preventive detention 
with Art. 5 § 1 ECHR.  
For the first option, regarding the avoidance of arbitrariness of the deprivation of 
liberty, the legal framework now stresses in Art. 66c StGB that the goal is to end preventive 
detention as fast as possible through reduction of the dangerousness. The article prescribes 
that a plan needs to be drafted and renewed to motivate detainees and offer psychiatric, 
psychological or social treatment and therapy, individualised if necessary.
334
 The obligation to 
offer adequate treatment is secured by Art 67d § 2 cl. 2 StGB. If no adequate treatment is 
offered to the detainee during a time limit of maximal six months, a competent court has to 
halt the preventive detention’s execution. Additionally, detainees need to be released if a 
general overview of their detention entails not enough treatment.
335
 Already in the preceding 
                                                 
329
 Bergmann v. Germany, supra note 121, §§ 38, 125. 
330
 Dessecker and Leuschner, empirical study, supra note 145, p. 29. 
331
 Dessecker, “§ 66c StGB”, supra note 177, recital 13. 
332
 Axel Dessecker, e-mail to author, 16.4.2020. 
333
 Ibid. 
334
 Art. 66c § 1 nr. 1 a) StGB. 
335
 Art. 67c § 1 nr. 2 StGB. 
 42 
prison-sentence, therapy and treatment must be offered with the goal of making preventive 
detention superfluous.
336
 The offering is controlled by courts.
337
 This legislation has rather 
strict regulations for therapy and treatment to make the detention superfluous. In combination 
with the judicial safeguards it seems fit to facilitate a deprivation of liberty that is not arbitrary 
because of unnecessary long detention. 
The goal of fast releases is supported by the obligation to provide relaxations of 
confinement, as long as it is not prevented by imperative security reasons, and to provide 
support for released offenders.
338
 As explained above, relaxations and after-release support 
are very important to reintegrate offenders. At the same time relaxations are often personnel-
intensive and lead to protest of local residents.
339
 Hence, it is very positive from a human 
rights perspective that the federal legislator included these obligations. They do not directly 
legally entitle the detainees, but the Länder’s execution laws can.340 
These laws in the different Länder also define the minimum requirements of the 
treatment and therapy plan prescribed by Art. 66c § 1 nr. 1 StGB with between 12 and 19 
specifications describing aspects of treatment and therapy that serve the goal of reducing the 
offenders’ dangerousness.341 If executed diligently, these laws seem to be suited to facilitate 
such treatment. 
In practice, it is hard to measure whether the treatment and therapy provided is in fact 
optimal for the detainees. Most preventive detainees are placed in the newly established 
preventive detention facilities.
342
 Over 10% of preventive detainees are placed in other 
facilities like socio-therapeutic ones that have special places for preventive detainees, few 
detainees are still placed in ordinary prisons, e.g. for security reasons, and few are detained in 
facilities like psychiatric hospitals for therapy reasons.
343
 This thesis tries to give an overview 
whether preventive detention in general is in line with the ECHR. Hence, I will focus on the 
usual cases wherever the data allows so. 
However, the most comprehensive, current (2019) study about the execution of 
preventive detention by Dessecker and Leuschner evaluated questionnaires that were send to 
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all facilities accommodating preventive detainees or prisoners with ordered or reserved 
preventive detention.
344
 The scientists compared the numbers of offenders suitable for 
relaxations of confinement with the relaxations actually conducted for prisoners against whom 
preventive detention was ordered or reserved and preventive detainees.
345
 Also the number of 
such prisoners and detainees with need for treatment and therapy was compared to measures 
actually conducted.
346
 As the different specialists working in the facilities filled out the 
questionnaires,
347
 they are potentially biased and the real conditions might be worse. 
The following table shows how many offenders are deemed by prison or facility 
personnel suitable for different relaxation measures with ascending degree of freedom.
348
 The 
first measure (excursion to preserve abilities to live) only serves the protection from damage 
caused by confinement and the conservation of human dignity, whereas the others serve 
reintegration into society.
349
 
 
350
 
                                                 
344
 Dessecker and Leuschner, empirical study, supra note 145, p. 14. 
345
 Ibid., pp. 43-49. 
346
 Ibid., pp. 50-59. 
347
 Ibid., pp. 13 f., 30, 70. 
348
 Ibid., pp. 43 f. 
349
 Ibid. 
350
 Ibid., p. 103. 
2014
A dult  
priso ners 
with o rdered 
preventive 
detent io n
P riso ners 
with 
reserved 
preventive 
detent io n
P reventive 
detainees
Executio n  
ended o r 
paused
414 38 20 ≤ 5 474
75,7% 76,0% 3,9%
129 11 477 15 632
23,6% 22,0% 93,5% 78,9%
44 ≤ 5 187 12 246
8,0% 36,7% 63,2%
17 ≤ 5 105 7 134
3,1% 20,6% 36,8%
6 ≤ 5 57 7 73
1,1% 11,2% 36,8%
≤ 5 ≤ 5 41 7 55
8,0% 36,8%
≤ 5 ≤ 5 23 ≤ 5 28
4,5%
≤ 5 ≤ 5 30 ≤ 5 35
5,9%
≤ 5 ≤ 5 19 ≤ 5 25
3,7%
547 50 510 19 1126
o pen priso n
Table A.15: Suitability for confinement relaxations sorted by status at 31.3.2014 and 
31.3.2015 (multiple answers) (translation)
* Percentage based on cases
excursio n with priso n 
perso nnel
excursio n with o ther 
perso ns
excursio n witho ut esco rt
lo ng excursio n/  vacat io n
wo rk o utside /  tempo rary 
leave
Status*
to tal
to tally unsuitable
excursio n to  preserve 
abilit ies to  live
excursio n with the 
po ssibility o f  pro gressio n
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351
 
It is noticeable that less than 10% of prisoners with ordered or reserved preventive 
detention were assessed as suited for relaxations that serve reintegration, instead of only 
conservation.
352
 The difference to 37-40% suitability for reintegration of preventive detainees 
is hardly explainable by their longer confinement. The enormous difference between prisoners 
and detainees regarding the total unsuitability for relaxations to keep offenders able to cope 
with life, cannot be explained only by short previous confinement.
353
 This suggests that 
prisoners with ordered or reserved preventive detention get assessed too cautiously. At least a 
positive trend from 2014 to 2015 in assessing more suitability for relaxations is noticeable. 
The following table compares suitability with actually conducted relaxations. 
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2015
A dult  
priso ners 
with o rdered 
preventive 
detent io n
P riso ners 
with 
reserved 
preventive 
detent io n
P reventive 
detainees
Executio n  
ended o r 
paused
344 32 10 8 394
70,8% 71,1% 2,0% 20,0%
133 12 481 31 657
27,4% 26,7% 96,0% 77,5%
47 ≤ 5 202 21 274
9,7% 40,3% 52,5%
23 ≤ 5 112 20 159
4,7% 22,4% 50,0%
10 ≤ 5 55 17 86
2,1% 11,0% 42,5%
9 ≤ 5 49 15 75
1,9% 9,8% 37,5%
≤ 5 31 8 43
6,2% 20,0%
6 42 9 57
1,2% 8,4% 22,5%
≤ 5 29 6 38
5,8% 15,0%
486 45 501 40 1072
o pen priso n
Table A.15: Suitability for confinement relaxations sorted by status at 31.3.2014 and 
31.3.2015 (multiple answers) (translation) - continuation
excursio n with priso n 
perso nnel
excursio n with o ther 
perso ns
excursio n witho ut esco rt
lo ng excursio n/  vacat io n
wo rk o utside /  tempo rary 
leave
Status*
to tal
to tally unsitable
excursio n to  preserve 
abilit ies to  live
excursio n with the 
po ssibility o f  pro gressio n
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2014
suitability realisation suitability realisation
excursion to 
preserve abilities to 
live
477 375 140 103
excursion with 
possibility of 
progression
187 144 47 26
excursion with 
personnel
105 77 22 11
excursion with 
other persons
57 31 9 ≤ 5
excursion without 
escort
41 37 7 ≤ 5
long excursion / 
vacation
23 17 ≤ 5 ≤ 5
work outside / 
temporary leave
30 17 ≤ 5 ≤ 5
open prison 19 11 ≤ 5 ≤ 5
Table 8: Confinement relaxations: Suitability and realisation sorted by status at 
31.3.2014 and 31.3.2015 (multiple answers) (translation)
preventive detainees prisoners (p.d. ordered/reserved)
2015
suitability realisation suitability realisation
excursion to 
preserve abilities to 
live
481 413 145 110
excursion with the 
possibility of 
progression
202 158 51 36
excursion with 
personnel
112 90 27 19
excursion with 
other persons
55 32 14 6
excursion without 
escort
49 38 11 7
long excursion / 
vacation
31 17 ≤ 5 ≤ 5
work outside / 
temporary leave
42 24 6 6
open prison 29 13 ≤ 5 ≤ 5
preventive detainees prisoners (p.d. ordered/reserved)
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354
 
Keeping in mind that confinement relaxations can be challenging for the authorities 
and that relaxations were given very restrictive before 1.6.2013,
355
 it might be defensible that 
still so many offenders did not receive relaxations although they were deemed suitable for 
them. Also, a positive trend here shows that from 2014 to 2015 more relaxations are actually 
conducted. If the trends in assessing suitability for relaxations and actually carrying them out 
continued in the following years, then Germany is on a good way to preventive detention that 
is non-arbitrary and proportional. 
Therapy is the basic element to reintegrate offenders. The next table compares the 
need of therapy with the actual participation. 
 
356
 
Still many useful treatments are not conducted. But apart from the violent offender 
programme, work and work therapy the trends from 2014 to 2015 are positive. However, 
treatment and therapy are much less subjected to security concerns and local protest than 
confinement relaxations. Hence, it seems especially arbitrary that not everything in this area is 
                                                 
354
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356
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need need
abs. abs. % abs. abs. %
motivation 746 511 68,5 740 531 71,8
psychiatry 204 127 62,3 197 130 66,0
psychotherapy (individually) 679 366 53,9 683 393 57,5
psychotherapy (in groups) 377 106 28,1 375 124 33,1
social therapy 611 276 45,2 595 289 48,6
sex offender programme 477 152 31,9 467 158 33,8
violent offender programme 353 72 20,4 369 56 15,2
addiction treatment 500 181 36,2 501 212 42,3
social training 605 217 35,9 595 197 33,1
school 136 42 30,9 129 46 35,7
vocational education 244 61 25,0 232 64 27,6
work therapy 179 90 50,3 172 86 50,0
work 769 623 81,0 803 628 78,2
other 437 267 61,1 450 289 64,2
Table 9: Treatmeant participation of offenders with ordered/reserved 
preventive detention and the preventive detainees sorted by assumption of 
a need of treatment (multiple answers) (translation)
2014 2015
participation participation
 47 
done to keep the detention as short as possible. But one also needs to look at the reasons for 
the lack of treatment. 
 
 
 
 
 
N o , due 
to  lack 
o f  o ffer
N o , due 
to  lack o f  
mo tivat io
n
N o , but  
planned
Yes, 
current l
y 
running
Yes, 
ended 
prematur
ely
Yes, 
f inishe
d as 
schedul
ed
P art ici
pat io n 
already 
earlier
4 0 0 4 0 7 11 26
15,4% 0,0% 0,0% 15,4% 0,0% 26,9% 42,3% 100,0%
10 186 39 432 23 52 4 746
1,3% 24,9% 5,2% 57,9% 3,1% 7,0% 0,5% 100,0%
6 1 0 2 0 0 0 9
66,7% 11,1% 0,0% 22,2% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 100,0%
8 57 12 112 6 8 1 204
3,9% 27,9% 5,9% 54,9% 2,9% 3,9% 0,5% 100,0%
1 2 1 0 0 0 11 15
6,7% 13,3% 6,7% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 73,3% 100,0%
65 147 101 310 19 22 15 679
9,6% 21,6% 14,9% 45,7% 2,8% 3,2% 2,2% 100,0%
4 7 0 0 0 2 6 19
21,1% 36,8% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 10,5% 31,6% 100,0%
75 133 63 79 12 10 5 377
19,9% 35,3% 16,7% 21,0% 3,2% 2,7% 1,3% 100,0%
3 2 1 3 1 0 6 16
18,8% 12,5% 6,3% 18,8% 6,3% 0,0% 37,5% 100,0%
15 200 120 237 19 6 14 611
2,5% 32,7% 19,6% 38,8% 3,1% 1,0% 2,3% 100,0%
3 2 0 0 0 2 12 19
15,8% 10,5% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 10,5% 63,2% 100,0%
21 208 96 96 13 26 17 477
4,4% 43,6% 20,1% 20,1% 2,7% 5,5% 3,6% 100,0%
4 2 0 0 0 0 9 15
26,7% 13,3% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 60,0% 100,0%
24 156 101 41 8 16 7 353
6,8% 44,2% 28,6% 11,6% 2,3% 4,5% 2,0% 100,0%
P art icipat io n
to tal
need o f  treatmeant 2014
T able A .30: C urrent  o r ended part icipat io n in treatment o n 31 M arch 2014 and 31 M arch 2015 acco rding to  need o f  treatment 
(mult iple answers)  ( translat io n)
treatment pro gramme fo r vio lent  
o ffenders
no t 
ident if iable
identif iable
mo tivat io n o r preparat io n fo r 
therapy
no t 
ident if iable
identif iable
psychiatric treatment
no t 
ident if iable
identif iable
individual psycho therapeutic 
treatment
no t 
ident if iable
identif iable
psycho therapeutic gro up therapy
no t 
ident if iable
identif iable
so cio therapeutic treatment
no t 
ident if iable
identif iable
treatment pro gramme fo r sex 
o ffenders
no t 
ident if iable
identif iable
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N o , due 
to  lack 
o f  o ffer
N o , due 
to  lack o f  
mo tivat io
n
N o , but  
planned
Yes, 
current l
y 
running
Yes, 
ended 
prematur
ely
Yes, 
f inishe
d as 
schedul
ed
P art ici
pat io n 
already 
earlier
0 2 0 1 0 1 3 7
0,0% 28,6% 0,0% 14,3% 0,0% 14,3% 42,9% 100,0%
15 211 93 130 7 29 15 500
3,0% 42,2% 18,6% 26,0% 1,4% 5,8% 3,0% 100,0%
0 1 3 1 0 1 7 13
0,0% 7,7% 23,1% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 53,8% 100,0%
48 244 96 121 15 50 31 605
7,9% 40,3% 15,9% 20,0% 2,5% 8,3% 5,1% 100,0%
3 3 0 0 0 1 4 11
27,3% 27,3% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 9,1% 36,4% 100,0%
10 60 24 25 8 6 3 136
7,4% 44,1% 17,6% 18,4% 5,9% 4,4% 2,2% 100,0%
3 3 0 0 0 4 4 14
21,4% 21,4% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 28,6% 28,6% 100,0%
26 77 80 44 7 7 3 244
10,7% 31,6% 32,8% 18,0% 2,9% 2,9% 1,2% 100,0%
4 2 0 3 0 1 1 11
36,4% 18,2% 0,0% 27,3% 0,0% 9,1% 9,1% 100,0%
6 68 15 61 12 10 7 179
3,4% 38,0% 8,4% 34,1% 6,7% 5,6% 3,9% 100,0%
1 3 1 9 0 0 0 14
7,1% 21,4% 7,1% 64,3% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 100,0%
17 79 50 582 24 9 8 769
2,2% 10,3% 6,5% 75,7% 3,1% 1,2% 1,0% 100,0%
1 6 2 4 0 1 2 16
6,3% 37,5% 12,5% 25,0% 0,0% 6,3% 12,5% 100,0%
13 104 53 217 18 27 5 437
3,0% 23,8% 12,1% 49,7% 4,1% 6,2% 1,1% 100,0%
no t 
ident if iable
identif iable
wo rk
no t 
ident if iable
identif iable
o ther
no t 
ident if iable
identif iable
treatment o f  addict io n
no t 
ident if iable
identif iable
so cial t raining
no t 
ident if iable
identif iable
educat io nal measures
no t 
ident if iable
identif iable
vo cat io nal training, qualif icat io n
no t 
ident if iable
identif iable
wo rk therapy
P art icipat io n
to tal
need o f  treatmeant 2014
T able A .30: C urrent  o r ended part icipat io n in treatment o n 31 M arch 2014 and 31 M arch 2015 acco rding to  need o f  treatment 
(mult iple answers)  ( translat io n)  -  co ntinuat io n
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N o , due 
to  lack 
o f  o ffer
N o , due 
to  lack o f  
mo tivat io
n
N o , but  
planned
Yes, 
current l
y 
running
Yes, 
ended 
prematur
ely
Yes, 
f inishe
d as 
schedul
ed
P art ici
pat io n 
already 
earlier
0 0 0 7 0 14 6 27
0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 25,9% 0,0% 51,9% 22,2% 100,0%
5 184 20 466 19 41 5 740
0,7% 24,9% 2,7% 63,0% 2,6% 5,5% 0,7% 100,0%
5 1 0 1 0 0 1 8
62,5% 12,5% 0,0% 12,5% 0,0% 0,0% 12,5% 100,0%
5 48 14 116 7 4 3 197
2,5% 24,4% 7,1% 58,9% 3,6% 2,0% 1,5% 100,0%
2 3 0 2 0 4 5 16
12,5% 18,8% 0,0% 12,5% 0,0% 25,0% 31,3% 100,0%
49 153 88 330 33 20 10 683
7,2% 22,4% 12,9% 48,3% 4,8% 2,9% 1,5% 100,0%
8 3 0 5 0 4 2 22
36,4% 13,6% 0,0% 22,7% 0,0% 18,2% 9,1% 100,0%
54 138 59 102 7 12 3 375
14,4% 36,8% 15,7% 27,2% 1,9% 3,2% 0,8% 100,0%
2 3 0 2 2 2 1 12
16,7% 25,0% 0,0% 16,7% 16,7% 16,7% 8,3% 100,0%
8 198 100 235 28 11 15 595
1,3% 33,3% 16,8% 39,5% 4,7% 1,8% 2,5% 100,0%
3 1 1 0 1 8 11 25
12,0% 4,0% 4,0% 0,0% 4,0% 32,0% 44,0% 100,0%
19 204 86 111 12 20 15 467
4,1% 43,7% 18,4% 23,8% 2,6% 4,3% 3,2% 100,0%
1 3 2 0 0 7 2 15
6,7% 20,0% 13,3% 0,0% 0,0% 46,7% 13,3% 100,0%
27 171 115 34 12 7 3 369
7,3% 46,3% 31,2% 9,2% 3,3% 1,9% 0,8% 100,0%
P art icipat io n
to tal
need o f  treatmeant 2015
T able A .30: C urrent  o r ended part icipat io n in treatment o n 31 M arch 2014 and 31 M arch 2015 acco rding to  need o f  treatment 
(mult iple answers)  ( translat io n)  -  co ntinuat io n
treatment pro gramme fo r vio lent  
o ffenders
no t 
ident if iable
identif iable
mo tivat io n o r preparat io n fo r 
therapy
no t 
ident if iable
identif iable
psychiatric treatment
no t 
ident if iable
identif iable
individual psycho therapeutic 
treatment
no t 
ident if iable
identif iable
psycho therapeutic gro up therapy
no t 
ident if iable
identif iable
so cio therapeutic treatment
no t 
ident if iable
identif iable
treatment pro gramme fo r sex 
o ffenders
no t 
ident if iable
identif iable
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358
 
That preventive detainees still do not get treatment because of a lack of offers is very 
problematic. For psychotherapeutic group therapy 14-20% detainees with need of such 
therapy received none in 2014 and 2015. Keeping in mind that prison-staff filled out the 
questionnaires, one needs to consider that lack of motivation might be recorded too often as 
reason for not conducting a treatment. Anyhow, the motivation for treatment is the task of the 
execution and maybe the quality of the treatment or the environment’s friendliness towards 
therapy needs to be increased.
359
 Nevertheless, an overall trend from 2014 to 2015 shows a 
decrease in lack of treatment offers. 
Post-reforms, the question whether the conditions to detain are met is reviewed at least 
every 12 months, instead of every 24 months.
360
 Two detainees were released until 31.3.2015 
because no sufficient treatment was offered to them.
361
 This indicates that the judicial control 
of preventive detention works. 
Is preventive detention ordered in the judgement after the reforms in Germany still 
arbitrary in the sense of a narrowly interpreted Art. 5 § 1 ECHR? The overall assessment 
shows that preventive detention changed its character from a measure that mainly confines 
offenders to protect the general public and just conducts some treatment without a specific 
plan or goal to a measure in that treatment, therapy and confinement relaxations are conducted 
                                                 
358
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359
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360
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N o , due 
to  lack 
o f  o ffer
N o , due 
to  lack o f  
mo tivat io
n
N o , but  
planned
Yes, 
current l
y 
running
Yes, 
ended 
prematur
ely
Yes, 
f inishe
d as 
schedul
ed
P art ici
pat io n 
already 
earlier
1 0 1 0 0 3 6 11
9,1% 0,0% 9,1% 0,0% 0,0% 27,3% 54,5% 100,0%
21 184 84 145 14 41 12 501
4,2% 36,7% 16,8% 28,9% 2,8% 8,2% 2,4% 100,0%
2 2 4 3 1 5 6 23
8,7% 8,7% 17,4% 13,0% 4,3% 21,7% 26,1% 100,0%
31 262 105 125 9 42 21 595
5,2% 44,0% 17,6% 21,0% 1,5% 7,1% 3,5% 100,0%
1 0 2 0 0 1 1 5
20,0% 0,0% 40,0% 0,0% 0,0% 20,0% 20,0% 100,0%
10 50 23 33 8 3 2 129
7,8% 38,8% 17,8% 25,6% 6,2% 2,3% 1,6% 100,0%
1 2 3 2 0 5 0 13
7,7% 15,4% 23,1% 15,4% 0,0% 38,5% 0,0% 100,0%
28 73 67 37 12 11 4 232
12,1% 31,5% 28,9% 15,9% 5,2% 4,7% 1,7% 100,0%
2 0 2 5 0 1 3 13
15,4% 0,0% 15,4% 38,5% 0,0% 7,7% 23,1% 100,0%
6 67 13 56 16 7 7 172
3,5% 39,0% 7,6% 32,6% 9,3% 4,1% 4,1% 100,0%
2 1 4 6 1 0 0 14
14,3% 7,1% 28,6% 42,9% 7,1% 0,0% 0,0% 100,0%
22 88 65 573 33 10 12 803
2,7% 11,0% 8,1% 71,4% 4,1% 1,2% 1,5% 100,0%
1 4 3 13 0 4 0 25
4,0% 16,0% 12,0% 52,0% 0,0% 16,0% 0,0% 100,0%
4 114 43 253 15 15 6 450
0,9% 25,3% 9,6% 56,2% 3,3% 3,3% 1,3% 100,0%
no t 
ident if iable
identif iable
wo rk
no t 
ident if iable
identif iable
o ther
no t 
ident if iable
identif iable
treatment o f  addict io n
no t 
ident if iable
identif iable
so cial t raining
no t 
ident if iable
identif iable
educat io nal measures
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in a systematic way, secured by judicial control. I can see no major problems in the legal 
framework. The number of measures actually conducted was still too low in 2014 and 2015, 
but positive trends in the key figures give hope that in the following years preventive 
detention will be kept as short as necessary. Hence, I conclude that preventive detention 
changed its character from a usually arbitrary deprivation of liberty to a usually non-arbitrary 
deprivation of liberty. In 2015 there was still much to do. What is important is that ways are 
found to motivate all detainees to participate in treatment and that this treatment is actually 
available. If preventive detention really changed its character, it must be possible to convince 
the vast majority of detainees that treatment can shorten their detention. Whether enough was 
done for one individual to minimise the time in detention and therefore making the detention 
non-arbitrary, still needs to be assessed individually. 
Regarding the proportionality of execution, Art. 66c § 1 nr. 2 StGB rules that 
preventive detention facilities have to enable conditions that are as close as possible to life in 
freedom, taking security aspects into account, and they are spatially or organisationally 
separated from prisons. The constitutional separation requirement as one specification of the 
constitutional distinguishing requirement gets less fulfilled than under the old law that 
demanded some organisational separation.
362
 However, for the ECHR it is not decisive to 
what degree the distinction requirement is fulfilled. For Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 lit a) ECHR it is 
important that the deprivation of liberty is non-arbitrary and proportional. But also here, any 
lack of organisational separation entails the danger that the responsible authorities treat 
preventive detainees similarly to prisoners and maybe consequently too much as security 
concern and too little as patients. 
The approximation of the detention to the life in freedom gets shaped by the Länder’s 
execution laws. According to these laws the cells need to have a specially separated sanitary 
area.
363
 The cells have 14-25 square meters.
364
 If one follows the line of reasoning that the 
approximation to life in freedom can be interpreted as life in freedom of persons who live 
together with many other people for some years, then one can conclude that the overall 
equipment of the cells is comparable to, for instance, a student’s dorm.365 An obligation to 
work is now only left in Bavaria and only if it serves the treatment plan.
366
 
To recall, the German distance requirement is not decisive for the ECHR. But to give 
some proportions, the most populated Land North Rhine-Westphalia pays 250,23 Euro per 
day of preventive detention or 200 Euro when it buys preventive detention capacities in other 
Länder,367 whereas a regular prisoner costed 135,65 per day in 2017.368 Patients in psychiatric 
hospitals cost North Rhine-Westphalia about 255 euro per day.
369
 This indicates that the 
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circumstances in preventive detention are substantially better than in prisons. However, it is 
imperative to keep in mind that preventive detainees are not confined because of their guilt or 
to their own benefit, but only for a small increase of safety of others or their security-feelings 
and for Germany being able to limit all other prison-sentences by the guilt of the offenders. 
Hence, I am of the opinion, that a big amount of money should be spent to make preventive 
detention as comfortable as possible. But now an amount of money is spent for preventive 
detainees comparable to the money spent for mentally ill offenders, who are also detained 
independently from guilt. Under the premise that psychiatric hospitals offer sufficient quality 
of life, the new preventive detention facilities might do so as well. 
However, whether the execution is in fact sufficient to mitigate the burden for single 
preventive detention facilities and single detainees, needs to be assessed individually. 
To sum up, preventive detention changed its character to a measure in that the goal of 
releasing the detainee fast is now important and the execution is now more proportional. 
Hence, applying the criteria deduced in chapter 3.2.1.3., preventive detention is not in general 
arbitrary and unproportional anymore. However, still the analysis of the individual cases is 
necessary to determine whether the detention is in line with Art. 5 § 1 ECHR that truly 
protects from the arbitrary and unproportional deprivation of liberty. For detainees who are 
suited for relaxation and in need for therapy as well as motivated, but do not get both while 
being confined in circumstances, that could be significantly better, the detention is still 
arbitrary, unproportional and hence a violation of a narrowly interpreted Art. 5 § 1 ECHR. 
5.2. Reserved in judgement 
The legal changes concerning reserved preventive detention do not make a significant 
difference for the exceptions in Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 b)-f) ECHR. These exceptions still do not 
allow reserved preventive detention. 
Regarding lit. a), also the outcome did not change concerning the causal link, as the 
ECtHR’s main-criterion to examine preventive detention’s confirmability. The assessment of 
dangerousness for the later ordering is now only supplementary based on the offenders 
development in prison, instead of equally with an overall assessment of him and his offences 
committed.
370
 Hence, compared to the old legal situation, the causal connection between the 
conviction and the preventive detention is now stronger as its ordering is relatively less based 
on the offenders conduct in prison. This makes arguments against a causal connection 
between the conviction and the deprivation of liberty as demanded for Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 lit. a) 
ECHR weaker. The demanded causal connection persists after the reforms. 
The question whether the new situation is a non-arbitrary and proportional deprivation 
of liberty in the sense of Art. 5 § 1 ECHR, has the same answer as for preventive detention 
that is ordered in the judgement. The execution of the detention is the same for both forms 
and the conditions under which they are ordered, still do not make a difference for 
assessments of arbitrariness and proportionality. The difference in the conditions to order 
detention between Art. 66 and Art. 66a StGB is basically that the reservation of the detention 
needs a lower degree of probability of dangerousness. Also the final assessment of 
dangerousness after the reservation is much closer to the detention. For the overall assessment 
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of the offenders and his offences committed, Art. 66a StGB takes supplementary into account 
the development till the decision, instead of the tendency to commit crimes which is part of 
Art. 66 StGB. But the tendency to commit crimes will be important in the evaluation of the 
dangerousness anyway.
371
 
As analysed for preventive detention ordered in the judgement, also reserved 
preventive detention is now not anymore executed generally arbitrary and unproportional. 
Also the specific conditions of every single reserved preventive detention need to be assessed 
individually to determine whether they are in conformity with Art. 5 § 1 ECHR. 
5.3. Retrospective preventive detention and retrospective 
prolongation of preventive detention 
For new cases, the only possibility left to order preventive detention retrospectively is 
regulated in Art. 66b § 1 StGB (§ 3 of the old version). It concerns offenders previously 
detained in psychiatric hospitals.
372
 This possibility will be examined in the second part of this 
subchapter. 
Only for Altfälle (old cases) in which the triggering offence was committed before the 
1.6.2013, retrospective preventive detention, as previously governed by Art. 66b § 1, 2 StGB 
old version, remains possible.
373
 The 10-year maximum duration for preventive detention was 
abolished in 1998. It still can happen that the preventive detention of an offender, who 
committed his triggering offence before 1998, exceeds this maximum duration. For both 
scenarios, Art. 316f Introductory Act to the Criminal Code governs the conditions under 
which individuals can be kept in preventive detention, although their detention violated the 
Convention. For both, “mental disorder” is the decisive criterion along with high level of 
dangerousness. These criteria are also decisive for detention under the Therapy Detention Act, 
that also creates a possibility to keep individuals detained, whose preventive detention was 
against the Convention.
374
 After a judgement of the Constitutional Court, the requirements in 
the Therapy Detention Act have to be interpreted like the requirements in Art. 316f 
Introductory Act to the Criminal Code.
375
 This made the Therapy Detention Act essentially 
irrelevant for the practice.
376
 Consequently, the numbers of offenders in therapy detention 
were reduced to only one offender in late 2013 and the CPT was told this last offender would 
soon be released.
377
 Additionally, the legislator had the idea that all new preventive detention 
facilities are appropriate for detention under the requirements of Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 lit. e) ECHR, 
making these facilities in principle also adequate under the Therapy Detention Act.
378
 Taking 
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the circumstances of the introduction of therapy detention into account,
379
 therapy detention 
seems to be just preventive detention named differently. Therefore, in the first part of this 
subchapter, I will assess together retrospective preventive detention, retrospectively prolonged 
detention and therapy detention to see whether the criterion of “mental disorder” in 
combination with the required very high degree of dangerousness, is able to justify these 
forms of detention under Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 lit. e) ECHR, namely the detention “of persons of 
unsound mind” and whether these forms of detention are in line with Art. 7 § 1 cl. 2 ECHR. 
5.3.1. Based on mental disorder – old cases 
5.3.1.1. Art. 5 § 1 ECHR 
A thing in common to all forms of preventive detention described above is that they are 
designed to enable forms of preventive detention against which the ECtHR established that 
the causal link as demanded for Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 lit. a) ECHR does not exist. 
But Art. 316f Introductory Act to the Criminal Code and the Therapy Detention Act 
are designed to justify detention under lit. e), the detention “of persons of unsound mind”. 
Firstly, I will assess whether these new forms of preventive detention can be justified 
under lit. e) according to the ECtHR’s established principles and, secondly, I will evaluate 
whether the entire German conduct to maintain retrospectively ordered or prolonged 
preventive detention is in line with lit. e). Before assessing the single criteria, I recall that all 
exceptions in Art. 5 § 1 ECHR have to be interpreted narrowly to fulfil its fundamental 
purpose to protect individuals from arbitrary detention.
380
 
The ECtHR states that the term “unsound mind” cannot be defined precisely, because 
it evolves with the progress in psychiatry.
381
 Hence, the ECtHR uses the following criteria 
first developed in Winterwerp v. the Netherlands.
382
 The deprivation of liberty because of an 
“unsound mind” is only allowed if three conditions are met: it must be reliably proven that a 
person has an unsound mind in form of “a true mental disorder”383, the detention must be 
necessary and detention is only allowed to continue as long as the mental disorder persists.
384
 
Applying these principles to German preventive detention, the necessity of the 
detention is rather unproblematic because the ECtHR also accepts the need to protect the 
individual concerned from harming others as reason.
385
 Preventive detention mainly serves 
this cause. Additionally, the criterion of the persistence of the mental condition is 
unproblematic for preventive detention. The German law just allows the detention as long as 
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the concerned mental disorder persists and causes a high degree of danger.
386
 These 
conditions are judicially controlled at least every year.
387
 
The primary problematic issue is whether “psychische Störung”388 in the German law 
constitutes a “true mental disorder” in terms of the ECtHR’s case-law. The term in the 
ECtHR’s case-law has to be interpreted autonomously, independently from national law.389 
Thus, the question is whether “psychische Störung” fulfils all criteria of “true mental 
disorder”, as named by the ECtHR, in a narrowly interpreted Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 lit. e) ECHR, 
namely “the lawful detention of persons of unsound mind”. To answer this question, I will 
first describe the term “psychische Störung” in the German law and then – assess whether this 
term is in line with the ECtHR’s case-law. 
There is no conclusive definition of psychische Störung.390 According to the 
legislative materials, the German term “psychische Störung” does not require the levels of 
mental conditions as described in Art. 20 f. StGB that diminish or remove criminal liability 
and are preconditions to detain offenders in psychiatric hospitals as per Art. 63 StGB.
391
 The 
notion is similar
392
 to the choice of terminology in the World Health Organisation’s 10th 
revision of the International Classifications of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD-
10), chapter V or in the 4th edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders by the American Psychiatric Association.
393
 The legislator stated that psychische 
Störung covers a broad spectrum of disorders that is only partly classified as mental illness in 
the psychiatric-forensic practice of professional diagnostics and treatment.
394
 The legislator 
had in mind especially dissocial personality disorders and disorders of sexual preference, like 
paedophilia and sadomasochism.
395
 Personality disorders and disorders of sexual preference 
are subdivisions of “disorders of adult personality and behaviour” in the ICD-10 system.396 
Dissocial personality disorders were diagnosed for the majority (80,8% according to a limited 
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scientific sample) of preventive detainees before the introduction of the category psychische 
Störung.397 Now (dissocial) personality disorder is most common mental disorder leading to 
the establishment of psychische Störung that justifies retrospectively ordered or 
retrospectively prolonged preventive detention.
398
 Common critique against dissocial 
personality disorders as additional justification for preventive detention is that this disorder is 
more an external description of the offender than an inner condition or that the commitment of 
an offence is the main factor leading to the diagnosis of this disorder.
399
 Thus, allegedly, 
circular logic is used to justify the detention:
400
 The offender has a dissocial personality 
disorder, because he offended; because he has a dissocial personality disorder, he will offend 
again; consequently, he is dangerous and should be preventively detained. In ICD-10 the 
dissocial personality disorder is described as follows: 
Personality disorder characterized by disregard for social obligations, and callous 
unconcern for the feelings of others. There is gross disparity between behaviour and 
the prevailing social norms. Behaviour is not readily modifiable by adverse 
experience, including punishment. There is a low tolerance to frustration and a low 
threshold for discharge of aggression, including violence; there is a tendency to blame 
others, or to offer plausible rationalizations for the behaviour bringing the patient into 
conflict with society.
401
 
Indeed, the first 37 out of 76 words or 3 out of 4 sentences of this definition describe exactly 
the typical reasons to get into prison, in general, and, more specifically, into preventive 
detention, in the first place. It is challenging to imagine how someone gets into preventive 
detention for recidivism without fulfilling some of the indications for dissocial personality 
disorder. Individuals whose behaviour is modifiable by punishment are probably not very 
likely to be convicted several times. 
On top of that, it is very easy to imagine how everything in this description could be 
very different in artificial prison-environments compared to life in freedom. Hence, conduct 
in prison does not seem very suitable to establish or maintain such a diagnosis. 
Mental disorders are prevalent in 50-70% of the German population.
402
 According to 
the first study about mental conditions of prisoners in Germany (2002-2003), 88% of 
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prisoners suffer at least from one mental or personality disorder.
403 
Dissocial personality 
disorders affect 33% of male prisoners.
404
 According to a newer scientific sample 
(2009/2010), 80,8% of preventive detainees suffer from a dissocial personality disorder.
405
 
Hence, it is not surprising that in a study on the aftermath of M. v. Germany conducted 
by Elz, not a single evaluated preventive detainee was released solely because he had no 
psychische Störung.406 Out of 35 detainees evaluated, who were released following the highest 
German court’s rulings after M. v. Germany, that established the criterion of an especially 
high level of dangerousness and later added psychische Störung as criterion, psychische 
Störungen were investigated in 21 court proceedings and were affirmed 15 times.407 Instead, 
the most frequent reason for releases was that the demanded degree of dangerousness was not 
reached.
408
 On a side note, in 18 of these 21 cases, the medical experts diagnosed a (dissocial) 
personality disorder as defined in ICD-10.
409 
So three offenders with (dissocial) personality 
disorder were not established to suffer from a psychische Störung. This shows that German 
courts do not accept every mental disorder as psychische Störung. 
However, against this backdrop, it is remarkable that in Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], the 
German government stated: 
The statistical material available (see paragraph 91 above) showed that many of the 
detainees whose preventive detention had been prolonged or ordered subsequently had 
been released since the M. v. Germany judgment had become final. It was thus clear 
that only some of the detainees concerned had been considered as persons of unsound 
mind and remained in detention and that there could be no question of all the 
preventive detainees concerned being classified as suffering from a true mental 
disorder.
410
 
The cited statistical material in § 91 of said judgement reads:  
on 10 May 2010, when the judgment in the case of M. v. Germany… became final, 
102 persons were in subsequently prolonged preventive detention. On 31 March 
2017… 41 of the 591 persons in preventive detention were in subsequently ordered or 
prolonged preventive detention. 
These data do not prove at all that detainees were released due to insufficient psychische 
Störung. As can be inferred from the Elz’s study, it was much more likely that offenders were 
released for other reasons like an insufficient level of dangerousness. Maybe some detainees 
just died. Hence, it is quite surprising that the Grand Chamber declared that now retrospective 
preventive detention 
is essentially based on a mental disorder existing at the time when the measure is 
imposed and rendering the person dangerous.
411
 
In my estimation, after the ICD-10 definition of dissocial personality disorder and numbers 
described above, it would be more adequate to describe retrospective preventive detention as 
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a measure that is imposed against offenders so dangerous that they normally fit in some broad 
category of the mental disorder anyhow. 
However, the considerations above show that the threshold of psychische Störung 
defined unclearly in the German legislation is rather low. But, as seen above, the German 
courts do not qualify every mental disorder as sufficient psychische Störung. Due to the 
limitations of this thesis, I will not examine lower courts’ decisions, but the pointers the 
Constitutional Court gave.  
The Constitutional Court advised the lower Courts to firstly examine the 
dangerousness and only if the offender is dangerous, then, lastly, investigate psychische 
Störungen.412 This explains why Elz could find no offender who was released purely because 
of his insufficient severe mental conditions and it refutes the government’s argumentation that 
the strictness of the criterion of psychische Störung was the reason for the reduced number of 
retrospective preventive detainees. 
The Constitutional Court did not specify psychische Störung itself, but referred to the 
legislative power already used to establish the term psychische Störung and to various ECtHR 
judgements circumscribing the notion of “true mental disorder”.413 Via selecting references 
and quotations from ECtHR cases, the Constitutional Court highlighted that there is no 
conclusive definition of “true mental disorder”; that it must warrant compulsory confinement; 
that the disorder must persist; that merely different social behaviour is not sufficient; that 
dissocial personality disorders or psychopathic disorders can fulfil the definition; that the 
Convention States have a margin of appreciation for establishing the existence of a mental 
disorder in the terms of the Convention and that the legislator is mainly responsible to define 
psychische Störung, as he already did.414 So the Constitutional Court does not give specific 
guidelines to the German courts, but the judgement might be interpreted as encouragement to 
the courts to align the German legislation and the ECtHR’s guidelines regarding “true mental 
disorder” within the described “margin of appreciation”. 
In another judgement, the Constitutional Court explained that the courts need to 
interpret the indeterminate legal concept psychische Störung, that it is not identical to 
definitions established by medical science and that it is independent of the possibility to treat 
the conditions clinically.
415
 Instead, the judgement stresses via a citation from the legislative 
materials that it was decisive for the legislator that an abnormally aggressive and seriously 
irresponsible behaviour was shown by a convicted offender.
416
 The legislator in turn, referred 
to this judgement without dissent when explaining the new law that introduced psychische 
Störung in Art. 316f Introductory Act to the Criminal Code.417 This indicates that psychische 
Störung is just another way to describe an extremely high level of dangerousness, but not an 
independent criterion. The required level of dangerousness translated means: a high-level risk 
of the most serious violent or sexual offences inferred from specific circumstances relating to 
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the personality or behaviour of the person detained.
418
 I cannot imagine how this level of 
dangerousness can be reached without an abnormal level of aggression and seriously 
irresponsible behaviour. Since the Constitutional Court advised lower courts to assess 
psychische Störung after the dangerousness was established, it seems impossible that the 
criterion “psychische Störung” is ever decisive for releasing an offender. Thus, it is effectively 
not a criterion. Art. 316f Introductory Act to the Criminal Code and the Therapy Detention 
Act effectively base continued retrospective ordered and prolonged preventive detention just 
on an extreme high level of dangerousness. Additionally, psychische Störung has no concrete 
criteria. It seems intended that the minimal mental issues, that the ECtHR might accept for 
Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 lit. e) ECHR, are sufficient to the German law without restrictions like the 
scientific acceptance of the mental conditions. 
In the picture, that psychische Störung is nothing special for preventive detainees, it 
fits that retrospectively ordered or prolonged preventive detentions are not executed in 
psychiatric hospitals as per Art. 63 StGB, but in preventive detention facilities together with 
ordinary preventive detainees not detained because of a psychische Störung and that no 
execution laws distinguish between the two groups. If preventive detention facilities were 
special institutions for mental health patients, it would need justification to detain there also 
mentally healthy offenders together with mental unhealthy offenders.
419
 
To conclude, taking the legislative materials and the Constitutional Court’s decisions 
into account, the definition of psychische Störung remains unclear. The analysis only 
indicated that psychische Störung describes a mental state that is very common for preventive 
detainees and that probably does never alter the outcome of the decision to perpetuate 
retrospectively ordered or retrospectively prolonged preventive detention. Because the term is 
so vague it will be hard to assess, whether “psychische Störung” fulfils the criteria of “true 
mental disorder”. 
On the other hand, the legislator and Constitutional Court deduced the benchmarks for 
psychische Störung from ECtHR judgements and continuously stressed that this criterion 
needs to be in line with Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 lit. e) ECHR.420 This could facilitate gradual 
convergence of the German term with the European through the case-law. The problem is that 
the ECtHR judgements do not clearly define what a “person of unsound mind” is because it 
“does not lend itself to precise definition, since its meaning continually evolves as research in 
psychiatry progresses”421. This means, to find out, whether the German courts use psychische 
Störung like the ECtHR defines “true mental disorder”, one would need to always thoroughly 
compare the current case law of both court systems. But this conduct would be also very 
impractical as there are infinitive descriptions of mental conditions, if recognized scientific 
classifications of mental disorders are not decisive. Hence, more concrete factors for “true 
mental disorder” would be helpful to determine the Convention-conformability of psychische 
Störung. 
The lack of sufficiently concrete criteria for “psychische Störung” and “true mental 
disorder” makes it very hard to determine whether the German term is compatible with the 
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ECtHR’s definition. The ECtHR might be able to concretise its principles through its case-
law. For example, the Court expressed serious doubts whether a dissocial personality disorder 
alone constitutes a “true mental disorder”, but accepted a personality disorder with 
psychopathic elements aggravated by abuse of alcohol.
422
 Nevertheless, because of the 
infinitely different combinations and levels of intensity of mental conditions, these principles 
would need to be concretised in many more cases, before they could help to answer the 
questions posed here whether psychische Störung is in line with “true mental disorder” and 
whether the German retrospectively ordered or prolonged preventive detention is in line with 
Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 lit. e) ECHR. The ECtHR’s Fifth Section, that decides in the first instance 
about preventive detention cases, still speculated that the notion of psychische Störung might 
be wider than the notion “persons of unsound mind” or its French text version’s “aliéné”.423 
But the Grand Chamber fully gave up on these question and declared that  
the Convention does not require that the notions used in domestic law, and in 
particular the notion of [psychische Störung], be defined or interpreted in the same 
manner as terms used in the Convention. What is decisive, in the Court’s view, is 
whether the domestic courts, in the case before them, have established a disorder 
which can be said to amount to a true mental disorder as defined by this Court’s case-
law.
424
 
It might be normally sufficient for the ECtHR, that decides individual cases, only to 
determine which individual of many possible descriptions of mental conditions amount to 
“true mental disorders”, rather than to assess how national notions are to interpret. But 
psychische Störung was particularly invented and introduced to maintain a practice that 
without this criterion violated the Convention according to ECtHR’s case-law. This means 
that the German law is incompatible with the ECtHR’s case-law in all cases in that 
“psychische Störung” is interpreted in a wider manner than “true mental disorder”. 
However, since the German legislative materials and highest courts’ decisions refer 
back to the ECtHR for the interpretation of psychische Störung, the attempt to answer the 
question posed here, whether the German retrospectively ordered or prolonged preventive 
detention is in general in line with the ECHR, goes in circles. Additionally, one could argue 
that already the ECtHR’s and European Commissions of Human Rights case-law restricts 
itself not always to narrow interpretations of Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 lit. e) ECHR. For instance, 
according to the Commission in X. v. Germany, “unsound mind” also includes not only 
mental illnesses, but also “abnormal personality traits”425. According to Hutchison Reid v. the 
United Kingdom the possibility to treat a mental disorder is not decisive for the justification of 
a deprivation of liberty under lit. e).
426
  
Thus, I will now assess instead whether the entire German conduct of continued 
retrospectively ordered or prolonged preventive detention is in line with the spirit or aim of 
Art. 5 § 1 ECHR to avoid all forms of arbitrary deprivation of liberty. 
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For the German conduct being in line with Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 lit. e) ECHR argues that the 
German law explicitly demands that the dangerousness results from a psychische Störung.427 
Hence, some sort of mental condition is a statutory requirement and must even cause the 
dangerousness as primary reason for detention.
428
 But this pro-argument is greatly relativised 
by psychische Störung just describing in another way dangerousness, independently from 
scientific medical categories and without any identifiable minimum-requirements. Since 
dangerousness is normally assessed prior to psychische Störung, the latter is usually without 
effects on the outcome of the decision to detain an offender. Psychische Störung cannot be 
called “a true mental disorder”, if one interprets Art. 5 ECHR narrowly. Of course, it is 
possible that individual offenders with “psychische Störung” have also what can be called an 
“unsound mind” in a narrowly interpreted Art. 5 ECHR. But for retrospectively ordered or 
prolonged preventive detention in general to fit under lit. e), it would have been better if the 
German law required scientific acknowledged mental conditions, with concrete and high 
minimum-standards that differ from an alternative description of dangerousness. 
The other big pro-argument is that the required level of dangerousness is very high. 
Heavy violent and sexual offences can have grave impacts on victims. The danger of such 
crimes presumably infringes the security-feeling of the general public. Preventive detention 
constitutes a safer frame of therapy for offenders than freedom. The security-feeling of the 
general public probably gets more protected with prison walls than state-of-the-art 
reintegration methods. Hence, preventive detention protects the important legally protected 
rights of the potential victims and the legitimate value of the general public’s security-feeling 
in a secure way. Also, a narrowly interpreted lit. e) must enable to protect these values. This 
argument about safety is relativised with the mathematically inevitable high number of false 
positives in preventive detention. Even in 2017, after the strong reduction to 41 detainees in 
retrospective or prolonged preventive detention, taking a possible rate of 85% false positives 
in ordinary preventive detention as base,
429
 still many detainees would not commit heavy 
crimes in freedom. 
Notwithstanding how disgusted the general public might be by certain types of crimes, 
the strictest form of retrospective ordered or prolonged preventive detention has only potential 
to reduce such crimes, but never to fully erase them. Those types of crimes will always be 
committed by not-yet-convicted offenders. Sexually motivated murders (against children and 
by released offenders) were an important part of the debate initiating the expansion of 
preventive detention since 1998. Since 1987, sexual murders and rapes resulting in death are 
declining; in the 21 years from 1999 to 2019 the total number of sexual abuses of children 
resulting in death was 21, with the earliest recorded year 1999 counting 5 as the highest 
number in this period.
430
 Since, prior to 1998, the society was able to endure more of those 
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crimes without the instruments of retrospectively prolonged or ordered preventive detention, 
it seems questionable whether these forms of preventive detention infringing human rights the 
most are necessary. 
A pro or contra argument could be, that just 41 detainees are still affected.
431
 One 
could say that just 41 infringements of freedom are not so grave compared to the benefits to 
justify and enable generally in Germany guilt-adequate sentences and protect the general 
public and its security-feeling. But human rights treaties are only worth something if no 
individual is sacrificed for the benefit of the general public. Thus, the low number of humans 
treated inhumanly can never be an argument. Germany has no constraining financial 
problems. For example, in the first half-year 2019 the surplus was 45,3 billion Euro.
432
 Hence, 
Germany is able to pay police observing this 41 allegedly maximal dangerous individuals. 
The most important argument is the entire history of the introduction of preventive 
detention based on psychische Störung. At the end of the nineteenth century, von Liszt 
proposed to name not guilt adequate sentences just differently.
433
 It became common 
understanding in the German law tradition that preventive detention is purely preventive, but 
till 1969 this preventive detention was executed in the “Zuchthaus”, the former most severe 
version of German prisons.
434
 In 1975, the 10-years maximum requirement for preventive 
detention was introduced inter alia to make judges less reluctant to order preventive detention 
perceived as life-imprisonment.
435
 Then in times of declining heavy violent and sexual 
offences, excessive media coverage of individual cases like Dutroux and growing public 
pressure were big factors to introduce many laws abolishing the 10-years maximum duration 
and expanding the ordering possibilities from 1998 on.
436
 In 2004, under pressure in face of 
increasing forms of preventive detention with questionable relationship to the prohibition on 
retroactivity of penalties, the Constitutional Court began to demand a stronger distinction 
from prison-sentences and an increasing therapeutic character of preventive detention.
437
 In 
2009, the expansion of preventive detention was halted by the ECtHR in M. v. Germany 
explaining that preventive detention is essentially executed like prison-sentences. Some 
detainees were released and the conditions of preventive detention got more therapy and 
reintegration orientated, but the legislator and Constitutional Court also searched for a way to 
keep very dangerous offenders detained, albeit prohibitions of retrospective worsening. The 
only possibility they saw, was Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 lit. e) ECHR.438 So they integrated the 
translation of the ECtHR’s criterion “true mental disorder” as psychische Störung into the 
law. Psychische Störung is not really defined or limited for instance by medical definitions. 
Important is just that the offender’s mental condition is somehow producing danger and that 
the ECtHR accepts it as “true mental disorder”. In this process, the German legislator and 
Constitutional Court refer repeatedly to the ECtHR judgements regarding “true mental 
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disorder”439 and those judgements all go back to the Winterwerp-case that introduced the 
necessity of “a true mental disorder in § 39. In § 37 this Winterwerp-case reads: 
The Convention does not state what is to be understood by the words "persons of 
unsound mind". This term is not one that can be given a definitive interpretation: as 
was pointed out by the Commission, the Government and the applicant, it is a term 
whose meaning is continually evolving as research in psychiatry progresses, an 
increasing flexibility in treatment is developing and society’s attitude to mental illness 
changes, in particular so that a greater understanding of the problems of mental 
patients is becoming more wide-spread. 
It would need a high degree of interpretation art to understand Winterwerp in a way that this 
judgement endorses the above described history of continued retrospectively ordered or 
prolonged preventive detention or, expressed differently, that a state, instead of science, 
invents a category of mental illness in order to be able to show “greater understanding of the 
problems of mental patients”, who were not treated as mentally ill offenders before, but very 
similar to prisoners, and solves their problems by detaining them. 
It is true that the Convention and its interpretation evolve over time with scientific and 
societal progress. But normally that means a higher protection of rights, not lower. It is 
probable that the society changed from accepting widely criminological findings resulting in 
less severe penalties in the sixties and seventies to a society that is highly afraid of certain 
possible imagined types of offenders, after big media coverage of single extreme cases. 
Although the number of sexual murders against children went down, it is understandable how 
humans get frightened by extensive media coverage of cases like Dutroux. It is also 
understandable that politicians react to such feelings in the population and try to form laws 
that enable to detain at least once-caught offenders forever, instead of trying to explain to the 
population why nobody can erase types of crimes fully and that all predictions of future heavy 
crimes lead to many false positives. Positively interpreted, the media coverage about cruel 
crimes raised awareness of the danger for potential victims of offenders who are not classified 
as mentally ill and therefore cannot be detained possibly forever in psychiatric hospitals 
according to Art. 63 StGB. There needs to be some kind of solution regarding heavily 
dangerous offenders and it should not be just releasing them. But the question this thesis tries 
to answer is not whether the German laws are understandable from a human perspective, but 
whether they are in line with the ECtHR. If the argumentation was just based on 
understandability, it would become arbitrary. One can also argue that an offender, who 
committed one crime aged 19, then got convicted once without the ordering of preventive 
detention; then five days before he would have been released, a new law, with legislative 
process in that he was one out of three examples mentioned by a head of prison to prove the 
need of retrospective preventive detention for young adults, allows that he is preventively 
detained possibly for life; and then he is still kept in detention after an human rights court 
ruled that detentions like his are against human rights; then this individual might also 
understandably doubt whether human rights apply to him. But exactly that happened to Mr. 
Ilnseher.
440
 Hence, understandability of political decisions cannot be the criterion to assess the 
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conformability with the ECHR that is a human rights treaty that foremost, should protect the 
individuals against the state, instead of the general public against individuals. Especially those 
groups with the weakest public representation of interests, such as convicted violent and 
sexual offenders, are dependent on human rights. 
The understandable change of the public perception of heavily violent and sexual 
offences, can cause changes of law, like longer sentences or more detention for future crimes, 
but it is not qualified to circumvent basic human rights like the prohibition to retrospectively 
impose higher penalties or the limitations on grounds for deprivation of liberty in 
Art. 5 § 1 ECHR. At least when interpreted narrowly, Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 lit. e) ECHR is not 
intended to help to establish such circumventions, at the very least – not in connection with 
the other flaws of preventive detention in connection with psychische Störung described 
above. 
Additionally, there is the following special issue regarding the “procedure prescribed 
by law” and the “lawful detention” in terms of Art. 5 § 1 ECHR. Until the end of 2011, the 
German courts had to decide whether detainees in retrospectively ordered or prolonged 
preventive detention could be continuously detained on the basis of the Constitutional Court’s 
transitional provision allowing continued detention if the offenders are heavily dangerous and 
suffer from a psychische Störung.441 But the new rules regarding enhanced treatment 
orientation and better confinement conditions entered into force on 1.6.2013. Consequently, 
courts, that ordered to maintain offenders in preventive detention, effectively ordered to 
maintain offenders for this period in conditions that were ruled to be against the Convention 
and against the constitution. Germany admitted that the detentions were not lawful until the 
new rules were implemented.
442
 The remaining question is whether the detention became 
completely lawful, after the new rules about its execution came into force. If one affirmed this 
question, then “lawful” in Art. 5 § 1 ECHR could be interpreted that a domestic court can first 
order a measure of which it knows that it is executed in violation of the Convention, but this 
measure becomes lawful as soon as it is eventually executed differently. 
 One could argue that the courts decisions to keep offenders at least temporarily in 
conditions that are against the Convention are unlawful decisions. In this case it is 
questionable whether this unlawful decision becomes lawful with retrospective effect in the 
moment when the execution of the decision is in line with the ECHR. 
Called upon to assess this problem the Grand Chamber just cited W.P. v Germany that 
does not discuss this issue, but just affirms that detention can become lawful when later 
executed in a suitable institution, and argued that also the compatibility with the prohibition of 
degrading treatment in the terms of Art. 3 ECHR can change over time.
443
 That the execution 
of a measure can first be against the Convention and later consistent with it is evident. But the 
normal case is that the domestic court assumes its measure is always executed lawfully. The 
question the ECtHR failed to answer is whether it is a lawfully ordered detention when the 
court ordered a confinement knowing that it will be first executed against the Convention. If 
the logic, that the Grand Chamber implicitly affirmed by ignoring the question, was in line 
with the Convention, then the following conduct would also result in a lawful detention: 
hypothetically domestic courts of Member States could order to confine prisoners in 
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inhumane circumstances, then the ECtHR could rule that this violates the Convention, then 
the domestic courts could order continued confinement in inhumane circumstances for 
dangerous offenders and then after the government would have built more prisons with 
humane conditions, the confinements enabled by these court orders would finally become 
lawful in the terms of Art. 5 § 1 ECHR. In my opinion, to accept such a logic in general 
would make misuse too easily possible. Thus, it would be beneficial to oppose such a logic, at 
least in general, in order to fulfil the aim of Art. 5 § 1 ECHR the prevention of arbitrary 
deprivation of liberty. 
Unlike the ECtHR, the German government had a real argument regarding this issue, 
namely that the courts ordered Convention-compatible detention.
444
 The government further 
argued that confinement in a suitable institution was not possible before because preventive 
detention facilities conforming with the new standards were still under construction.
445
 But 
Germany has plenty of psychiatric hospitals. If these are not suitable institutions for people 
with psychischer Störung, but only for offenders with diminished or repealed criminal 
liability, then psychische Störung can hardly be a “true mental disorder”. Otherwise true 
mental disorders could be divided in disorders suitable and non-suitable for treatment in 
psychiatric hospitals. Thus, either the German courts ordered execution knowing that it will 
be against the convention for a certain time, although they could have ordered compatible 
execution temporarily in psychiatric hospitals or psychische Störung is even more unlikely to 
be a true mental disorder.  
In Glien v. Germany the ECtHR still criticised that the legal possibilities to execute 
preventive detention in institutions appropriate for mental health patients were not used while 
the new preventive detention facilities were still under construction.
446
 Against this 
background and given the severity of continued retrospective ordered or prolonged preventive 
detention, it is unfortunate that the Grand Chamber ignored the question posed to it whether 
detention can be still considered as “lawful” and enabled by a “procedure prescribed by law” 
in the terms of Art. 5 ECHR if a court ordered the detention knowing that it will be 
temporarily against the Convention. 
My assessment is that confinement knowingly ordered to be temporarily executed 
against the Convention, while different possibilities potentially not violating the Convention 
exist, is not compatible with a narrow interpretation of “lawful” and does not become 
“lawful” in the sense of a narrow interpretation after an anticipated change in the conditions. 
To conclude, the forms of retrospectively ordered or prolonged preventive detention 
justified with psychische Störung are against the aim of a narrowly interpreted 
Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 lit. e) ECHR to prevent all forms of arbitrary deprivation of liberty. 
Additionally, a narrow interpretation of lawful procedure does not allow to order measures 
that are temporarily unlawful. Continued retrospectively ordered and prolonged preventive 
detention violates Art. 5 § 1 ECHR. 
5.3.1.2. Art. 7 § 1 cl. 2 ECHR 
To be detained possibly for life is undoubtedly more severe than just a prison sentence or 
preventive detention with a 10-years maximum duration. Hence, the only question remaining 
is whether the detention as per Art. 316f Introductory Act to the Criminal Code or the 
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Therapy Detention Act constitutes a penalty in the terms of Art. 7 § 1 cl. 2 ECHR. Therefore, 
I will now apply the Welch-criteria the ECtHR uses to assess this question.
447
 
Retrospectively ordered or prolonged preventive detention still has a conviction as 
precondition in the German law. Thus it “was imposed following conviction for a ‘criminal 
offence’448.  
Under the domestic law, all forms of preventive detention are still qualified as purely 
preventive measures. Nevertheless, the history of its invention and execution can be 
interpreted differently and the German Constitutional Court ruled that it was executed too 
much like penalties, as explained above. 
Regarding the nature and purpose the ECtHR explained that preventive detention is 
extended because of, and with a view to the need to treat a mental disorder… changed 
to such an extent that it was no longer to be classified as a penalty within the meaning 
of Article 7
449
 
while ordinary preventive detention remained a penalty.
450
 But, as showed above, psychische 
Störung is a precondition that likely never made a difference for the outcome of decisions 
about preventive detention and is executed exactly like ordinary preventive detention. A 
purely formal precondition should not alter the categorisation as penalty. The purpose of 
preventive detention with psychische Störung as condition can be better described as attempt 
to justify continuous detention of dangerous offenders, although their detention was against 
the Convention and constitution. 
But maybe the ECtHR’s premise, that ordinary preventive detention is still a penalty, 
is wrong. Maybe preventive detention in general has now the nature of a purely preventive 
measure.  
As argued above, the new legal framework for the execution of preventive detention is 
capable of facilitating rehabilitation and release as fast as possible and a detention 
environment that is close enough to life in freedom. I would argue, that this also means that 
preventive detention can be qualified as preventive measure, instead of penalty in the 
individual cases in which the detention is actually executed optimally regarding both 
benchmarks. If an offender is perfectly rehabilitated from the first day in prison on, then his 
preventive detention is in fact just as long as necessary. Some solution for very dangerous 
offenders is necessary. It can be a solution, within the minimum standards guaranteed by the 
ECHR, to confine offenders longer than their guilt indicates, as argued above.
451
 But this 
extension of confinement can only be legitimate as long as absolutely necessary to lower the 
dangerousness of the offender detained. Then the preventive detention is truly predominately 
preventive. That over 51.000 prisoners, but under 600 preventive detainees are confined,
452
 
shows that preventive detention has a high threshold. Preventive detention in connection with 
psychische Störung demands an even higher level of dangerousness.453 This high level was a 
common reason, unlike psychische Störung, to end retrospectively ordered or prolonged 
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preventive detention.
454
 So preventive detention is not arbitrary under the premise that one 
accepts the prediction methods and it can be a preventive measure, instead of a penalty. But, if 
a single day of confinement is wasted without reintegration measures, then every day that the 
offender needs to stay longer in confinement than guilt-adequate, is arbitrary deprivation of 
freedom under preventive aspects and therefore predominately a penalty. Art. 7 ECHR serves 
to protect from arbitrary punishment.
455
 The confinement is arbitrary when it is claimed to 
serve only a preventive cause, but the confinement is not fully necessary for prevention 
because not everything for reintegration and therefore prevention is done. Of course, in 
reality, it is impossible to fulfil the just posed requirements of using every day for 
reintegration, but there must be a concept in force, that facilitates those requirements and gets 
credibly executed. 
If the ECHR allowed to alter retrospectively the classification as penalty via adding 
some prerequisites and bettering execution, then full arbitrariness would arise. Then 
Convention states would be allowed to first confine offenders without Convention-compatible 
reasons under bad circumstances and wait to find better reasons and to improve the 
circumstances to make the confinement compatible. This would constitute an easy 
circumvention of nulla poena sine lege. According to Art. 15 ECHR, no derogation of 
Art. 7 ECHR is allowed “[i]n time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation”. It seems inconsistent to allow instead a circumvention of Art. 7, for example, as in 
the case of continued retrospectively ordered or prolonged preventive detention, just for the 
reasons to improve the security-feeling of the population and to get a small gain in security. 
Hence, I conclude that what determines the penalty character of individual preventive 
detentions is whether everything was done to reintegrate from the first day of confinement on 
and whether the purely preventive part of the confinement was executed in a non-punitive 
way. 
This, as a rule, will not alter the punitive nature of preventive detention in connection 
with psychische Störung that is typically used for old cases in that Germany wants to keep 
offenders detained. Thus the offenders were usually already long confined before the German 
reforms of preventive detention changed the legal framework towards therapy and 
reintegration. The law makes it theoretically possible that an offender committed his crimes 
before the 1.6.2013, after this date, gets into a prison that does everything for his reintegration 
and afterwards preventive detention is ordered retrospectively and executed perfectly. In this 
case, preventive detention in connection with psychische Störung would not have a punitive 
nature. But this scenario is highly unlikely because preventive detention against such an 
offender would be typically ordered or reserved in the judgement. Apart from this theoretical 
exception, preventive detention in connection with psychische Störung still has a punitive 
nature. 
For the next Welch-criterion, namely the procedure and implementation, it is 
noteworthy that the criminal courts decide over preventive detention and the civil courts over 
therapy detention, the latter being now unimportant in reality.
456
 However, the only arguments 
the Grand Chamber presented on this Welch-criterion were that criminal courts are 
“particularly experienced”457 and that criminal and civil courts are “courts with ordinary 
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jurisdiction”458. This indicates that the Grand Chamber does not weigh this Welch-criterion as 
important. However, the criterion predominately speaks for a penal character of preventive 
detention. 
The last Welch-criterion is severity. Preventive detention is arguably the most severe 
measure in Germany, as outlined above.
459
 When it becomes retrospectively ordered or 
prolonged against the Convention and the constitution, but offenders are just kept detained 
justified by a high level of dangerousness and the ineffective criterion psychische Störung, it 
is even more severe. On the other hand, preventive detention is now credibly directed towards 
therapy and reintegration.
460
 The conditions might be adequately close to life in freedom.
461
 
Nevertheless, as established in the last subchapter, it is still an arbitrary deprivation of liberty 
and hence very severe. 
To conclude, apart from theoretical exceptions and one unimportant criterion for the 
unimportant therapy detention, all Welch-criteria speak for preventive detention in connection 
with psychische Störung to be still a penalty. Hence, it is still a penalty in the terms of Art. 
7 ECHR. Thus this form of preventive detention violates Art. 7 § 1 cl. 2 ECHR. 
 
5.3.2. Art. 66b § 1 StGB – new cases 
For new cases, the only possibility for retrospectively ordered preventive detention is 
regulated in Art. 66b § 1 StGB.462 It is essentially identical to former Art. 66b § 3 StGB.463 As 
described more detailed above,
464
 if an individual was indeterminately detained according to 
Art. 63 StGB in a psychiatric hospital because he was not or not fully criminally liable in the 
sense of Art. 20 f. StGB and had to be released from the psychiatric hospital according to 
Art. 67d § 6 StGB because his mental condition was not longer as described in Art. 20 f. 
StGB, Art. 66b § 1 StGB allows to retrospectively order preventive detention under certain 
conditions. As one condition, the dangerousness is evaluated with an overall assessment of the 
offender and his acts committed. The minimal difference compared to 2004 is that now 
supplementary the development of the offender till the decision about the order of preventive 
detention is taken into account, whereas before it was the development during the execution 
of the measure in the psychiatric hospital. Before the reforms, the ECtHR rightly declared that 
this form of preventive detention had no causal connection as demanded for Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 lit. 
a) ECHR.
465
 
I cannot see any reason, why this should have changed. Especially the possibility that 
after the indefinite placement in a psychiatric hospital, indefinite preventive detention might 
follow, will not have been part of any judgement.
466
 Hence, Art. 66b § 1 StGB still cannot be 
justified by Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 lit. a) ECHR.  
One could consider, whether the new concept of mental disorder or the new standard 
in executing preventive detention makes Art. 66b § 1 StGB now compatible with lit. e). But 
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Art. 66b § 1 StGB does not anyhow require a mental disorder. The opposite is the case. It 
applies for offenders who are not suffering from a mental condition as demanded for Art. 63 
StGB. Hence, also Art. 5 § 1 cl. 2 lit. e) ECHR cannot justify preventive detention ordered as 
per Art. 66b § 1 StGB. Consequently, it violates Art. 5 § 1 ECHR. 
Regarding Art. 7 § 1 cl. 2 ECHR, the Court only sees preventive detention that is 
ordered “because of, and with a view to the need to treat a mental disorder, which [is] a new 
precondition”467 as no penalty in the terms of Art. 7 § 1 ECHR. This is clearly not foreseen in 
Art. 66b § 1 StGB. Hence, Art. 66b § 1 StGB constitutes a penalty in the terms of 
Art. 7 § 1 cl. 2 ECHR according to the ECtHR’s case-law. 
Nonetheless, the application of the line of reasoning developed in the last subchapter 
could lead to the conclusion that Art. 66 b § 1 StGB can be purely preventive and therefore of 
non-punitive nature in individual cases. The confinement in a psychiatric hospital as per 
Art. 63 StGB is not dependent on guilt, but only serves to cure mental illnesses that cause 
dangerousness. It is plausible that a form of dangerousness persists after the mental illness is 
cured. If from the first day in hospital to the last day in preventive detention everything is 
done to reintegrate the offender as fast as possible, one could classify this confinement as 
purely preventive and therefore non-punitive. But the Welch-criteria “procedure and 
implementation” as well as “severity” still argue for a classification as penalty. On the other 
hand, the detention as per Art. 66b § 1 StGB does not necessarily follow a conviction, as the 
prior confinement in a psychiatric hospital can be ordered for offenders without criminal 
liability. Regarding such offenders, no guilt is established in the judgement and therefore they 
are not convicted. 
One can probably decide one way or the other regarding the classification as penalty. 
However, in case of doubt, human right treaties should work for individual humans. For the 
offenders concerned, it will feel like a penalty to be confined with ordinary preventive 
detainees who are convicted criminals. Thus, also the preventive detention as per Art. 66b § 1 
StGB should constitute a penalty in the terms of Art. 7 § 1 ECHR.  
Therefore, this form of preventive detention violates Art. 7 § 1 cl. 2 ECHR when the 
triggering offence was committed before the possibility to order preventive detention this way 
had existed. Art. 66b § 1 StGB was introduced into the law on 29.7.2004. Hence, for offences 
committed subsequently, it is not a heavier penalty than applicable at the time of the offence. 
However, Art. 66 § 1 StGB always violates at least Art. 5 § 1 ECHR. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Every society needs to decide what to do with heavily dangerous offenders. In this thesis, the 
German preventive detention system was used as an example to illustrate how problematic the 
solution is to keep allegedly particularly dangerous criminals confined longer than other 
offenders. From a human rights perspective, it is very problematic to detain convicted 
offenders longer, independently from their guilt in the vague hope to increase the security of 
the general public.  
Nonetheless, allegedly dangerous offenders need to be handled in some way. It is not 
necessarily a better solution to imprison all offenders including those deemed as not 
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dangerous longer independent from their guilt, than to have short prison-sentences limited by 
guilt and to detain the offenders deemed most dangerous longer. As shown above,
468
 the 
principle of guilt-adequate sentences generally ensures much less long prion-terms in 
Germany than in most comparable other European states. 
However, from a criminological and human rights perspective it would be the best to 
use short guilt-adequate prison-sentences and to reintegrate offenders deemed dangerous 
without confining them after their prison-terms. But the ECHR constitutes just a European 
minimum standard for human rights. As desirable as it would be that the States Parties use the 
most human rights-friendly option to solve the problem of allegedly particularly dangerous 
criminals, they still have a margin of appreciation under the Convention. The security-feeling 
of the general public is easier to protect with measures that include confinement for dangerous 
offenders than with prevention measures in freedom. Although this feeling might be 
irrational, it is important for not fully rational societies which have to accept the state 
monopoly of violence. Also, it is very probable that some crimes with grave consequences for 
the victims can be prevented if the confinement of the most dangerous offenders does not 
automatically end after their guilt-adequate prison-sentence. When taking these considerations 
into account, also solutions for the problem of heavily dangerous offenders lie in the states’ 
margin of appreciation, although they are not optimal from a human rights perspective. At 
least this holds true as long as the common human rights minimum standards in Europe still 
allow for some confinement-based forms of prevention. 
Hence, a system that has very short prison-sentences in general and only detains a 
small number of the most dangerous offenders longer can still lie in the states’ margin of 
appreciation under the Convention. Nevertheless, such a system is so problematic that it can 
only be in accordance with the ECHR if the inner shaping is in accordance with very strict 
human rights standards. 
These standards must include that from the first day in prison on, the state does 
everything to reintegrate the offenders. Otherwise the state’s decision not to do everything 
makes the confinement longer than necessary and therefore not purely preventive anymore, 
but also punitive. If in the case of unnecessary long confinement, prevention is the only 
justification under national law or the Convention. Any confinement becomes arbitrary when 
it is unnecessary long for prevention purposes. Since the limited prediction accuracy for 
future heavy crimes produces so many false positives, this very infringing form of 
confinement is always on the edge to arbitrariness. Therefore, it needs to be scrupulously and 
regularly verified. 
Such an infringing confinement should always be clearly in line with the basic human 
right nulla poena sine lege, because for the detainees it feels like punishment regardless of 
sophisticated theoretical justifications. A society must be able to decide prior to crimes about 
the handling of dangerous offenders and cannot expect to handle them according to the 
societies fluctuating trends in perception of crimes. 
It is also imperative that after the prison-sentence inter alia compensating for guilt the 
subsequent confinement, in that a special sacrifice for the general public is inflicted on the 
offenders without their guilt, the circumstances of living are as good as possible. Otherwise 
the confinement is unproportional. 
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I strongly welcome the ECtHR playing the most important role in halting the 
expansion of preventive detention and in facilitating its change from a measure with very little 
difference to ordinary punishment to a measure that evolves towards actual prevention, as 
described above. Even better would have been if the ECtHR followed through with pushing 
Germany to a truly preventive – preventive detention. The Court accepted the non-decisive 
criterion psychische Störung to alter the entire characterisation of the most human rights 
unfriendly forms of preventive detention. Its newer judgements are also strangely uncritical 
towards German declarations about the new quality of treatment in preventive detention and 
they contain contradictive claims. This suggests the assumption that the ECtHR made political 
decisions. 
The German Constitutional Court likes to claim that it is in a dialogue with 
Strasbourg. That is certainly a good idea when the human rights of different individuals are 
balanced, for instance, in parental custody cases. But for preventive detention the rights of 
individuals are balanced with the rights of the general public. Human rights treaties should 
protect predominately individuals. Hence, it would have been preferable if the dialogue would 
have been more unidirectional; more the ECtHR explaining Germany the importance of 
individual rights and less Germany explaining Strasbourg how to circumvent human rights 
guarantees in order to reach more security-feeling. 
From a political point of view, it is understandable that the ECtHR did not want to be 
too critical with Germany. Germany strongly changed preventive detention, invested a lot of 
money and at least found plausible arguments to be in line with the ECHR. In contrast, other 
Member States provoke a lot more judgements and seem much more reluctant with following 
ECtHR judgements such as Turkey or Russia, that even implemented a law expressis verbis to 
be able to stop the implementation of international judgements.
469
 But strategic considerations 
should have implied the opposite to the Court. Now it will have much more difficulties not to 
be overly tolerant with other countries arguing that allegedly dangerous individuals need to be 
confined. It is understandable that the Court did not want to alienate that part of the public for 
which retribution or security from a group of offenders perceived as different and dangerous 
are important. But the imagination of a group that consists out of people who are just 
unchangeably different, has always been a typical pattern to restrict human rights. Although 
most members of the public the public might think they could never be deemed as heavily 
dangerous violent or sexual offender with an abnormal or crazy mind, human rights must also 
protect people in such situations. In fact, especially groups with the weakest public 
representation of interest depend on human rights. Hence, it would have been better if the 
ECtHR had tried not to alienate the part of that society that highly values human rights 
protection including groups of humans perceived as most different and dangerous. A human 
rights court should protect the most vulnerable parts of society. The ECtHR did not do 
everything to protect the many false positives in forms of preventive detention that were ruled 
to be against the Convention or against the German constitution. 
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The likelihood that German preventive detention and its execution becomes fully 
preventive and in line with the ECHR would have been higher if the ECtHR had not accepted 
very questionable forms of preventive detention so easily, but instead kept the pressure high 
on Germany to fulfil the ECHR’s human rights standards. It is possible that such a strict 
scrutiny would also have accelerated the process in Europe to a minimum standard where the 
right to freedom is respected regardless of perceived danger. 
  
 73 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
1. PRIMARY SOURCES: LEGISLATION AND TREATIES  
Council of Europe European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, ECHR (last amended by Protocols nr. 11 and 
14, published 4 November 1950). Available on: 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. 
 Protocol Nr. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (last amended by Protocol nr. 11 
published: 22 November 1984). Available on: 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-
/conventions/rms/090000168007a082. List of ratifications available 
on: https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-
/conventions/treaty/117/signatures?p_auth=jFa84vtF. 
Deutscher Bundestag 
(German Parliament) 
Einführungsgesetz zum Strafgesetzbuch, EGStGB (Introductory Act 
to the Criminal Code), (last amended by Art. 2 Act of 4 November 
2016 [BGBl. I (2016) pp. 2460, 2462], passed 2.3.974, BGBl. I 
(1974) p. 469. Available on: http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/stgbeg/.  
 Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, GVG (Court Constitution Act), (last 
amended by Art. 3 of the Act of 12.12.20019 [BGBl. I (2019), p. 
2633]), in the version of the publication of 9.1975. Available on: 
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gvg/GVG.pdf. 
 Gesetz zur Änderung der Vorschriften über die Straftaten gegen die 
sexuelle Selbstbestimmung und zur Änderung anderer Vorschriften 
(Reform of the Provisions on Offences against Sexual Self-
determination and of Other Provisions Act), passed 27.9.2003, BGBl. 
I (2003) p. 3007. Available on: 
https://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?start=%2F%2F*%5B%40at
tr_id%3D%27bgbl103s3007.pdf%27%5D#__bgbl__%2F%2F*%5B
%40attr_id%3D%27bgbl103s3007.pdf%27%5D__1583683620153. 
 Gesetz zur bundesrechtlichen Umsetzung des Abstandsgebotes im 
Recht der Sicherungsverwahrung (Preventive Detention Distinction 
Act), passed 5.12.2012, BGBl. I (2012), p. 2425. Available on: 
https://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?start=//*%5B@attr_id=%2
7bgbl112s2425.pdf%27%5D#__bgbl__%2F%2F*%5B%40attr_id%3
D%27bgbl112s2425.pdf%27%5D__1583683377402. 
 Gesetz zur Bekämpfung von Sexualdelikten und anderen gefährlichen 
 74 
Straftaten (The Combat of Sexual Offences and Other Dangerous 
Offences Act), passed: 26.1.1998, BGBl. I (1998), p. 160. Available 
on: 
https://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav#__bgbl__%2F%2F*%5B%
40attr_id%3D%27bgbl198s0160.pdf%27%5D__1583683826107. 
 Gesetz zur Einführung der nachträglichen Sicherungsverwahrung 
(The Retrospective Preventive Detention Act), passed: 23.7.2004, 
(BGBl. I (2004), p. 1838. Available on: 
https://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?start=//*%5B@attr_id=%2
7bgbl104s1838.pdf%27%5D#__bgbl__%2F%2F*%5B%40attr_id%3
D%27bgbl104s1838.pdf%27%5D__1583741964647. 
 Gesetz zur Einführung der nachträglichen Sicherungsverwahrung bei 
Verurteilung nach Jugendstrafrecht (Act on the introduction of 
subsequent preventive detention for convictions under the criminal 
law relating to young offenders), passed: 8.7.2008, BGBl. I (2008) p. 
1212. Available on: 
https://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?startbk=Bundesanzeiger_B
GBl&bk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&start=//*[@attr_id=%27bgbl108s1
212.pdf%27]#__bgbl__%2F%2F*%5B%40attr_id%3D%27bgbl108s
1212.pdf%27%5D__1583742225326. 
 Gesetz zur Einführung der vorbehaltenen Sicherungsverwahrung (Act 
on the introduction of reserved preventive detention), passed: 
21.8.2002, BGBl I (2002), p. 3344. Available on: 
https://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?start=%2F%2F*%5B%40at
tr_id%3D%27bgbl102s3344.pdf%27%5D#__bgbl__%2F%2F*%5B
%40attr_id%3D%27bgbl102s3344.pdf%27%5D__1583742737990. 
 Gesetz zur Neuordnung des Rechts der Sicherungsverwahrung und zu 
begleitenden Regelungen (Reform of Preventive Detention Act and 
accompanying provisons), passed: 22.12.2010, BGBl. I (2010), 
p. 2300. Available on: 
https://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav#__bgbl__%2F%2F*%5B%
40attr_id%3D%27bgbl110s2300.pdf%27%5D__1583742965238. 
 Jugendgerichtsgesetz, JGG (Juvenile Courts Act), (last amended by 
Article 1 of the 9.12.2019 [BGBl I (2019), p. 2146]), in ther version 
of the publication of 11.12.1974. Available on: https://www.gesetze-
im-internet.de/jgg/. 
 Strafgesetzbuch, StGB (Criminal Code), (last amended by Article 62 
of the Act of 20.11.2019 [BGBl. I (2019), p. 1626]), in the version of 
the publication of 13.11.1998. Available on: https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/stgb/BJNR001270871.html.  
 75 
 Strafprozessordnung, StPO (Code of Criminal Procedure), (last 
amended by Art. 2 of the Act of 3.3.2020 [BGBl. I (2020), p. 431], in 
the version of the publication of 7.4.1987. Available on: 
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stpo/. 
 Strafvollzugsgesetz, StVollzG (Execution of Sentences Act), (last 
amended by Article 7 of the Act of 9.12.2019 [BGBl. I (2019), p. 
2146, 2152), passed: 16.3.1976. Available on: https://www.gesetze-
im-internet.de/stvollzg/BJNR005810976.html. 
 Zweites Gesetz zur Reform des Strafrechts (Second Criminal Justice 
Reform Act), passed: 4.7.1969, BGBl I (1969), p. 717. Available on: 
https://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav#__bgbl__%2F%2F*%5B%
40attr_id%3D%27bgbl169s0717.pdf%27%5D__1585209752091. 
 Therapieunterbringungsgesetz (Therapy Detention Act), (last 
amended by Article 8 of the Act of 5.12.2012 [BGBl. I (2012), p. 
2425]), passed 22.12.2010, BGBl. I (2010), p. 2300, 2305. Available 
on: https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/thug/index.html#BJNR230500010BJNE000100000.  
Landtag NRW (Parliament 
of North Rhine-Westphalia) 
Gesetz zur Regelung des Vollzuges der Sicherungsverwahrung in 
Nordrhein-Westfalen (Law regulating the execution of preventive 
detention in North Rhine-Westphalia), (last amended by Article 3 of 
the Act of 2.7.2019 [GV. NRW (2019), p. 339]), passed 30.4.2013, 
GV. NRW (2013), p. 212). Available on: 
https://recht.nrw.de/lmi/owa/br_text_anzeigen?v_id=1320130603094
535113#FV. 
Reichsregierung 
(Government of the Third 
Reich) 
Gesetz gegen gefährliche Gewohnheitsverbrecher und über 
Maßregeln der Sicherung und Besserung (act against dangerous 
habitual offenders and on measures of prevention and betterment) 
passed: 24.11.1933, RGBl I (1933), p. 995. Available on: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20180120000042/http://www.servat.unib
e.ch/dns/RGBl_1933_I_995_G_Gewohnheitsverbrecher.pdf.  
2. PRIMARY SOURCES: LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS 
Deutscher Bundestag 
(German parliament) 
Bundestagsdruckssache V/4094 (Bundestag printed paper V/4094). 
 Bundestagsdrucksache 7/550 (Bundestag printed paper 7/550). 
 76 
 Bundestagsdrucksache 13/7163 (Bundestag printed paper 13/7163). 
 Bundestagsdrucksache 15/2576 (Bundestag printed paper 15/2576). 
 Bundestagsdrucksache 15/2887 (Bundestag printed paper 15/2887). 
 Bundestagsdrucksache 15/3346 (Bundestag printed paper 15/3346). 
 Bundestagsdrucksache 16/9643 (Bundestag printed paper 16/9643). 
 Bundestagsdrucksache 17/3403 (Bundestag printed paper 17/3403). 
 Bundestagsdrucksache 17/9874 (Bundestag printed paper 17/9874). 
 Protokoll des Rechtsausschusses der 103. Sitzung in der 16. 
Wahlperiode, 28.5.2008. Available on: 
http://gesmat.bundesgerichtshof.de/gesetzesmaterialien/16_wp/sichve
rw_jugendr/wortproto.pdf. 
Deutscher Bundesrat 
(German Federal Council) 
Bundesratsdrucksache 173/12 (Bundesrat printed paper 173/12). 
3. PRIMARY SOURCES: CASE-LAW 
Bundesgerichtshof (German 
Federal Court of Justice) 
Beschluss vom 12.5.2010, file number 4 StR 577/09, NStZ (issue 10, 
2010), 567. 
 BGHSt 50, 121. 
 BGHSt 56, 73.  
 BGHSt 62, 211. 
 Judgement of 9.3.2010, file number 1 StR 554/09, NJW (issue 21, 
2010), 1539. 
Bundesverfassungsgericht 
(German Federal 
Constitutional Court) 
BVerfGE, 91, 1. 
 BVerfGE 109, 133. 
 77 
 BVerfGE 109, 190. 
 BVerfGE 111, 307. 
 BVerfGE 128, 326. 
 BVerfGE 134, 33. 
 Beschluss vom 15.9.2011, file number 2 BvR 1516/11, BVerfGK 19, 
62. Available on: https://www.juris.de/perma?d=KVRE395691101.  
European Commission of 
Human Rights 
Dax v. Germany, (application nr. 19969/92, Commission decision of 
7 July 1992). 
 X. v. Germany, (Application nr. 4324/69, Commission decision of 4 
February 1971, published in Collection 37, pp. 98-100). 
 X. v. Germany, (Application nr. 7493/76, Commission decision of 12 
July 1976, published in D.R. Volume 6, 182). 
European Court of Human 
Rights 
B. v. Germany (Application nr. 61272/09, judgement of 19 April 
2012). 
 Becht v. Germany (Application nr. 79457/13, judgement of 6 July 
2017). 
 Bergmann v. Germany (Application nr. 23279/14, judgement of 7 
January 2016). 
 Carine Simons contre la Belgique (Application nr. 71407/10, decision 
of 28 August 2012). 
 Del Río Prada v. Spain [GC] (Application nr. 42750/09, judgement 
of 21 October 2013). 
 Demir and Baykara v. Turkey (Application nr. 34503/97, judgement 
of 12 November 2008). 
 Van Droogenbroeck v. Belgium (Application nr. 7906/77, judgement 
of 24 June 1982, published in Series A nr. 50). 
 Eriksen v. Norway (Application nr. 17391/90, Judgement of 27 May 
1997, published in Reports 1997-III). 
 78 
 G. v. Germany (Application nr. 65210/09, judgement of 7 June 2012). 
 Glien v. Germany (Application nr. 7345/12, judgement of 28 
November 2013). 
 Grosskopf v. Germany (Application nr. 24478/03, judgement of 21 
October 2010). 
 Guzzardi v. Italy (Application nr. 7367/76, judgement of 6 November 
1980, published in Series A nr. 39). 
 H.W. v. Germany (Application nr. 17167/11, judgement of 19 
September 2013). 
 Haidn v. Germany (Application nr. 6587/04, judgement of 13 January 
2011). 
 Hassan v. the United Kingdom (Application nr. 29750/09, judgement 
of 16 September 2014). 
 Hutchison Reid. V. the United Kingdom (Application nr. 50272/99, 
judgement of 20 February 2003, published in Reports of Judgments 
and Decisions 2003-IV). 
 Ilnseher v. Germany (Applications nr. 10211/12 and 27505/14, 
judgement of 2 February 2017). 
 Ilnseher v. Germany [GC] (Applications nr. 10211/12 and 27505/14, 
judgement of 4 December 2018). 
 K. v. Germany (Application nr. 61827/09, judgement of 7 June 2012). 
 Kallweit v. Germany (Application nr. 17792/07, judgement of 13 
January 2011). 
 M. v. Germany (Application nr. 19359/04, judgement of 17 
December 2009). 
 Mautes v. Germany (Application nr. 20008/07, judgement of 13 
January 2011). 
 Müller v. Germany (Application nr. 264/13, decision of 5 March 
2015). 
 79 
 O.H. v. Germany (Application nr. 4646/08, judgement of 24 
November 2011). 
 Petschulies v. Germany (Application nr. 6281/13, judgement of 2 
June 2016). 
 Rees v. the United Kingdom (Application nr. 9532/81, judgement of 
17 October 1986). 
 S. v. Germany (Application nr. 3300/10, judgement of 28 June 2012). 
 Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC] (Application nr. 13229/03, 
judgement 29 January 2008). 
 Schummer v. Germany (Applications nr. 27360/04 and 42225/07, 
judgement of 13 January 2011). 
 S.W. v. the United Kingdom (Application nr. 20166/92, judgement of 
22 November 1995, published in Series A nr. 335-B). 
 Trajče Stojanovski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(Application nr. 1431/03, judgement of 22 October 2009). 
 Tyrer v. the United Kingdom (Application nr. 5856/72, judgement of 
25 April 1978). 
 Vinter and others v. the United Kingdom [GC] (Applications nr. 
66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10, judgement of 9 July 2013). 
 W.P. v. Germany (Application nr. 55594/13, judgement of 6 October 
2016). 
 Weeks v. the United Kingdom (Application nr. 9787/82, judgement of 
2 March 1987, published in Series A nr. 114). 
 Welch v. the United Kingdom (Application nr. 17440/90, judgement 
of 09 February 1995, published in Series A nr. 307-A). 
 Winterwerp v. the Netherlands (Application nr. 6301/73, judgement 
of 24 October 1979, published in Series A nr. 33). 
Oberlandesgericht (Higher 
Regional Court) Hamm 
Beschluss vom 12.5.2010, file number 4 Ws 114/10 Available on the 
database juris. There cited as: “OLG Hamm, Beschluss vom 12. Mai 
2010 – 4 Ws 114/10 –, juris”. 
 80 
 Beschluss vom 22.7.2010, file number 4 Ws 171/10, excerpts 
published in NStZ-Rechtssprechungsreport (issue 12, 2010), pp. 388-
389. Additionally available online: https://beck-
online.beck.de/Dokument?vpath=bibdata%2Fzeits%2Fnstz-
rr%2F2010%2Fcont%2Fnstz-rr.2010.388.1.htm&anchor=Y-300-Z-
NSTZ-RR-B-2010-S-
388&readable=2&VorgaengerDokumentStreffer3=Beschluss%20vo
m%2020.07.2010%20-
%205%20StR%20199%2F10&VorgaengerDokumentFullname=bibd
ata%2Fzeits%2Fnstz-rr%2F2010%2Fcont%2Fnstz-
rr.2010.387.2.htm.  
  
4. SECONDARY SOURCES: BOOKS 
Alex, Michael Nachträgliche Sicherungverwahrung – ein rechtsstaatliches und 
kriminalpolitisches Debakel (Retrospective preventive detention – a 
rule of law and criminal policy debacle), 2nd edition. Holzkirchen: 
Felix-Verlag, 2013. 
Arai-Takahash, Yutaka The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of 
Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR. Antwerpen et al: 
Intersentia, 2002. 
Ebner, Katharina Die Vereinbarkeit der Sicherungsverwahrung mit deutschem 
Verfassungsrecht und der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention 
(The compatibility of preventive detention with German 
constitutional law and the European Convention on Human Rights). 
Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovač, 2015. 
Elz, Jutta Rückwirkungsverbot und Sicherungsverwahrung. Rechtliche und 
praktische Konsequenzen aus dem Kammerurteil des Europäischen 
Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte im Fall M. ./. Deutschland 
(Prohibition of retroactive effect and preventive detention. Legal and 
practical consequences of the European Court of Justice's Chamber 
judgement on human rights in the case of M. v. Germany). 
Wiesbaden: Kriminologische Zentralstelle e.V., 2014. 
Fischer, Thomas Strafgesetzbuch mit Nebengesetzen (Criminal code with subsidiary 
laws), 67th edition. Munich: C.H. Beck, 2020. 
Morgenstern, Christine Die Untersuchungshaft. Eine Untersuchung unter 
rechtsdogmatischen, kriminologischen, rechtsvergleichenden und 
europarechtlichen Aspekten (The Detention Awaiting Trial. An 
 81 
investigation among legal-dogmatic, criminological, comparative and 
European law aspects). Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2018. 
Mushoff, Tobias Strafe – Maßregel – Sicherungsverwahrung. Eine kritische 
Untersuchung über das Verhältnis von Schuld und Prävention 
(Punishment – measure of betterment and prevention - preventive 
detention. A critical examination of the relationship between guilt and 
prevention). Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Internationaler Verlag 
der Wissenschaften, 2008. 
Renucci, Jean-François Introduction to the European Convention on Human Rights. The 
rights guaranteed and the protection mechanism. Strasbourg: Council 
of Europe Publishing, 2005. 
Schabas, William A. The Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015. 
Schuster, Kristina Die Sicherungsverwahrung im Nationalsozialismus und ihre 
Fortentwicklung bis heute (Preventive Detention under National 
Socialism and its further development until today). Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 2019. 
Somek, Alexander The Cosmopolitan Constitution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014. 
Stahl, Sandra Schutzpflichten im Völkerrecht – Ansatz einer Dogmatik (Obligations 
to protect in international law – approach of a dogmatic). Heidelberg: 
Springer, 2012. 
5. SECONDARY SOURCES: CONTRIBUTIONS TO EDITED BOOKS 
Alex, Michael “Kriminalprognose und Legalbewährung – Wie zuverlässig lässt sich 
Rückfallgefahr vorhersagen?” (Prediction of crime and legal 
probation - How reliably can the risk of recidivism be predicted), in 
Brauchen wir eine Reform der freiheitsentziehenden Sanktionen? (Do 
we need a reform of custodial sentences?), edited by Katrin Höffler, 
pp. 21-36. Göttingen: Universitätsverlag Göttingen, 2015. 
Best, Dominik and Rössner, 
Dieter 
“Der Maßregelvollzug und die Aussetzung der 
Maßregelvollstreckung zur Bewährung” (The execution of measure 
of betterment and prevention and the suspension of the execution of a 
measure on probation), in Handbuch der Forensischen Psychiatrie 
(Manual of Forensic Psychiatry), 1st volumen, edited by Hans-
Ludwig Kröber, Dieter Dölling, Norbert Leygraf and Henning Sass, 
 82 
pp. 323-339. Germany: Steinkopff Verlag, 2007. 
Dessecker, Axel 
 
“§ 66 StGB” and “§ 66c StGB” (Art. 66 criminal code and Art. 66c 
criminal code), in Strafgesetzbuch (criminal code), 1st volume, 5th 
edtion, edited by Urs Kindhäuser, Ulfired Neumann and Hans-Ulrich 
Pfaeffgen. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2017. 
Drenkhahn, Kristin and 
Morgenstern, Christine 
“Sicherungsverwahrung in Deutschland und Europa” (preventive 
detention in Germany and Europe), in Strafrecht 
Wirtschaftsstrafrecht Steuerrecht. Gedächtnisschrift für Wolfgang 
Joecks (Criminal law Commercial criminal law Tax law. Memorial 
publication for Wolfgang Joecks), edited by Friede Dünkel et al., pp. 
25-49. Munich: C.H. Beck, 2018. 
Freund, Georg “Vorbemerkung zu § 13” (Preliminary remark on Art. 13), in 
Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch (Munich Commentary 
on the Criminal Code), 1st Volume, 3th edition, edited by Wolfgang 
Joecks and Klaus Miebach. Munich: C.H. Beck, 2017. 
Van Gemmern, Gerhard “§ 61 StGB”, “§ 63 StGB” and “§ 64 StGB” (Art. 61, 63 and 64 
criminal code) in Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch 
(Munich Commentary on the Criminal Code), 2nd Volume, 3th 
edition, edited by Wolfgang Joecks and Klaus Miebach. Munich: 
C.H. Beck, 2016. 
Joecks, Wolfgang “Einleitung” (Introduction) in Münchener Kommentar zum 
Strafgesetzbuch (Munich Commentary on the Criminal Code), 1st 
volume, 3th edition, edited by Wolfgang Joecks and Klaus Miebach. 
Munich: C.H. Beck, 2017. 
Kinzig, Jörg “§ 66c StGB” (Art. 66c criminal code), in Strafgesetzbuch 
Kommentar (criminal code commentary), 30th edition, edited by 
Adolf Schönke and Horst Schröder. Munich: C.H. Beck, 2019.  
Mehde, Veith 
 
“Art. 104”, in Grundgesetz. Kommentar (Basic Law. Commentary), 7 
volumes, edited by Theodor Maunz and Günter Dürig. Munich: C.H. 
Beck, years 1962 ff. (status: 88th supplementary delivery August 
2019). 
Meyer-Ladewig, Jens and 
Harrendorf, Stefan and 
König, Stefan 
 
“Art. 5” and “Art. 7”, in Europäische Menschenrechts Konvention 
Handkommentar, (European Convention on Human Rights Hand 
Comment), 4th edition, edited by Jens Meyer-Ladeswig, Martin 
Nettesheim and Stefan Raumer. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2017. 
Morgenstern, Christine and “§ 66c StGB” (Art. 66c criminal code) in Münchener Kommentar 
 83 
Drenkhahn, Kristin zum Strafgesetzbuch (Munich Commentary on the Criminal Code), 
2nd volume, 3th edition, edited by Wolfgang Joecks and Klaus 
Miebach. Munich: C.H. Beck, 2016. 
Pollähne, Helmut “§ 61 StGB” (Art. 60 criminal code), in Strafgesetzbuch (criminal 
code), 1st volume, 5th edtion, edited by Urs Kindhäuser, Ulfired 
Neumann and Hans-Ulrich Pfaeffgen. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2017. 
Putzke, Holm “Art. 316e EGStGB“ (Art. 316e Introductory Act to the Criminal 
Code) in Münchener Kommentar zur StPO (Munich Commentary on 
the Code of Criminal Procedure), volume 3/2, 1st edition, edited by 
Christoph Knauer, Munich: C.H. Beck, 2018. 
Ullenbruch, Thomas and 
Drenkhahn, Kristin 
 “§ 66b StGB” (Art. 66b criminal code) in Münchener Kommentar 
zum Strafgesetzbuch (Munich Commentary on the Criminal Code), 
2nd volume, 3th edition, edited by Wolfgang Joecks and Klaus 
Miebach. Munich: C.H. Beck, 2016. 
Ullenbruch, Thomas and 
Drenkhahn, Kristin and 
Morgenstern, Christine 
 “§ 66 StGB” (Art. 66 criminal code) in Münchener Kommentar zum 
Strafgesetzbuch (Munich Commentary on the Criminal Code), 2nd 
volume, 3th edition, edited by Wolfgang Joecks and Klaus Miebach. 
Munich: C.H. Beck, 2016. 
Ullenbruch, Thomas and 
Morgenstern, Christine 
 “§ 66a StGB” (Art. 66a criminal code) in Münchener Kommentar 
zum Strafgesetzbuch (Munich Commentary on the Criminal Code), 
2nd volume, 3th edition, edited by Wolfgang Joecks and Klaus 
Miebach. Munich: C.H. Beck, 2016. 
Ziemele, Ineta “European Consensus and International Law” in The European 
Convention on Human Rights and General International Law, edited 
by Anne van Aaken and Iulia Motoc, pp. 23-40. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2018.  
6. SECONDARY SOURCES: JOURNAL ARTICLES 
Albrecht, Hans-Jörg “Die Determinanten der Sexualstrafrechtsreform“ (The determinants 
of the criminal law reform), Zeitschrift für die gesamte 
Strafrechtswissenschaft (issue 111[4], 1999): pp. 863-888. 
Alex, Michael “Nachträgliche Sicherungsverwahrung – eine empirische erste 
Bilanz” (retrospective preventive detention a first empirical 
conclusion), Neue Kriminalpolitik (issue 20 [4], 2008): pp. 150-153.  
 “Risikofaktoren für gravierende Rückfalldelinquenz – Nachlese einer 
 84 
Studie zur nachträglichen Sicherungsverwahrung“ (Risk factors for 
serious relapse delinquency - Review of a study on preventive 
detention), Neue Kriminalpolitik (issue 20 [1], 2015): pp. 48-61. 
 “Rückfälligkeit nach nichtangeordneter nachträglicher 
Sicherungsverwahrung“ (Recidivism after non-ordered retrospective 
preventive detention), Forensische Psychiatrie, Psychologie, 
Kriminologie (issue 5, 2011): pp. 244-252. 
Bartsch, Tillmann “Verfassungsgerichtlicher Anspruch und Vollzugswirklichkeit 
Ergebnisse. einer empirischen Studie zum Vollzug der 
Sicherungsverwahrung*“ (Aspirations of the constitutional court and 
reality of execution. Result of an empirical study on the execution of 
preventive detention), Zeitschrift für Internationale 
Strafrechtsdogmatik (issue 6, 2008): pp. 280-293. 
Brodwoski, Dominik “Diskussionsbeiträge der 36. Tagung der deutschsprachigen 
Strafrechtslehrerinnen und Strafrechtslehrer 2015 in Augsburg“ 
(Contributions to the discussion at the 36th Conference of German-
speaking Criminal Law Teachers 2015 in Augsburg), Zeitschrift für 
die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft (issue 127[3], 2015): pp. 691–
736. 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Psychiatrie, Psychotherapie 
und Nervenheilkunde, 
DGPPN (German Society 
for Psychiatry, 
Psychotherapy and 
Neurology) 
“Zur Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts zu den 
Regelungen zur Sicherungsverwahrung vom 04.05.2011. 
Stellungnahme der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Psychiatrie, 
Psychotherapie und Nervenheilkunde (DGPPN)“ (On the decision of 
the Federal Constitutional Court on the rules on preventive detention 
of 04.05.2011. Statement of the German Society for Psychiatry, 
Psychotherapy and Neurology [DGPPN]), der Nervenarzt, (issue 7, 
20119): pp. 933-935). 
Dessecker, Axel “Das neue Recht der Sicheurngsverwahrung: ein erster Überblick“ 
(The new law of preventive detention: a first overview), 
Bewährungshilfe (issue 4, 2013): pp. 309-322. 
Drenkhan, Kristin “Secure Preventive Detention in Germany: Incapacitation or 
Treatment Intervention?”, Behavioral Sciences and the Law (issue 31, 
2013): pp. 312-327. 
Drenkhahn, Kristin and 
Morgenstern, Christine 
“Dabei soll es auf den Namen nicht ankommen – der Streit um die 
Sicherungsverwahrung“ (It should not depend on the name – the 
dispute over preventive detention), Zeitschrift für die gesamte 
Strafrechtswissenschaft (issue 124[1], 2012): pp. 132-203. 
Eisenberg, Ulrich and “Extensive Gesetzesauslegung bei Anordnung von 
 85 
Schlüter, Susanne Sicherungsverwahrung“ (Extensive interpretation of the law when 
ordering preventive detention), Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (issue 
3, 2001): pp. 188-190. 
Gairing, S.K. and de 
Tribolet-Hardy, F. and 
Vohs, K. and Habermeyer, 
E. 
“Sicherungsverwahrte (§ 66 StGB) Merkmale der Täter und ihre 
Bedeutung für die Erfolgsaussichten eines therapeutischen Vollzugs“ 
(Characteristics of offenders in preventive detention (§ 66 StGB) and 
their significance for the prospects of success of therapeutic 
enforcement), Der Nervenarzt, (issue 1, 2013): pp. 65-71. 
Heger, Martin “Diskussionsbeiträge der Strafrechtslehrertagung 2005 in 
Frankfurt/Oder” (Contributions to the discussion at the 2005 criminal 
law teachers' conference in Frankfurt/Oder), Zeitschrift für die 
gesamte Rechtswissenschaft, (issue 117[4], 2005): pp. 865-888. 
Heinrich, Bernd “Die Grenzen des Strafrechts bei der Gefahrprävention. Brauchen 
oder haben wir ein ‚Feindstrafrecht‛?“ (The limits of criminal law in 
the prevention of danger. Do we need or have an “enemy criminal 
law”?), Zeitschfrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft (issue 
121[1], 2009): pp. 94-130. 
Höffler, Katrin “Tätertypen im Strafrecht und in der Kriminologie” (Types of 
offenders in criminal law and criminology), Zeitschrift für die 
gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft (issue 127[4], 2015): pp. 1018-1058. 
Kinzig, Jörg “Das Recht der Sicherungsverwahrung nach dem Urteil des EGMR in 
Sachen M. gegen Deutschland,” (the law governing preventive 
detention after the judgement of the ECtHR in M. v. Germany), Neue 
Zeitschrift für Strafrecht (issue 5, 2010): pp. 233-239. 
 “Die Praxis der Sicherungsverwahrung. Ergebnisse eines empirischen 
Forschungsvorhabens” (The practice of preventive detention. Results 
of an empirical research project), Zeitschrift für die gesamte 
Strafrechtswissenschaft (issue 109[1], 1997): pp. 122-164. 
 “Die Neuordnung des Rechts der Sicherungsverwahrung“ (The 
reorganisation of the law on preventive detention), Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift (issue 4, 2011): pp. 177-182. 
Kröber, Hans-Ludwig  “‚Psychische Störung‘ als Begründung für staatliche Eingriffe in 
Grundrechte des Individuums“ ("Mental disorder" as a justification 
for state encroachment on the fundamental rights of the individual), 
Forensische Psychiatrie, Psychologie, Kriminologie (issue 2011[5]): 
pp. 234–243. 
Laubenthal, Klaus “Die Renaissance der Sicherungsverwahrung“ (The renaissance of 
 86 
preventive detention), Zeitschrift für die gesamte 
Strafrechtswissenschaft (issue 116[3], 2004): pp. 703-750. 
Von List, Franz “Der Zweckgedanke im Strafrecht.” (The purpose-idea in criminal 
law.) Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft (1883): pp. 
1-47. 
 “Die Deterministischen Gegner der Zweckstrafe” (The Deterministic 
Opponents of the Purpose-driven Penalty.) Zeitschrift für die gesamte 
Strafrechtswissenschaft, (1893): pp. 325-370. 
Maelicke, Bernd “Wie Wasser von Klippe zu Klippe geworfen. Plädoyer für einen 
anderen Umgang mit Mehrfach- und Intensivtätern” (Like water 
thrown from cliff to cliff. Plea for another approach to serial and 
intensive offenders) Forensische Psychiatrie, Psychologie, 
Kriminologie, (issue 5, 2011): pp. 215-218. 
Merkel, Grischa "Incompatible Contrasts - Preventive Detention in Germany and the 
European Convention on Human Rights" German Law Journal 
(volume 11, issue 9, September 2010): pp. 1046-1066, 
https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-
core/content/view/1EAD06D2F61B16100E9AA3D7CF9743E8/S207
1832200020095a.pdf/incompatible_contrasts_preventive_detention_i
n_germany_and_the_european_convention_on_human_rights.pdf. 
Nedopil, Norbert “Prognosebegutachtungen bei zeitlich begrenzten Freiheitsstrafen - 
Eine sinnvolle Lösung für problematische Fragestellungen?“ 
(Forecast assessments regarding prison sentences of limited duration - 
A sensible solution for problematic issues?), Neue Zeitschrift für 
Strafrecht (issue 7, 2002): pp. 344-349. 
Nestler, Nina and Wolf, 
Christian 
“Sicherungsverwahrung gem. § 7 Abs. 2 JGG und der 
Präventionsgedanke im Strafrecht – kritische Betrachtung eines 
legislativen Kunstgriffs“ (preventive detention according to Art 7 § 2 
Juvenil Court Act and the idea of prevention in criminal law – critical 
examination of a legislative artifice), Neue Kriminalpolitik (issue 20 
[4], 2008): pp. 153-159. 
Peglau, Jens “Die Sicherungsverwahrung im ‘Dialog’ zwischen EGMR und 
BVerfG” (Preventive detention in the “dialogue” between the ECtHR 
and the German Constitutional Court), Juristische Rundschau (issue 
9, 2016): pp. 491-498.  
 “Zur Anordnung der Sicherungsverwahrung neben lebenslanger 
Freiheitsstrafe“ (On ordering preventive detention in addition to life 
imprisonment), Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (issue 40, 2000): pp. 
 87 
2980-2981. 
Renzikowski, Joachim “Abstand halten! – Die Neuregelung der Sicherungsverwahrung” 
(Keep distance! - The new rules on preventive detention), Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift (issue 23, 2013): pp. 1638-1644. 
Von Schönfeld, C.-E. and 
Schneider, F. and Schröder, 
T. and Widmann, B. and 
Botthof, U. and Diessen, M 
“Prävalenz psychischer Störungen, Psychopathologie und 
Behandlungsbedarf bei weiblichen und männlichen Gefangenen“ 
(Prevalence of mental disorders, psychopathology and treatment 
needs in male and female prisoners), Der Nervenarzt (issue 7, 2006): 
pp. 830-841. 
7. SECONDARY SOURCES: DIFFERENT PUBLISHED RESEARCH AND 
STUDIES 
Alex, Michael and Feltes, 
Thomas 
Sicherungsverwahrung – „Die Gefahr wird extrem überschätzt” 
(Preventive Detention – “The danger is extremely overestimated“), 
writen version of the presentation at the conference 
“Sicherungsverwahrung und Führungsaufsicht – Wie gehen wir mit 
gefährlichen Straftätern um?“ (Preventive detention and supervision 
of conduct – How do we deal with dangerous criminals?”) from 18.-
19.7.2011 in the Evangelischen Akademie Bad Boll. Available on: 
https://www.thomasfeltes.de/pdf/vortraege/2011_Alex_Feltes_Manus
kript_Bad_Boll_kurz.pdf. 
Bundeskriminalamt 
(German Federal Criminal 
Office) 
Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik. Grundtabelle – ohne Tartortverteilung 
ab 1987. 4-stelliger Straftatenschlüssel. V1.0 erstellt am: 04.02.2020 
(Police crime statistics. Basic table - without distribution of places of 
crimes from 1987. 4-digit crime key. V1.0 created on: 04.02.2020). 
Available on: 
https://www.bka.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Publikationen/Polize
ilicheKriminalstatistik/2019/Zeitreihen/Faelle/ZR-F-01-T01-
Faelle_excel2.xlsx?__blob=publicationFile&v=2.  
Dessecker, Axel Lebenslange Freiheitsstrafe und Sicherungsverwahrung. Dauer und 
Gründe der Beendigung in den Jahren 2011 und 2012 mit einer 
Stichtagserhebung zur lebenslangen Freiheitsstrafe (Life 
imprisonment and preventive detention. Duration and reasons for 
termination in 2011 and 2012 with a key date survey on life 
imprisonment). Wiesbaden: Eigenverlag Kriminologische 
Zentralstelle e.V., 2013. Available on: 
https://www.krimz.de/fileadmin/dateiablage/forschung/texte/LF_SV_
2011-12.pdf. 
Dessecker, Axel and Sicherungsverwahrung und vorgelagerte Freiheitsstrafe. Eine 
 88 
Leuschner, Fredericke empirische Untersuchung zur Ausgestaltung der Unterbringung und 
des vorhergehenden Strafvollzugs (Preventive detention and prior 
imprisonment. An empirical study on the design of the detention and 
the previous prison sentence). Wiesbaden: Eigenverlag 
Kriminologische Zentralstelle e.V, 2019. Available on: 
https://www.krimz.de/fileadmin/dateiablage/E-Publikationen/BM-
Online/bm-online14.pdf. 
European Court of Human 
Rights 
Analysis of statistics 2019, January 2020. Available on: 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_analysis_2019_ENG.pdf. 
Eurostat File:Prisoners by 100 000 inhabitants 2017 .png, last modified on 
18.12.2019. Available on: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php?title=File:Prisoners_by_100_000_inhabitants_2
017_.png. 
Statista Number of prisoners under sentence in England and Wales on 31 
March 2019, by length of sentence, published on 24.3.2020. Availble 
on: https://www.statista.com/statistics/283478/prisoners-in-england-
and-wales-by-sentence-lengths/. 
 Strafgefangene nach Vollzugdauer in Deutschland bis 2018 (number 
of prisoners in order of duration of execution of the sentence in 
Germany until 2018), published on 14.1.2020. Available on: 
https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/75829/umfrage/strafgefan
gene-nach-vollzugsdauer-in-deutschland/. 
 
8. SECONDARY SOURCES: OTHER SOURCES 
C.H. Beck, editorial staff 
beck-aktuell  
“BGH: Strafvollzugsbedienstete haften nicht für Straftat eines 
Gefangenen im offenen Vollzug” (Federal Court of Justice: Prison 
officers are not liable for offences committed by a prisoner in open 
prison), 26.11.2019. Available on: 
https://rsw.beck.de/aktuell/meldung/bgh-strafvollzugsbedienstete-
nicht-fuer-toedlich-endende-verkehrsstraftat-eines-strafgefangenen-
im-offenen-vollzug-verantwortlich. 
Council of Europe Report to the German Government on the visit to Germany carried 
out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 20 
November to 2 December 2005, CPT/Inf (2007) 18, 17.4.2007. 
Available on: 
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDC
TMContent?documentId=0900001680696304. 
 89 
 Report to the German Government on the visit to Germany carried 
out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 25 
November to 2 December 2013, CPT/Inf (2014) 23, 24.7.2014. 
Available on: https://www.refworld.org/docid/53d10c124.html. 
ECtHR Registry Judicial Seminar 2020. The Convention as a Living Instrument at 70. 
Background Document. Available on: 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Seminar_background_paper_20
20_ENG.pdf. 
Erstes Deutsches Fernsehen 
(First German TV Channel) 
Zahlen zur Sicherungsverwahrung in Deutschland (numbers 
regarding preventive detention in Germany). Available on: 
https://www.daserste.de/unterhaltung/film/ein-offener-
kaefig/specials/diagramm-zahlen-sicherungsverwahrung-
deutschland100.html. 
Grottendieck, Michael “Forensik. Protest gegen Aufhebung der Ausgangsregelung” 
(Psyiachatric hospital. Protest against the repeal of the day-release 
arrangement), Westfälische Nachrichten, 15.4.2018. Available on: 
https://www.wn.de/Muenster/3253646-Forensik-Protest-gegen-
Aufhebung-der-Ausgangsregelung. 
Manager Magazin “Rezession droht - doch Deutschland schwimmt in Geld” (Recession 
looms - but Germany is swimming in money), 27.8.2019. Available 
on: https://www.manager-
magazin.de/politik/deutschland/deutschland-haushaltsueberschuss-
von-mehr-als-45-milliarden-euro-a-1283807.html.  
Ministerium für Arbeit, 
Gesundheit und Soziales des 
Landes Nordrhein-
Westfalen (Ministry of 
Labour, Health and Social 
Affairs of North Rhine-
Westphalia) 
Maßregelvollzug: Fragen und Antworten (Execution of meassures of 
betterment and prevention, questions and answers). Available on: 
https://www.mags.nrw/massregelvollzug-fragen-und-antworten. 
Accessed 26.5.2020. 
Ministry of Justice United 
Kingdom 
Restricted Patients 2018 England and Wales, p. 1 Available on: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/u
ploads/attachment_data/file/796926/restricted-patients-statistical-
bulletin-2018.pdf. 
Ministry of Justice North 
Rhine-Westphalia 
Gesantkosten des Vollzugs (total costs of the penitentiary system), 
published 2018. Available on: 
https://www.justiz.nrw.de/Gerichte_Behoerden/zahlen_fakten/statisti
 90 
ken/justizvollzug/kosten.pdf.  
Muižnieks, Nils and 
Hammarberg, Thomas and 
Gil-Robles, Álvaro 
“As long as the judicial system of the Russian Federation does not 
become more independent, doubts about its effectiveness remain” 
published in Kommersant 25.2.2016. Available on: 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/as-long-as-the-judicial-
system-of-the-russian-federation-does-not-become-more-
independent-doubts-about-its-effectiveness-remain. 
Open Society Justice 
Initiative 
Briefing Paper. Summary of ECtHR Judgements Presented to the 
Committee of Ministers, November 2015. Available on: 
https://www.justiceinitiative.org/uploads/6015c5b3-2f0d-4288-9a34-
4cbfaf13030f/briefing-summary-echr-judgment-com-20151120.pdf. 
Polakiewicz, Jörg “Europe’s multi-layered human rights protection system: challenges, 
opportunities and risks.” Transcript of lecture at Waseda University 
Tokyo, 14.2016. Available on: 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/dlapil/speeches-of-the-director/-
/asset_publisher/ja71RsfCQTP7/content/europe-s-multi-layered-
human-rights-protection-system-challenges-opportunities-and-
risks?inheritRedirect=false. 
Prison Reform Trust Advice 
and Information Service 
Extended Sentences. Available on: 
http://www.prisonreformtrust.org.uk/Portals/0/Extended%20sentence
s%20information%20sheet.pdf. 
Rath, Christian “Der Trick mit der Therapie” (The trick with the therapy), taz, 
8.1.2016. Available on: https://taz.de/Kommentar-
Sicherungsverwahrung/!5267575/. 
Ringelstein, Ronja “Offender Vollzug für Sicheurngsverwahrte stößt in Berlin auf 
Widerstand“ (open prison for preventve detainees meets with 
resistance in Berlin), der Tagesspiegel, 7.12.2019. Available on: 
https://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/freiheit-mit-restrisiko-offener-
vollzug-fuer-sicherungsverwahrte-stoesst-in-berlin-auf-
widerstand/25309268.html. 
Spektrum.de “Lexikon der Psychologie: Basisraten” (Lexica of psychologie: base-
rates). Available on: 
https://www.spektrum.de/lexikon/psychologie/basisraten/1937. 
Der Spiegel “Gerhard Schröder ‘Sexualstraftäter lebenslang wegsperren‘” 
(Gerhard Schröder “lock up sexual offenders for lifetime“), 
08.07.2001. Available on: 
https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/gerhard-schroeder-
sexualstraftaeter-lebenslang-wegsperren-a-144052.html. 
 91 
Westfalenpost “JVA in Werl overcrowded: places for preventive detainees missing), 
14.11.2019. Available on: https://www.wp.de/region/sauer-und-
siegerland/nrw-will-sicherungsverwahrte-in-rheinland-pfalz-
unterbringen-id227644697.html?service=amp.  
Wiese, Angela “Kommen Sicherungsverwahrte in NRW bald in den offenen 
Vollzug?“ (Are preventive detainees in North Rhine-Westvale 
coming soon into the open enforcement?), Neue Westfälische, 
8.3.2019. Available on: 
https://www.nw.de/nachrichten/thema/22396006_Kommen-
Sicherungsverwahrte-in-NRW-bald-in-den-offenen-
Vollzug.html?fbclid=IwAR1lKHsOJI7VK6-
FLtvybPRhAeEvT1RCBf8y46TTim7Pvu5dVWdj5bf1wYE. 
World Health Organisation International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health 
Problems 10th Revision (ICD-10)-WHO Version for 2019, Chapter V 
Mental and behavioural disorders (F00-F99). Available on: 
https://icd.who.int/browse10/2019/en#/F65. 
 
  
 92 
APPENDIX 1: LENGTH OF INCARCERATION IN GERMANY COMPARED TO 
ENGLAND AND WALES 
1. PRISONERS IN GERMANY ORDERED BY LENGTH OF THE PENALTY 
470
 
                                                 
470
 Source: Statista, Strafgefangene nach Vollzugdauer in Deutschland bis 2018 (number of prisoners in order of 
duration of execution of the sentence in Germany until 2018), published on 14.1.2020. Available on: 
https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/75829/umfrage/strafgefangene-nach-vollzugsdauer-in-deutschland/. 
under 3 months
3 months - 1 
year
more than 1 
year - 5years
more than 5 
years - 15 
years
lifelong 
including 
preventive 
detainees
6.695 20.462 28.951 6.192 2.400
6.193 19.597 28.006 6.119 2.433
6.294 19.775 27.409 5.900 2.500
6.238 19.803 26.564 5.504 2.584
6.165 19.876 26.273 5.201 2.552
5.852 19.180 25.680 4.864 2.497
5.716 18.835 25.065 4.539 2.486
5.854 18.345 23.583 4.272 2.461
5.971 17.194 22.729 4.106 2.412
6.222 16.799 21.594 3.840 2.403
6.072 17.627 21.880 3.672 2.392
5.657 17.232 21.971 3.737 2.360
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Prisoners by length of inprisonment in Germany until 2018 (translation)
Number of prisoners in Germany according to expected duration of execution of the sentence from 2007 to 2018 (cut-off 
date in each case 31.3.)
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Indeterminate custody in Germany including psychiatric hospital
Since the beginning of the nineties also East German numbers are included.
471
 
                                                 
471
 Dessecker and Leuschner, empirical study, supra note 145, p. 7. 
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2. IN DETAIL COMPARISON TO ENGLAND AND WALES 
472
 
 
Germany has 83 million inhabitants. England and Wales have about 59 million inhabitants. 
 
2.1. Long sentences 
Comparing the total of prisoners with long sentences (over 5 years), excluding life sentences: Germany had 3737 
in 2018 and England and Wales had 7.861+6.969+5.163+4.171=24.164 in 2019.  
Germany: 4,5 long time prisoners/100.000 Inhabitants 
England and Wales: 41,0 long time prisoners/100.000 inhabitants. 
This does not even take into account the extended determinate sentences that are probably mostly also above 5 
years. Since 2005 England and Wales have additionally longer prison-sentences for prisoners that are deemed 
                                                 
472
 Source: Statista, Number of prisoners under sentence in England and Wales on 31 March 2019, by length of 
sentence, published on 24.3.2020. Available on: https://www.statista.com/statistics/283478/prisoners-in-england-
and-wales-by-sentence-lengths/. 
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dangerous (“Extended Sentence for Public Protection” till 2012), since 2012 “Extended Determinate 
Sentence”.
473
  
 
2.2. Indeterminate sentences 
England and Wales have also much more indeterminate sentences. 
In Germany 2360 lifelong prisoners and preventive detainees equals 2,8 indeterminate 
sentences/100.000 inhabitants. 
In England and Wales, it is 16,0 indeterminate sentences/100.000 inhabitants. 
The differences cannot be explained with Germany detaining more offenders in psychiatric 
hospitals. 
About 6600 offenders in psychiatric hospitals (see above “Illustration 2”) equals 8,0/100.000 
inhabitants in Germany. Offenders with diminished or no criminal liability in combination 
with dangerousness have to be placed in a psychiatric hospital.
474
 
In England and Wales 4821 restricted patients are detained in hospitals
475
 equals 8,1/100.000 
inhabitants, in 2018. That mental-ill offenders are placed in a hospital, instead of prisons is 
optional in England and Wales.
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 Prison Reform Trust Advice and Information Service. Extended Sentences. Available on: 
http://www.prisonreformtrust.org.uk/Portals/0/Extended%20sentences%20information%20sheet.pdf. 
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 Art. 63 StGB. 
475
 Ministry of Justice United Kingdom. Restricted Patients 2018 England and Wales, p. 1 Available on: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/796926/restrict
ed-patients-statistical-bulletin-2018.pdf.  
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 Ibid., p. 2.  
